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The disintegration of Indonesia’s New Order regime in 1998 put an end to the crude forms of 
centralised authoritarianism and economic protectionism that were essential for the emergence 
and rise of large Chinese conglomerates, which have dominated the country’s private sector. 
What were the consequences of the democratic transition for Chinese big business? How do 
business groups adapt to changes in the political environment? Despite massive problems and 
contrary to expectations, most of the major capitalist groups have in fact succeeded in getting 
through the economic and political crisis that brought down Soeharto, and are now presiding 
over refashioned but still thriving corporations. This study identifies the strategies the tycoons 
employed to survive in an unfamiliar, initially threatening post-authoritarian regime, thereby 
revealing the dynamics of power and the particular structural position of big business in the 
post-Soeharto Indonesian political economy.  
I argue that it is important to take the ethnicity of private capital in Indonesia into consid-
eration, which – since colonial times – has been ‘Chinese’. Discriminatory policies marginal-
ised this ethnic minority both socially and politically, confining it to distinctively economic 
functions. A small group of Sino-Indonesian capitalists was thus ideally suited to be co-opted 
as business clients of the New Order powerholders from 1966 onwards. Without direct access 
to political power, these ‘limited capitalists’ could not pose a threat to the state managers and 
were therefore nurtured to grow into huge business groups. The combination of economic 
strength and political weakness allowed them to become an integral part of the New Order rul-
ing oligarchy, in which the politico-bureaucrats prevailed. 
The financial crisis of 1997/1998, eventually, rendered this accommodation no longer fea-
sible. It caused significant damage to the business groups, brought them close to collapsing, 
and unravelled the regime that had provided protection. The democratisation, decentralisation, 
and deregulation push of the post-Soeharto reformasi governments appeared on the surface to 
be detrimental to the continuing existence and business success of most New Order era con-
glomerates. However, this study shows that the Chinese tycoons have in fact benefited tremen-
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dously from the changed political conditions. The new regime could not ignore their capital 
due to its indispensability to an Indonesian economy re-emerging from deep crisis. Continui-
ties in Indonesia’s predatory form of capitalism as well as the discontinuation of overtly anti-
Chinese policies allowed the major business groups to survive, recoup their losses, and even 
placed them in a position to help determine future economic and political directions. Tradi-
tional modes of conducting political business, along with the significant rise of money politics, 
enhanced the Chinese capitalists’ bargaining power and provided the setting for the emancipa-
tion of the businessmen from their former bureaucratic patrons.  
I suggest that reformasi did not, as widely expected, terminate the rule of the old politico–
business oligarchy, but prompted a change of power relations between the two contending 
fractions in favour of capital. In-depth observations and a thorough analysis of the Indonesian 
political economy after the demise of Soeharto will substantiate that the former bureaucracy-
controlled alliance has now given way to one that has more plutocratic characteristics – where 
a relatively autonomous business class rose to an increasingly dominant position within the 
prevailing constellation of power. This study thus highlights an important case of big business 
response to new political conditions and contributes to our understanding of the exercise of 
capital’s power in and over the state.  
  
1 
‘Money politics will be less and less in our open, 
more democratic economy. […] We are heading 
towards an improved capitalism.’ 
(Former President Abdurrahman Wahid)1 
‘It is part of my responsibility to help the country to 
democratize. […] We are built to become the main 
engine of democracy in Indonesia.’ 
(Artha Graha Group boss Tomy Winata)2 
1 
INTRODUCTION: 
CAPITAL AND THE STATE 
Plutocracy, literally, means the rule of wealth. This study analyses the transformations in In-
donesia from a bureaucratic regime to one which is plutocratic. It will demonstrate how the 
hierarchy inside the state–business oligarchy shifted in favour of capital. 
One may argue that all societies are ruled by the wealthy (e.g. Miliband 1969: 23). How-
ever, this assertion is too general, as state power may also be held by groups that establish 
their power and authority on sources other than capital. Indonesia during the rule of the so-
called New Order (1966–98) was one such case. This regime was by and large dominated by 
bureaucrats, while the predominantly Chinese capitalists were politically restricted. The more 
distinct characteristics of plutocracy in post-authoritarian Indonesia thus need to be defined in 
contrast to the previous regime that was in power until the financial crisis in 1997/1998, in 
which politico-bureaucrats were a dominant part of the ruling alliance that prevailed. 
To suggest the emergence of a plutocratic regime is not in line with commonly purported 
assessments of the post-crisis development of Indonesia. Mackie’s evaluation represents the 
widespread expectation of the end of Chinese big business, common especially during the 
immediate post-Soeharto years:  
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 Interview 17 September 2004.  
2
 Interview 27 September 2004. 
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Soeharto […] and his major cukong (Chinese financial backers; cronies) have crashed into the 
dustbin of history. (Most of the top 20 or 30 are either bankrupt, or nearly so, in any case, and 
no doubt many hundreds or even thousands more.)  
(Mackie 1999: 189) 
One of the major spokespersons of Chinese Indonesian businessmen3, Sofjan Wanandi (inter-
view 1 July 2003), concurred with this appraisal and commented on my research project: 
‘Chinese big business? Don’t waste your time. They are all bankrupt!’ 
Indeed, the events during the upheavals in 1998 painted a fairly desperate picture for these 
capitalists. Demonstrators held the conglomerates responsible for the economic crisis, politi-
cians used them as scapegoats, and rioters destroyed corporate and private property of the big 
tycoons. With the fall of long-time dictator Soeharto in May 1998, the regime that estab-
lished, promoted, and protected them came to an end. The new political environment was per-
ceived as being full of unpredictable threats to the interests of big businesses. The sudden dis-
sipation of the authoritarian, centralised, and protectionist features of the New Order made 
Chinese capitalists not only vulnerable to bankruptcy or, at least, to an enforced partial set-
tlement of their gargantuan debts, but also to a general reorganisation of the Indonesian econ-
omy without them. The immense amount of capital that left Indonesia during the crisis – es-
timated to range up to US$165 billion (Merdeka 6 June 1998) – as well as the exodus of most 
major tycoons who sought shelter in Singapore, Australia, or elsewhere, testified to their pes-
simistic perception of the situation in 1998. The end of the New Order was thus widely re-
garded as possibly heralding the end of Chinese big business. 
However, a few years after the crisis, the boss of Indonesia’s largest conglomerate, An-
thony Salim (interview 13 April 2005), claimed that his companies were ‘in fact not only not 
affected but thriving because of the new conditions’. Reports on other conglomerates and es-
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 As a matter of fact, there is no single woman in the upper echelons of Indonesian big business (and 
rarely outside). Hence I use ‘businessmen’ interchangeably with capitalists. 
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timations by most of my respondents presented the same judgement on the state of Chinese 
big business. Reformasi, as the post-Soeharto period is called (maybe too euphemistically), 
obviously failed to disrupt many of the structural foundations of the New Order regime and 
disempower the oligarchy that presided over it. 
The main question is thus how the capitalists proceeded to recover, regain economic 
strength, and reinvent themselves in a post-authoritarian political environment. How has big 
business adapted to the monumental political changes in Indonesia? How does the re-
emergence of capital affect the state, particularly its managers? Understanding the political 
economy of Chinese big business in Indonesia and its development after 1998 will help us to 
better comprehend the current nature of relations between capital and the state. 
  
1.1 Focus and definitions 
A study on ‘Chinese big business’ and the state requires careful definitions of its objects and 
scope of research. Three analytical dimensions have to be clarified, before I elaborate on my 
central argument: first, the ‘Chinese’ ethnicity of the capitalists in Indonesia, second, the type 
of ‘big business’ that is of concern here, and third, how I conceive concepts such as state, re-
gime, and government. I will differentiate this study from other approaches to the Chinese 
minority and explain its specific focus on the largest of these conglomerates. 
 
The Chineseness of capital 
When speaking of ‘Chinese’, I refer to Indonesians who define themselves as ‘orang Tiong-
hoa’/Chinese Indonesians and are seen by others as ‘Chinese’.4 Ethnic Chinese have been liv-
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 As it is only a constructed identity, ‘Chinese’ should ideally always have quotation marks. However, 
for readability reasons, this will not be done here. 
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ing in Indonesia for generations, if not centuries. It is often impossible to find differences be-
tween them and the Indonesians regarded as indigenous, the so-called pribumi. Most of the 
Sino-Indonesians have Indonesian names, use the Indonesian language, are Indonesian citi-
zens, and have never been outside Indonesia. However, until 1998 they constituted the ‘non-
pribumi’, the counterpart of the pribumi-majority. This ‘non-asli’ (‘not original’) attribute not 
only legally marked the Chinese as outsiders of the nation, but constituted the dominant social 
reality in Indonesia. In many ways, be it in the institutional enactment of discriminatory laws 
and unfair practices or publicly in riots, the exclusion of the Chinese took place (Chua 2002). 
As I will point out in Chapter 3, the ‘Chinese problem’ – manifest in state-sanctioned dis-
crimination – seriously affected the social position of Indonesia’s major capitalists in the New 
Order. Similarly decisive for capital was the relative but general de-marginalisation of Sino-
Indonesians from 1998 onwards. It is for that reason that I apply the commonly used label 
‘Chinese’ to refer to big business and to entrepreneurs whose ancestors migrated from China, 
even though I explicitly seek to analytically de-link the Chinese tycoons from the Chinese 
minority, with whom they do not share more than the same ethnic ascription. To treat them as 
one group would mean to neglect their material heterogeneity and eventually reproduce the 
effective construction of ethnicity by the New Order.  
The pervasiveness of the latter was highlighted by the widespread equation of ‘ordinary’ 
Chinese Indonesians with the big businessmen. The common assertion that ‘the Chinese con-
stitute only 3.5 percent of the population but control 70 percent of Indonesia’s economy’ (Far 
Eastern Economic Review 28 May 1998: 21) was constantly repeated by politicians (e.g. 
Habibie, cited in Suryadinata 1999: 11) and appeared in popular literature and imagination as 
well as in academic works (e.g. Huntington 1996: 170). Backman’s description of the eco-
nomic domination of ethnic Chinese is worth being quoted at length, as it gives a good exam-
ple of how the whole Chinese minority is represented by the wealth of a few tycoons.  
Apart from Japan and South Korea, business in Asia largely consists of ethnic Chinese busi-
nesses. In South-East Asia, they absolutely dominate business and yet, form only a small minor-
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ity of the population. Approximately 6% of the combined population of the five main South-
East Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) is ethni-
cally Chinese, but this 6% controls perhaps as much as 70% of the region’s private corporate 
wealth. This tiny minority also accounts for all but one of the 18 South-East Asia billionaires 
identified by Forbes magazine in 2000. The dominance of the Chinese is perhaps at its greatest 
in Indonesia. In fact, of Indonesia’s top 300 conglomerates just prior to the 1997-98 economic 
crisis, 217 (72%) were either wholly or mostly owned by Indonesian-Chinese – not a bad result 
for an ethnic group that comprises just 3.5% of the country’s population. 
(Backman 2001: 193-4) 
The powerful position of the Chinese billionaires is without question; what is problematic was 
that the remaining 6 million5 Sino-Indonesians were considered to be as powerful, wealthy, 
and exploitative. As I pointed out elsewhere (Chua 2004b), this prejudice provided the poli-
tico-bureaucratic powerholders of the New Order with the possibility to depict the constantly 
intensifying economic conflict in Indonesia as an ethnic one between the ‘indigenous’ and the 
Chinese, using the latter as a buffer to deflect criticism of the regime. To instrumentalise Chi-
nese ethnicity, ‘Chineseness’ therefore had to be constantly constructed and negatively stig-
matised. 
Every study – as well as every newspaper report or magazine article – on Chinese capital 
in Indonesia bears the risk of fostering anti-Chinese stereotypes. Although I only use the eth-
nic marker in a descriptive way that does not refer to any innate ethnic characteristics, nor 
implicate a primordial belonging of the capitalists to a certain ethnic group, I would have pre-
ferred to omit the adjective ‘Chinese’ totally. However, the ‘Chineseness’ of big business in 
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 This figure is based on the 1930 census that saw the ratio of ethnic Chinese at 2 to 3 per cent. Accord-
ing to Suryadinata’s and Ananta’s interpretation of the 2000 population census, this ratio decreased to 
only 1.5 per cent (i.e. 3 million) (Suryadinata et al. 2003: 73-101). Their estimation, however, is most 
likely too low as it only includes the ones who defined themselves as Chinese and who admitted this – 
after decades of having to keep quiet about ethnicity – in a census. The accurate number will be higher, 
probably somewhere in the order of 5 to 6 million (Mackie 2005: 101). Nonetheless, the conventional 
definition of ‘ethnic Chinese’ needs to be reconsidered, as ethnic boundaries (see Barth 1969) are con-
stantly shifting.  
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Indonesia is a social fact and of utmost relevance for this research inasmuch it explains the 
politically weak position of the capitalists during the New Order and the changes due to the 
reforms after the crisis. The inclusion of the ethnic dimension (see Chapter 2) thus makes it 
inevitable to speak of and focus on ‘Chinese big business’.  
 
Chinese ‘big business’ 
Braudel (2002: 23-5) distinguished between the subsistence, market, and capitalist sectors of 
the economy. Only in the latter has capital appropriated the means of production; their owners 
are the capitalists, who command huge amounts of capital and participate in complex opera-
tions to accumulate profits and substantiate their wealth. This is the group of people whose 
power this thesis seeks to assess, thereby regarding the main vehicles of capital in Indonesia, 
the conglomerates, not as a power in themselves, but as ‘a particular way in which capitalists 
organize their wealth’ (Greenfield, cited in Wood 2003: 12-13). I refer to them as ‘Chinese 
big business’. 
Although ‘big business’ might be considered too vague a term, it has the advantage in that 
it addresses the largest corporations of any particular space and time. Significant Chinese 
businesses have been existent since colonial times. However, only from 1966 onwards did 
they assume the form of large business groups, or ‘conglomerates’. In fact, 23 of the 30 big-
gest groups in 1996 were established during the New Order (Sato 2004: 25; see also Appendi-
ces, Table 1).6 According to Sato’s (1994: 112) definition, a business group can be regarded 
as a conglomerate if more than five companies are owned by the same or related persons. The 
founder, or his successor, and his family are the centre of the highly diversified group, with 
many – not necessarily related – ventures clustered around one or several core business fields. 
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 Most conglomerates, however, were founded upon single companies that already existed before.  
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Another term for the owners of conglomerates is ‘tycoon’ – ‘businessmen of extraordinary 
wealth and power’ (Mackie 1991: 83).  
For this study, the 20 to 30 largest conglomerates in the last years of the New Order – in 
terms of their annual turnover rates – are at the centre of attention (see Appendices, Table 1). 
This range is somewhat arbitrary, but there are valid reasons for narrowing down the scope: 
First, the annual sales of the top 30 groups were significantly higher than those of lower rank-
ing business groups. Second, there was a consensus between interviewed experts and busi-
nessmen on the frontiers of ‘big business’. Their notion of conglomerates belonging to that 
category broadly coincided with Sato’s (1994: 121) list of ‘top groups’ vis-à-vis the ‘secon-
dary top groups’ on ranks 20 to 47 of her table. However, it is not relevant – and not possible, 
for that matter (see Chapter 1.3) – to have exact criteria to clearly demarcate the largest con-
glomerates. ‘Big’ are the groups that are considered to be the biggest in comparison to other 
businesses of the country. 
In 1996, there were, besides Chinese conglomerates, three other types of private domestic 
business groups that were listed in the top 30: two conglomerates (Bimantara and Humpuss) 
mainly owned by the Soeharto family (the so-called Cendana Group7), one by an ethnic In-
dian (Texmaco), and one by a pribumi businessman (Bakrie). These groups emerged under 
different conditions than Chinese businesses. They were not subject to the same constraints 
and policies that determined the role of the Chinese. Especially the capitalists from the presi-
dent’s family, who effectively depicted themselves as pribumi entrepreneurs, founded their 
rise upon immediate proximity to the bureaucratic state apparatus and Soeharto’s central posi-
tion within it. They were first and foremost bureaucrats or families of bureaucrats, who trans-
formed themselves into capitalists. This study will not deal with them particularly.  
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 Soeharto’s family’s enterprises were named after the street where the president’s house was located 
(i.e. Jalan Cendana in Menteng, Jakarta). 
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Even though Soeharto family business interests were to be particularly ubiquitous by the 
1990s in most major business deals, ‘indigenous capital’ was indeed rather negligible in terms 
of quantity and significance. In contrast, Chinese owned corporations – including business gi-
ants such as the Salim Group, Astra International, and Sinar Mas – constituted by far the larg-
est ones and the absolute majority of the top enterprises. In 1996, 26 conglomerates of the top 
30 could be categorised as ‘Chinese big business’. Together, their sales added up to about 30 
per cent of the Indonesian GDP (Rachbini 1999: 32). Hence, it is not just the immense impor-
tance of Chinese private capital for Indonesia’s economy, but also the specific perspective of 
this study on the political economy of ‘ethnic business’ (Jomo & Folk 2003) that justifies an 
exclusive focus on the largest Chinese corporations.  
 
States and regimes 
The modern capitalist state, I suggest, is structurally determined by the specific requirements 
of the capitalist mode of production that, in turn, imposes particular functions upon the state. 
Its main objective is the provision of favourable conditions for the private accumulation of 
capital, through which it ensures its own financial subsistence and indispensability. Therefore, 
the state might impose impediments for individual capitalists or against the short-term inter-
ests of capital in general; it might also make concessions to non-capitalist classes and imple-
ment or strengthen workers’ rights; however, these essential mediations between propertied 
and unpropertied classes merely safeguard the long-term interests of capital in general that 
many particular capitalists do not even pursue (Altvater 1972). Essential for this system is the 
state’s authority and legitimacy through coercion and ideological hegemony, which Gramsci 
(1971: 244) defines as ‘the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which 
the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active 
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consent of those over whom it rules’. Because ‘the ruling ideas of any age are the ideas of the 
ruling class’8 (Marx & Engels 1969: 47), citizens of all classes subscribe, or are forced to sub-
scribe, to the capitalist logic of permanent capital accumulation, regarding – and experiencing 
through income, jobs, and stability – that everything that is good for the economy is also good 
for the individual. 
The state and its managers, the bureaucrats, are thus crucial for capital. The specific char-
acteristics of states are manifestations of the relative positions of the bureaucracy and capital. 
The bureaucrats represent the state apparatus and form its government, the ‘legislative and 
executive branch of the state apparatus and those officials, parties and individuals who oc-
cupy its offices’ (Robison & Hadiz 2004: 17). But ultimately, power in the modern capitalist 
state resides with the capitalists. Their major advantage is that they possess the means of capi-
tal accumulation. They are thus the keepers of structural power. Similar to a ‘board of com-
missioners’, the supervisory board of Indonesian companies, they usually do not interfere in 
day-to-day affairs, but they ensure that the long-term vision and interests of the corporation 
are abided and, in the event they see significant deviations from corporate values and inter-
ests, they can veto the course chosen by the board of directors. In certain ventures, the com-
missioners might be more powerful than the main executives, intervening directly or taking 
over the directors’ board or at least their decisions. In others, the supervisory board is muted, 
or co-opted in ways it loses its critical distance and potential to interfere. This is similar to 
capitalist states, where the exact form of political influence of capital is highly variable and 
contingent on the political regime. During the New Order, for instance, capital had to accept 
its limited and subordinate position. However, I argue that the capitalist class in post-Soeharto 
Indonesia achieved a more powerful position in relation to the officials of the state than it had 
during the New Order. 
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 Original (written 1845/46): ‘Die Gedanken der herrschenden Klasse sind in jeder Epoche die herr-
schenden Gedanken’.  
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In most cases, despite all inter-fractional power struggles, capital and bureaucrats form an 
alliance of varying hierarchy, dependency, and proximity. This can develop into a relative co-
hesive state–business oligarchy, as it was the case in New Order Indonesia. A complete re-
moval of this oligarchy from power would require a new system, which, however, can only be 
realised if the general hierarchies of power are turned upside down, as it only happens 
through revolutions. As long as the material conditions of capitalist systems remain widely 
unaffected, power structures as outlined above will continue to prevail. 
Regime changes will effectuate not more than a rearrangement of the internal hierarchy in-
side the oligarchy. Hence, a new regime comprises nothing but a modified institutional 
framework to organise the power of the state. It constitutes only a change in the personnel of 
the state and its style, or, as Marx & Engels (1961: 8) termed it, the ‘legal and political super-
structure’ that arises ‘on the economic structure of society, the real foundation’9. The New 
Order was therefore one regime, and reformasi Indonesia produced another one. As I will 
demonstrate, the reforms failed to change the underlying class structures of capitalism that 
enabled the rule of the oligarchy. Instead, they made it stronger and thus increased capital’s 
resilience in yet another regime.  
 
                                                     
 
9
 Marx & Engels (1961: 9) further emphasised that ‘in studying such transformations it is always nec-
essary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, 
which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic 
or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it 
out.’ 
Original (published 1859): ‘Die Gesamtheit dieser Produktionsverhältnisse bildet die ökonomische 
Struktur der Gesellschaft, die reale Basis, worauf sich ein juristischer und politischer Überbau erhebt 
und welcher bestimmte gesellschaftliche Bewußtseinsformen entsprechen. […] In der Betrachtung sol-
cher Umwälzungen muß man stets unterscheiden zwischen der materiellen, naturwissenschaftlich treu 
zu konstatierenden Umwälzung in den ökonomischen Produktionsbedingungen und den juristischen, 
politischen, religiösen, künstlerischen oder philosophischen, kurz, ideologischen Formen, worin sich 
die Menschen dieses Konflikts bewußt werden und ihn ausfechten. 
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1.2 Central argument: The emergence of plutocracy 
What are the consequences of the regime change in 1998 for Chinese big business? Why – 
and how – were the conglomerates able to survive in a dramatically changed environment? I 
argue that the new democratised reformasi regime facilitated the emergence of plutocracy in 
Indonesia. It did not, as widely expected, terminate the rule of the power bloc consisting of 
politico-bureaucrats and Chinese capitalists, but it prompted a change of power relations be-
tween the two fractions in favour of capital. The oligarchy in which politico-bureaucrats and 
their families tended to dominate has now given way to one that is composed in a more pluto-
cratic fashion – where big business will tend to run the show more unabashedly. 
In the New Order, the politico-bureaucrats held instrumental power over the state, success-
fully maintaining their dominance through a sophisticated regime of authoritarianism, central-
ism, and collusion. One integral component of their largely unchallenged rule was the subju-
gation of the capitalists, who were effectively limited by being labelled ‘Chinese’ – a stigma 
that linked them with a socially marginalised ethnic minority and prevented their access to di-
rect power. The Chinese tycoons were thus appropriate partners to be raised and co-opted as 
compliant partners in a bureaucracy dominated oligarchy. This was, after all, a price they 
were willing to pay to maintain a stake in a predatory, extremely profitable symbiosis with the 
state, whose managers allowed and supported them to establish enormous conglomerates that 
dominated the country’s private sector. The crisis, however, forced an end to this accommo-
dation. 
I further argue that the Chinese tycoons benefited most from the democratisation, decen-
tralisation, and deregulation efforts of the reformasi period. While the disintegration of the 
New Order seriously disrupted the oligarchy’s bases of authority – and with it the power con-
figurations thought to be essential for Chinese business success – the new regime could not do 
without the Chinese capitalists due to their economic indispensability to an Indonesian econ-
omy re-emerging from deep crisis. The resulting continuities allowed the major business 
groups to survive, recoup their losses, and even help determine the course of post-Soeharto 
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Indonesia, enabling them to steadily distance themselves from bureaucratic patrons, extend 
their autonomy, and perhaps to rise to a more overtly dominant position within the ruling alli-
ance. 
By showing how the conglomerates dealt with the unravelling of the New Order and its 
centralised network of patronage, this thesis will demonstrate that the Chinese tycoons man-
aged to reorganise in post-Soeharto Indonesia, and that their interests and actions have paved 
the way for a more plutocratic regime. The study will thus highlight an important case in 




This study provides a sociological analysis of the relations between the state and capital in 
post-Soeharto Indonesia, focussing on the intangible, unquantifiable question of power. More 
specifically, this study scrutinises the political economy of those who hold power in Indone-
sia. This is per se a tricky task, as research on the rich and powerful in general has to deal 
with the problem of inaccessibility. In most cases, these people form an exclusive club that 
makes participant observation or other in-depth scrutiny rather difficult, if the researcher her-
/himself does not belong to this class. 
In the specific context of Indonesia, there are additional problems in studying capital be-
cause of the Chinese predominance in the capitalist sector. As in the case of most societies 
where entrepreneurial activities are undertaken as a family business, there is a tendency for 
ethnic Chinese in business to function like a closed society, making it difficult to have access 
to them for research purposes, as Diao & Tan (2001: 141) observed. Another, probably more 
important reason for this reluctance may be found in the particular political conditions for 
Chinese capital during the New Order, where it was generally forbidden to talk about race, re-
ligion, ethnic groups, and class (the so-called SARA-taboo; see van Dijk 1994). To address 
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Chineseness was even more sensitive, as anti-Sinicism and anti-government feelings increas-
ingly overlapped during the evolution of the New Order, turning criticism against the con-
glomerates into a powerful political tool against the state elite. Therefore only a little, filtered 
information on Chinese businesses reached the public, while at the same time most of the 
Chinese tycoons kept a very low profile. Public relations efforts were unknown, and indeed 
not needed. The authoritarian, protectionist regime made it possible to do without them. An-
other reason for the shortage of facts and figures is the rather late development of private cor-
porations in Indonesia, which only became significant through the economic policies at the 
outset of the New Order in the late 1960s. Hence, the establishment of a stock exchange, usu-
ally the major source of information of this kind, came in late as well. Useful data on this ba-
sis is only available for the last decade of the New Order. As Sato (1994: 102) pointed out, 
this led to a scarcity of research interest in private capital in Indonesia. 
The new political situation has not brought significant changes in this regard. Most Chi-
nese businessmen still shy away from publicity, if not because of state policies or political 
sensitivity, then because of a general aversion to reveal strategies to others. The struggle for 
survival and the settlement of their debts with the Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency 
(IBRA) constituted a further reason not to disclose the actual property situation and the modi-
fied structure of a business group. The end of authoritarianism has put the conglomerates at 
the centre of attention of journalists and politicians alike, which increased the secretiveness of 
the actors.10 On the other hand, the relative openness of post-Soeharto Indonesia provided 
new sources of information that balanced the lack of data for the New Order. These could be 
                                                     
 
10
 No ranking has been published since 1997. My own attempts to compile data for an updated list 
failed, due to a situation still very much in flux, the lack of suitable sources, and endeavours of busi-
ness groups to hide their actual size and constitution. With this I share the same experience as econo-
mists (e.g. M. Chatib Basri, Universitas Indonesia, interview 12 May 2004), journalists (e.g. Eddy Su-
prapto, Kontan/Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, interview 8 September 2004), or even specifically ap-
pointed government watchdogs (e.g. Raden Pardede, Vice President Director of State-owned Asset 
Management Company PPA, interview 20 October 2004), who sought to, but were not yet able to pro-




used to supplement the insights of the few seminal works on capital before 1998, most impor-
tantly Robison’s (1986) and Shin’s (1989) studies on ‘the rise of capital’ and ‘capitalists-in-
formation’ respectively. Established business magazines such as SWA, Eksekutif, Warta Eko-
nomi, or Kontan, and the political magazines Tempo or Gatra, as well as the international 
press (e.g. Far Eastern Economic Review) re-opened several closed cases of the past and fo-
cussed – together with the many Indonesian newspapers (such as Jakarta Post, Bisnis Indone-
sia, or Kompas) – their gaze on Chinese big business of the present. In addition to this, infor-
mation found in compilations of Data Consult (1998) or in business reports, company files, 
annual reports, and statistics provided further material to consider, although such data was 
subject to the same constraints and biases as mentioned before and, more often than not, 
lacked explanatory power as well as sufficient reliability. 
These sources had to be verified through direct observation as well as through that of oth-
ers, which were best disclosed in talks with (ordinary) Indonesians, in commentaries, 
speeches, articles, and statements of activists, critics, journalists, politicians, and experts. I 
conducted interviews with seven politicians (among them former President Abdurrahman 
Wahid and former Minister of Finance Bambang Subiyanto), seven journalists, and 21 
economists or other academics (see Appendices). In order to concretise the abstract concept 
of ‘capital’, I further sought to meet the persons who represent capital, i.e. the capitalists. Due 
to greater accessibility, I first focussed on the ones who work for Chinese big business at the 
highest managerial level. I interviewed 12 business persons, of whom nine were high ranking 
executives or board members of the conglomerates or one of their companies, among them 
the President Directors of Indomobil and Lippo Investments, the Managing Director of Sam-
poerna, President Commisioners of Bank Central Asia and Bank Artha Graha, and Commis-
sioners of Lippo Group, Lippo Bank, Bank Internasional Indonesia, and Bank Artha Graha. 
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In addition, I intended to meet the bosses of the top groups in Indonesia, even though ac-
cess was a serious problem.11 The interviews that I eventually conducted with some of the 
most important capitalists in Indonesia today – Anthony Salim (Salim Group), Tomy Winata 
(Artha Graha Group), Eddie Lembong (Pharos Group, also Chair of the Chinese Indonesian 
Association INTI), and Sofjan Wanandi (Gemala Group, also Chair of the Indonesian Em-
ployers Association APINDO) – delivered a wealth of information that I would not have 
found elsewhere and helped to verify or repudiate hypotheses and substantiate my interpreta-
tions. 
 Altogether, I conducted 62 semi-structured interviews with 51 persons. However, the 
challenge was to put this kind of information together with the other bits and pieces, to evalu-
ate and analyse them and combine my own assessments with the reflections and judgements 
of these and other observers. 
 
1.4 Outline 
Chapter 1 has briefly outlined the major questions, the focus, the central argument, and the 
methodology of this study. The following chapters will provide theoretical, historical, and 
empirical analyses to explain the course of capital before, in, and after the crisis. 
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 It was immensely difficult to finally get in contact with the manager-owners of the conglomerates. 
As a general rule, it was essential to know somebody who referred you to someone else who was a 
friend of a friend of the respective businessmen. Thereafter, I had to send in letters, emails, or faxes, 
find out the number of the personal secretary, call her, submit another fax, call the office again, wait for 
a return call, call again, send in a third fax that – in case I was lucky – got through to the boss, who 
then decided if he had some time to spare with a young and unimportant researcher. (It helped that the 
businessmen regarded me as ‘one of them’ in terms of Chinese Indonesian ethnicity, that I am German, 
that I studied in Singapore, or that I was attached to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies – 
or a combination thereof. This, presumably, made me more trustworthy in their eyes.) Usually, I first 
had to talk to a proxy. One of them obviously recommended to his boss not to talk to me, even though 
the interview was already scheduled. For another conversation, I flew back to Jakarta twice, only to be 
told – while already waiting for the respondent in his office – that he was too tired to be interviewed by 
me, or, the following time, that he was in Singapore (where I just came from) and thus could not meet 




Chapter 2 discusses theoretical perspectives on capital and the state, including culturalist 
and structuralist models. It presents an approach appropriate to scrutinising the special power 
relations between Chinese capitalists and the bureaucratic elite. 
Chapter 3 contains the historical background with an emphasis on the New Order accom-
modation. It depicts the Chinese businessmen as ‘limited capitalists’, who became part of the 
bureaucratic oligarchy but lacked appropriate political power.  
Chapter 4 seeks to understand the conglomerates during the crisis. Without the authoritar-
ian, centralised, and protectionist New Order regime they had to face serious constraints that 
endangered their existence in reformasi Indonesia. 
Chapter 5 scrutinises the reactions of capital to the reforms. The crisis turned out to be not 
too detrimental; on the contrary, most conglomerates not only managed to survive and con-
solidate, but also moulded the new post-Soeharto regime significantly.  
Chapter 6 analyses the changing role of Chinese big business in a more democratic, decen-
tralised, and deregulated political and economic environment. It points out that capital found 
new formats of representation and successfully dominated the post-crisis modes of political 
business. 
Chapter 7 summarises the findings and relates the empirical observations of Chapters 4 to 
6 to the historical background as well as to the theoretical framework. It further outlines fu-





POWER CONFIGURATIONS OF STATE AND CAPITAL 
The state, according to Brown (1994: xii-xix), determines the boundaries, content, and char-
acter of ethnicity by translating ‘sometimes minor linguistic graduations or physical variations 
into cultural boundary markers which are believed to be intrinsically significant and clearly 
demarcated’. In the case of Indonesia, the constructed pribumi nation and the assumed soli-
darity of a ‘kinship community’ became the ‘psychological and political ideology’ against the 
Chinese as internal enemy (Brown 1994: xviii-xix). Ethnic policies as tools of state power 
limited the capitalists in Indonesia significantly. Hence, it is imperative to ask who imple-
mented these policies and who benefited from them, or, in a more general sense, who holds 
control over the state. Traditional class-based accounts have difficulties in attributing power 
to any non-capitalist class and should therefore be modified to appropriately evaluate the New 
Order with its weak Chinese business element. To expand definitions of the ‘ruling class’ will 
thus help in assessing the role of Chinese capitalists vis-à-vis state bureaucracy. 
To lay out an appropriate theoretical framework, it is first necessary to discuss the existing 
literature on Chinese Indonesian capitalists. I shall argue that both culturalist and structuralist 
perspectives provide useful foci that only in combination deliver a fuller picture. While my 
study employs a political economy approach, it does not disregard the question of ethnicity. 
The main objective of this chapter is to provide the analytical tools to assess the power 
configurations during the New Order and understand the changes brought about by reformasi. 
For this, the ruling class has to be identified. Generally, as a review of state theories will 
show, capitalists are considered to be the ruling class in capitalist societies. In New Order In-
donesia, however, this proposition was questionable, as political authority lay exclusively 
with the state politico-bureaucrats, while capital, predominantly Chinese, was confined to act 
inside strictly demarcated boundaries.  
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I suggest that the rulers of New Order Indonesia can be regarded as a complex power bloc 
consisting of powerful politico-bureaucrats and politically restricted Chinese capitalists that 
together formed an oligarchy under the hegemony of the bureaucracy. This oligarchy, how-
ever, was prone to change, especially after the state managers were considerably weakened 
through new dynamics induced by the economic crisis of 1997/1998. Capital, no doubt, was 
also badly wounded, but salient elements have been able to rebound with the help of new 
strategies. By means of a typology of capitalist systems I will spell out the characteristics of 
state–business relations during the New Order and outline potential models towards which the 
post-Soeharto Indonesian state is developing.  
 
2.1 Approaches to Chinese Indonesian capitalists 
Very often Chinese businesses were identified as the main engine of growth during the aston-
ishing boom of the Southeast Asian economies until 1997. However, what facilitated their 
business success? Was it due to their ethnicity and its manifestations in values and behaviour 
patterns, or were the deep-seated structures of capitalism and the role of capitalists (that hap-
pened to be Chinese) within them more important? The answers given came from a broad 
range of disciplines, most notably from scholars working in the frameworks of cultural stud-
ies, business administration, economics, and political economy. They can be differentiated 
into culturalist perspectives on Chinese businessmen as part of the Chinese minority and 
structuralist perspectives on Chinese capital as part of the capitalist class.  
 
Culturalist perspectives 
Most experts on the Chinese minority in Indonesia tend to disregard class considerations and 
focus mainly on the culture and behaviour of the Sino-Indonesians. The first comprehensive 
monograph on this topic was Purcell’s (1951) study on ‘The Chinese in Southeast Asia’. With 
this early work he carved out the framework for succeeding scholars such as Tan (1963), 
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Heidhues (1974), Mackie (1976), Coppel (1983), and Suryadinata (1986), who gave insight-
ful, albeit now outdated, analyses on the socio-cultural background of the ethnic Chinese in 
Indonesia, tackling a wide spectrum of aspects that ranged from a broad comparative perspec-
tive including other Southeast Asian Chinese communities to more specific research on rela-
tionships with the pribumi population, minority politics, and anti-Chinese discrimination.12 
More recent studies involved further empirical research on, for instance, identities of 
young Chinese (Thung 1998), on anti-Chinese violence (Purdey 2002), on ethnic Chinese in 
the ‘outer’ islands (Heidhues 2003) and on the ethnic biases of the legal system (Lindsey 
2005). However, most of these works share a similar disposition: They tended to take the eth-
nicity of Chinese Indonesians at least implicitly for granted and treated it as a given fact, co-
herent and largely unproblematic. The primordiality of ‘Chineseness’, though questionable, 
was considered to be a useful, independent variable to explain the behaviour and treatment of 
the people defined as ‘Chinese’. Ethnicity, from this perspective, was thus regarded as the 
natural and most eminent boundary marker.13 
There is little to say against the latter proposition as ethnic segregation constitutes part of 
social reality in Indonesia. However, culturalist reasoning fails to realise that Chinese ethnic-
ity is constructed to be so relevant. Hence it often led to disputable frameworks that overem-
phasised the vertical division of society by, for instance, combining owners of small shops 
with big businessmen into one minority labelled ‘Chinese’. To give one example: Suryadinata 
accurately stated that ‘the Chinese in Indonesia are not a homogenous cultural group’, con-
tinuing that  
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 The writings mentioned here are only the most important publications of scholars who actively 
shaped the academic debate on the Chinese minority.  
13
 To date, only few studies on Chinese ethnicity deviate from the prevailing paradigm. Most notable 
here is the inspiring work of Heryanto (1998; 1999), who convincingly challenged the behaviouralist 
orthodoxy by pointing out how ethnic identities were constructed. 
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there are two groups: the peranakan Chinese […] and the totok Chinese, who are less Indone-
sianized. […] Despite the peranakanization and Indonesianization process, at this stage, it is still 
useful to talk about the totok and peranakan communities, especially when we refer to the elite 
level.  
(Suryadinata 1997: 9-10) 
He emphasised a distinction which has become relatively irrelevant for most Indonesians of 
Chinese origin. Many cannot even classify themselves as either totok (culturally Chinese) or 
peranakan (culturally Indonesian), as these communities have no impact on their daily lives. 
The emphasis on the ‘elite level’ discloses that being ‘Chinese’ was regarded as being more 
significant than horizontal class partitions. This perspective bears the risk of only reiterating 
government policies that need to be questioned, thereby reproducing the construction of the 
category ‘Chinese’ in Indonesia in an essentialist fashion. It is thus an inherent weakness of 
culturalist approaches to not take more objective stratification criteria, like material condi-
tions, into account. For that reason, most of these studies neglect the economic dimension, 
merely discussing Chinese big business – if at all – in a few paragraphs, and always as part of 
the broader Chinese minority ‘problem’.14 Characteristically, Suryadinata (1997: 25-74) in-
cluded a chapter on ‘Chinese economic elites in Indonesia’ in a book titled ‘The culture of the 
Chinese minority in Indonesia’.  
Only few of the scholars who specialised on the Indonesian Chinese minority attempted to 
exclusively focus on the capitalists. Mackie (1988; 2003), for instance, compared the role of 
Chinese businessmen in Indonesia with that in other countries. Trying to find analogies with 
Weber’s ‘protestant ethic’ (2004), economic success was attributed to cultural traits, ‘Asian 
values’, and the ‘Confucian’ spirit of capitalism, which also reflected Weber’s (1991: 208) as-
sumption that ‘the Chinese would be, it is expected, as much capable, supposedly even more 
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capable than the Japanese, to adopt the capitalism brought to technically and economically 
complete development in the culturally modern world’.15 Chineseness or Confucianism – 
though not necessarily coterminous, nor homogeneous – were regarded as the same modernis-
ing force that Protestantism once had been for European capitalism and were interpreted to 
have similar views on this-worldliness, education, obedience, materialistic values, etc. The 
emphasis was thus placed on non-economic factors that were seen to play a crucial role for 
business in a world that was not only determined by capitalism, but by many other factors as 
well. Power depended on a variety of sources, which included primordial characteristics. Sig-
nificantly, Mackie (1989: 99) claimed that no other people, ‘for reasons which are deeply 
rooted in the values and cultural systems’, seem to have ‘the same battery of incentives and 
capacities for commercial success as have the Chinese’. He cited their ‘strong motivation to 
succeed’, or even ‘the widespread Chinese propensity towards gambling’ as assets that facili-
tated the rise of Chinese capitalists. 
In contrast to these more anthropological accounts, there has been a range of studies that 
did not primarily focus on values and ethnicity as causes, but on that which was seen by the 
culturalists as the very effect of them: the business behaviour of the Chinese. However, these 
approaches dealing in the framework of business administration agreed on the same basic as-
sertion that saw the reasons for entrepreneurial success in ‘uniquely Chinese’ characteristics 
(e.g. Redding 1990). Of key concern was the position of Chinese firms in the market. The in-
dividual group leaders and the impact of their decisions were the major focal point. By exam-
ining the corporations and their strategies, research attempted to extrapolate the entrepreneu-
rial aspects of ‘Chinese capitalism’ (Yeung 2004) relevant for efficient management. The po-
litical setting, however, was only regarded as important if it impinged on market performance. 
One such example is R. Brown’s (2000) study on ‘Chinese big business and the wealth of 
                                                     
 
15
 Original: ‘Der Chinese würde, aller Voraussicht nach, ebenso fähig, vermutlich noch fähiger sein als 
der Japaner, sich den technisch und ökonomisch im neuzeitlichen Kulturgebiet zur Vollentwicklung ge-
langten Kapitalismus anzueignen.’ 
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Asian nations’, in which she emphasised institutions that were, however, related to an a priori 
culture. Hence, she identified ‘the heavy reliance on the family’ and the ‘Chinese attitude to 
finance’ (R. Brown 2000: 5) as the reason for the crisis, thus remaining in the ethnic perspec-
tive. Yoshihara (1988) as well attributed the success of the rent-seeking Chinese ‘ersatz capi-
talists’ to culture. Elsewhere he claimed:  
One can easily hypothesize that one basic reason [for the poor economic performance of some 
countries in the ASEAN region (e.g. Indonesia)] is that their culture lacks a strong work ethic. If 
this is true, the dominance of the ethnic Chinese in the capitalist sector of the economy (or the 
private sector as a whole) can be a result of it, instead of its cause. 
(Yoshihara 1995: 66) 
The literature on Chinese business networks is usually founded upon the same culturalist 
premises. Most accounts confine themselves to pointing out how relationships of xin yong 
(trust), based on ethnocentric Confucian ethics, have helped the Chinese to span Southeast 
Asia with their closely-knotted international business networks (e.g. see Tan 2000). A few 
studies relate their observations to the underlying structural conditions that bear such net-
works (as, for instance, Menkhoff & Gerke 2002), but typically they take guanxi (connec-
tions) as just another characteristic trait of ethnic Chinese (e.g. Wu 2000; Backman 2001), 
thereby implying the homo economicus character of the whole Chinese minority and failing to 
analyse how the state appropriated their ‘political ethnicity’ for its interests. 
‘Culture’ is often shifting and constantly moulded. To regard it as primordial and essential 
is thus highly problematic. Due to such propositions and an analytical horizon that encumbers 
the necessary conceptualisation of the Chinese capitalists as a class, culturalist approaches do 
not provide a suitable framework to be used for a study on Chinese capital. However, there is 
much to learn from these scholars and their works. A description of the values, traditions, and 
behaviour patterns of the Chinese is valuable as grounding and essential in order to move on 
from the present state of knowledge to further questions that yet remained irrelevant for the 
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In the 1970s, Anderson promoted an alternative to the culturalist approaches employed by 
‘anthropologists, sociologists and displaced Sinologists’ (Anderson 1982: 79), as he polemi-
cally remarked. He rejected behaviouralist explanations that regarded the Chinese ‘primarily 
as a racial minority rather than as a commercial bourgeoisie’:  
In all kinds of ways, the Chinese commercial bourgeoisie were made a ‘given’ of Indonesian so-
ciety, and then used as a criterion of its satisfactory, or more usually unsatisfactory, progress. 
Treated as a racial group, they were a measure of its constitutionalism and humanity; as a busi-
ness interest group, they were a measure of its differentiation and modernity. Nowhere were 
they treated […] as classes, whose conflicts and alliances with other classes determine the desti-
nies of civilizations. 
(Anderson 1982: 79) 
This was indeed a valid objection to the culturalist school. Nevertheless, by stressing the class 
characteristics of the whole Chinese minority, Anderson made some unavoidable generalisa-
tions, implicitly depicting every Sino-Indonesian as capitalist, thereby ignoring the huge het-
erogeneity even amongst the businessmen (Coppel 2002). He, however, paved the way for a 
group of economists and sociologists whose research deviated significantly from the ethnic 
paradigm, giving attention to the underlying economic structures and the position of Chinese 
capitalists within.  
While studies on the macro economy (such as Booth 1998; Hill 2000) contributed im-
mensely to our understanding of the economic setting but rarely discussed Chinese conglom-
erates in particular, micro economic studies, on the other hand, have produced several re-
markable works, most important of which is the research of Sato (e.g. 1994; 2004). In her 
view, scholars should pay attention to ‘endogenous forces of private capitalists themselves’, 
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such as ‘corporate strategies to cope with the given external conditions, ranging from the 
fields in which to invest, and how to accumulate business resources, to how to organize the 
corporation on the strategic level’ (Sato 1994: 103). While she did not disregard political fac-
tors, her approach remains largely empirical and not particularly theoretically informed, and 
displays the same technocratic inclinations that characterise the works of neoclassical and 
neo-institutionalist economists. 
The latter consider economic policies as an instrument to find the best solution for prob-
lems that are essentially technical in nature (e.g. Hill 1999; Thee 2003). Good governance – 
‘widely identified with the following four attributes: transparency, accountability, efficiency 
and fairness’ (Soesastro 2000: 125) – is seen as a precondition for efficient institutions and 
vice versa, resulting in economic growth and prosperity. Development can only be obstructed 
by bad economic policies and interfering politicians. It is thus an approach that disregards the 
vested interests of the actors as well as the systemic impediments to reform. The inherent 
shortcoming of such perspectives is that power is not an issue dealt with when the question of 
Chinese capital arises. 
The second major stream of interpretations based on the structural underpinnings of the 
political-economic system emerged in direct opposition to the culturalist approaches and was 
concerned with social conflict. One of its key proponents, Robison (1982: 131), rebutted the 
mainstream propositions of Indonesianists as ‘inadequate in two respects: they fail to com-
prehend the dynamics of politics; and, more importantly in terms of New Order Indonesia, 
they fail to provide a means for explaining why power and conflict exist there in their present 
form’. Instead, he offered a class analysis based on the assumption that modern societies were 
characterised by class divisions, and capitalism was their main driving force (Robison 1986). 
Without the crude simplification of Anderson’s proposal, he as well as other political econo-
mists such as Evers & Schiel (1988), Shin (1989), MacIntyre (1990), Winters (1996), and 
Rosser (2002), firmly abandoned cultural explanations for Chinese business success in favour 
of structural interpretations. By eliminating the ethnic variable, they were able to focus on 
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state–business relations, political partnerships, and the composition of certain conglomerates, 
providing a wealth of information that obviously bore no significance to culturalist accounts. 
However, the main advantage of this perspective was also its major limitation. By discussing 
Chinese businessmen as part of the capitalist class and not as members of an ethnic group, 
class-based approaches merely addressed ethnicity coincidentally. Chinese capital was only 
worth being dealt with insofar as it was part of a larger bourgeoisie. In fact, ethnicity was im-
plicitly regarded as false consciousness; its deep and comprehensive political impact was 
therefore negligently overlooked.  
For that reason, the contradiction of Chinese big business’ economic strength and political 
weakness is difficult to explain from a purely class-based perspective. Consequently, most 
accounts simply played down or ignored this issue. Robison (1982: 134), for instance, could 
only offer the weak explanation that Chinese capital’s inability to translate economic power 
into political authority was voluntary. Banking on their structural veto power, the Chinese 
capitalists preferred, as he put it, to take a low profile and rely on personal links with the poli-
tico-bureaucrats with whom they coincidently shared the same interests, instead of becoming 
actively and publicly involved in politics – a role that perfectly fulfilled the expectations and 
aspirations of the powerholders. Shin (1989: 40), even less interested in ethnicity, regarded 
‘their racial attribute as relatively insignificant to the common interest and characteristics the 
emerging new capitalists share’, thereby massively understating the relevance of being Chi-
nese especially during the New Order. Like MacIntyre (1990: 256), he emphasised the inter-
ethnic composition of the business class, criticising Robison who – until the mid-1980s – still 
differentiated between Chinese and indigenous capitalists and considered the ‘deep political 
and social divisions’ between them as ‘the factor which has proven most fundamental in the 
development of the Indonesian capitalist class’ (Robison 1986: 271). The latter’s stance on 
Chinese capitalists, however, shifted with time. He suggested that they surmounted their role 
as client bourgeoisie: ‘They are now capitalists whose position and power is based to a sig-
nificant degree on the ownership of capital’ (Robison 1986: 318). In subsequent works, Robi-
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son (e.g. 1993) also regarded the ethnic partition of capital to be secondary. Together with 
Hadiz, he combined ‘powerful bureaucratic and corporate families’ (Hadiz 2001b: 120) in one 
group that they termed ‘capitalist oligarchy’ (Robison & Hadiz 2002; 2004). Although they 
frequently referred to internal conflicts, their main focus was on the ascendance of the capital-
ist oligarchy rather than on the friction between the components within it. Thus, it was of no 
major concern for this perspective to explore why the capitalists were predominantly Chinese 
and how they were instrumentalised. 
In the course of this study, I will demonstrate that it is indeed very rewarding to focus on 
such questions. Notwithstanding the inherent incapability of class-based approaches to take 
ethnicity into consideration, they, however, offer a more appropriate, albeit incomplete 
framework for analysing Chinese capital. Logically, Chinese big business has not yet been the 
main focus of a structural analysis of Indonesia. This study attempts to fill the existing void 
identified here. 
 
An analysis of Chinese capital’s ethnic and material conditions 
Although the two frameworks seem to oppose each other paradigmatically, culturalist and 
structuralist considerations are not as mutually exclusive as it may appear. Indeed, a judicious 
and simultaneous application of both is not only useful but also very necessary in order to 
analyse Chinese capital in its entirety. Reid’s (1961) mediation between the two Australian 
schools of Indonesian studies, that ‘neither approach is more legitimate or objective than the 
other, that both have been and will be productive of fine scholarship, and that the tension be-
tween the two is likely to be particularly creative’, is as much valid for analyses on Chinese 
big business in Indonesia. 
There were a few culturalist studies that tried to combine class and ethnicity. In particular, 
Mackie (e.g. 1998; 2000; 2003), who frequently published on ethnic Chinese businesses, at-
tempted to expand the scope of socio-cultural accounts. However, he still put more weight on 
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ethnic factors, making clear himself that ‘it is appropriate […] to take the vertical divisions as 
the primary point of reference’ (Mackie 1988: 218):  
To try to account for their economic, social or political actions solely in class terms, as if they 
had a stronger sense of class solidarity with other wealthy capitalists in the Indonesian bourgeoi-
sie, and to disregard their status as members of an ethnic minority also, would require us to 
leave out a large part of the story, in many cases the more important part. One of the striking 
features of all overseas Chinese communities has been the way their strong sense of ethnic soli-
darity has overridden the wide social differences between towkays and coolies … 
(Mackie 1988: 234) 
The latter proposition reveals that it remains inadequate to merely add some elements of the 
structural approach while basically upholding the ethnicity-centred perspective. As long as 
more weight is given to the ‘strong sense of ethnic solidarity’ between ‘towkays and coolies’ 
– an assumption that lacks empirical proof16 – it is not possible to analytically isolate the capi-
talists to discuss them in regards to their class position. 
Management perspectives do not provide an apposite platform either. The study under-
taken here is concerned about the political-economic position of Chinese capitalists and can 
thus largely disregard entrepreneurial decisions. Corporate strategies per se are not of interest; 
they only come into the picture if state policies impinge on them or vice versa. Moreover, it is 
hardly suitable here to use an approach that explains patterns as deriving from values. More 
helpful in dealing with capital are studies in the field of economics, although they usually lack 
the political-sociological dimension and ignore the aspect of embedded vested interests. 
However, contrary to many of the quantitative methods applied by economists, precise figures 
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 I could neither observe an innate solidarity between ‘ordinary’ ethnic Chinese and the major Chinese 
capitalists, nor has it been expressed by any of my ‘towkay’ interviewees and middle/lower class Sino-
Indonesian conversation partners. One of my respondents, tycoon Tomy Winata (interview 17 Septem-
ber 2004), even explicitly rejected this assumption. To my question if he feels a sense of ethnic solidar-




(on assets, investments, etc.) are not of the utmost importance to this study. Unquestionably, 
they can be very illustratative of certain points and trends, but without being interpreted in re-
lation to the broader political economy, such data alone make little sense. The institutionalist, 
often functionalist viewpoints of economists additionally obstruct a discussion of issues of 
power.  
Hence, for an analysis of the power of Chinese Indonesian capitalists (and not the values 
of capitalistic Indonesian Chinese), a perspective, based on the economic divisions of society, 
has to be adopted, which takes into account the material conditions as well as the interests of 
the various factions who compete with each other for power, resources, and non-material 
gains. To categorise the Chinese tycoons as the main element of the capitalist class, therefore, 
brings us closer to a more accurate and objective analysis than one that is based on their as-
cribed affiliation to an ethnic minority. However, ethnicity as a vertical pillar of society and a 
powerful political instrument must not be neglected as it justifies class divisions. Hence, a 
class analysis should also include Mackie’s (1988: 234) valid objection that the capitalists 
‘are subject to a constant tension between the imperatives of their status as members of that 
class and the imperatives of their ethnicity, since they cannot cease to be members of a highly 
vulnerable and politically suspect minority group’. 
This study takes up the position that there are no ethno-cultural reasons for big business in 
Indonesia to be predominantly ‘Chinese’; nor is it a coincidence. It is a question of power and 
the related usage of ethnicity. Thus, analysing the structure of Indonesia’s political economy 
will give an insight into state–capital power relations. Starting from this viewpoint, a struc-
tural approach to Chinese big business can be developed as an analytical framework that 
helps to explain the Chineseness of capital in Indonesia and leads towards a more holistic ex-




2.2 Identifying the ‘ruling class’: Capital and the state 
If the Chineseness of Indonesia’s capitalists is to be seen as a socially constructed and politi-
cally instrumentalised variable and not as a primordial given, we need to shift the focus away 
from ethnicity to more explanatory categories such as the state, the bureaucracy, and capital, 
to assess the power configurations in Indonesia. Who has power over the state? In what ways 
do capitalists exert authority over the state apparatus? How does the state represent and real-
ise the interests of capital? This section will discuss the specific Indonesian conditions during 
the New Order.  
As Jessop (1990: 44) rightly claimed, it is ‘debatable whether it is possible to develop a 
theory of the capitalist state in general. For, since capitalism exists neither in pure form nor in 
isolation, states in capitalist societies will necessarily differ from one another.’ Moreover, 
there are not only variations from state to state; one state at a particular point in time hardly 
resembles the same state in another period. Therefore, different states at different times re-
quire a different set of theories to explain them. For the Indonesian case, I will outline the 
most applicable interpretations of the New Order and potential configurations of future re-
gimes, despite their inconclusiveness for other states as well as for other time spans than that 
which is specified.  
I argue that traditional Marxist theories of the state remain unable to grasp the complex 
power relationships between the state managers and capital during the New Order. Instead, I 
suggest describing the New Order as bureaucratic capitalism in which the state elite managed 
to preserve its autonomous appropriation of the state apparatus and its hegemony over the 
capitalist class. As a discussion of various forms of capitalism will illustrate, the post-
Soeharto Indonesian state is moving towards a plutocratic capitalist regime, where capital fi-





Theories of the capitalist state 
The most well-known understanding of the state goes back to Weber (1926: 8-9), who attrib-
uted three major characteristics to the state: territoriality, monopoly of coercion, and legiti-
macy. However, this formal definition mainly refers to the institutional dimension and lacks 
any evaluation of power relations. It comprehensively describes the state apparatus, but it 
does not seek to find out who controls it.  
Thus it is necessary to turn to class-based approaches to the state. Classical Marxist analy-
ses share the basic assumption that capitalist states in general serve the interests of the capital-
ist class, i.e. a continuous reproduction and accumulation of its capital. Of main concern are 
the motives, modes, and the extent of class domination. In that respect, the answers given 
vary significantly. Most accounts can be broadly distinguished into two perspectives that em-
phasise either the instrumental grip of the ruling class on the state or the structural contradic-
tions and constraints of the capitalist system mediated by a relatively autonomous state. 
The former, instrumentalist approach presupposes that ‘the executive of the modern State 
is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie’17 (Marx & 
Engels 1993: 21). The instrumental seizure of state institutions through individuals enables 
the capitalists to implement policies serving their interests. Miliband (1969: 23) accordingly 
maintained that ‘the “ruling class” of capitalist society is that class which owns and controls 
the means of production and which is able, by virtue of the economic power thus conferred 
upon it, to use the state as its instrument for the domination of society’. Through the method 
of power structure research (e.g. Mills 1956) instrumentalists seek to reveal the existence and 
composition of the capitalist class and its links to the state managers and intermediary institu-
tions, thereby proving capital’s instrumental domination over the state apparatus. Originally, 
this approach was intended to confront advocates of the pluralist school that regarded the state 
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 Original (1848): ‘Die moderne Staatsgewalt ist nur ein Ausschuß, der die gemeinschaftlichen Ge-
schäfte der ganzen Bourgeoisklasse verwaltet.’ 
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as inherently neutral and focussed on individuals and groups and their decisions. However, al-
though instrumentalists indeed questioned the neutrality of the state, proponents of the oppos-
ing structuralist school argue that most such studies remained largely in the same pluralist 
framework, totally leaving out the structural context. 
Referring to Marx’ (1962: 16) dictum that ‘individuals are dealt with only in so far as they 
are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class-relations and 
class-interests’18, these critics of the instrumentalists reject the latter’s scope and maintain that 
‘the direct participation of members of the capitalist class in the state apparatus and in the 
government, even where it exists, is not the important side of the matter’ (Poulantzas 1969: 
245). Instead, they identify the state as a relatively autonomous actor not directly under the 
control of a ruling class, but nevertheless reconciling the major contradictions of capitalism 
and thus implicitly accomplishing the long-term interests of the capitalists. 
Although instrumentalists and structuralists argue about the nature of power and the re-
spective conceptualisation of the state, both approaches define capitalists as the ruling class. 
Kautsky’s (1902: 13) seemingly paradoxical statement that ‘the capitalist class rules but does 
not govern. It is satisfied, however, to rule the government’, referred to the variety of ways in 
which capitalist interests could be represented. Therborn elaborated on the question ‘what 
then does the ruling class do when it rules?’: 
Essentially, it reproduces the economic, political and ideological relations of its domination. 
This rule is exercised through state power, that is to say, through the interventions or policies of 
the state and their effects upon the positions of the ruling class within the relations of produc-
tion, the state apparatus and the ideological system. 
(Therborn 1978: 161) 
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 Original (published 1867): ‘Aber es handelt sich hier um die Personen nur, soweit sie die Personifi-
kation ökonomischer Kategorien sind, Träger von bestimmten Klassenverhältnissen und Interessen.’ 
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Whether a state was ruled directly or structurally by capital could have perhaps been better 
depicted as an empirical question rather than a matter of theoretical proposition. The consen-
sus was, however, to regard the capitalist state as generally conducive to the advancement of 
capital. 
A study on big business cannot do without the insights of these basic theories. It is inade-
quate, however, to rely solely on structural or instrumental explanations. Certainly, no state is 
totally under control of the capitalists, or structurally completely autonomous. The previously 
mentioned models describe ideal types to which any existing state is nothing more than an 
approximation. State–business relations are contingent on time and place and require thor-
ough empirical as well as theoretical research to determine whether the bourgeoisie has pre-
dominantly instrumental or structural power over the state. In the case of Indonesia, the given 
characterisation of the capitalists as ruling class further calls for an amended, more differenti-
ated analysis. In the following, I will show that – especially for the New Order – classical 
Marxism does not provide an adequate framework to explain the power relations of Chinese 
big business and the state.  
 
The New Order state 
From the point of view of classical class-based interpretations, the New Order in Indonesia 
constituted nothing less than an abnormality. As I will show in Chapter 3, the predominantly 
Chinese capitalist class could hardly be considered as a ruling class, while the governing poli-
tico-bureaucrats were primarily self-interested, relatively independent managers of the state 
and only additionally owners of capital. I will thus outline an alternative perspective to de-
scribe the power structure in Indonesia until 1998. For this, it is necessary to briefly discuss 
the roles and characteristics of bureaucrats and capitalists during the Soeharto regime. 
According to Therborn (1978: 181), ‘the ruling class exercises its ruling power over other 
classes and strata through the state – through holding state power.’ Therefore, I suggest that 
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the state managers of the New Order were not mere functionaries, but constituted the ruling 
class in Indonesia, or at least its predominant part. They succeeded in limiting the power of 
capitalists by marginalising them through the exercise of ethnic politics on the one hand, 
while at the same time building up their own capital base on the other. Although some power-
ful families – especially the Soehartos – managed to transform themselves into capitalists, 
their capital was highly related to and dependent on their position inside the state apparatus. 
Therefore, I regard them – following Robison (1986: xxiv) – as politico-bureaucrats, who 
merged political and bureaucratic authority, rather than as capitalists-proper. In the years of 
their rule they appropriated state power so absolutely that the state lost its autonomy and be-
came their instrument (see Robison & Hadiz 2004: 69-144). 
The capitalist class in New Order Indonesia, in contrast, was severely restricted through its 
ascribed ethnicity. While, in Marxist schemes, capitalists have at least a structural veto even 
in the absence of direct political power due to the investment imperatives of the capitalist 
state that can only be met by them, big business in Indonesia could not count on this source of 
authority. Unquestionably, the Chinese capitalists were, especially in the latter half of the 
New Order, increasingly vital for the successful continuation of the state, but their political 
influence remained widely clientelistic in nature (MacIntyre 1994: 253). Links to state offi-
cials as patrons were critical for the emergence of business groups and crucial for further 
capital accumulation. Riggs (1966) thus termed such businessmen ‘pariah capitalists’, which 
is indeed a very accurate description (that is also adopted here in this study), although he, as 
well as most other patron–client-approaches, depicted the capitalists as mere compradors, 
who were totally dependent upon the bureaucrats.19 In New Order Indonesia, Chinese big 
business was indeed restricted, but they were more than the ‘ersatz’ capitalists portrayed by 
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 To prevent a misunderstanding of the term ‘patronage’, Robison (1982: 136) emphasised ‘that pa-
tron–client political forms do not indicate an absence of classes, but constitute one form in which 
classes work out relationships and seek political and economic accommodation.’  
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Yoshihara (1988) and more than just the financiers of the state elite. They were real capital-
ists, and as such part of the oligarchy presiding over the state.  
However, their exact position inside this coalition is debatable. Robison & Hadiz (2004) 
fused both bureaucrats and businessmen into a single entity they called ‘capitalist oligarchy’, 
perceiving potentially antagonistic political and economic concerns as secondary. Indeed, the 
two parties’ long-term interests always coincided and it never came to a serious clash 
throughout the whole Soeharto era. Nevertheless, as I will demonstrate later, the state manag-
ers were ultimately in the driver’s seat, because there were severe limitations in the capacity 
of Chinese capital – even big Chinese capital – to confront and challenge state bureaucrats 
when it suited their interests.  
It is therefore more helpful to talk about a ‘division of labour between those who accumu-
late capital and those who manage the state apparatus’ (Block 1987: 54) and view the oligar-
chy as a ‘power bloc’, into which the highly fractioned bourgeoisie has organised itself (Pou-
lantzas 1969). The ruling class could thus be regarded as a political alliance between a hege-
monic bureaucracy totally embedded in the state and a politically circumscribed business 
class lacking the means of direct political action. This was by far no static ensemble, but a 
coalition whose internal dynamics were permanently negotiated. Chinese capitalists in the 
early 1970s were undoubtedly more clientelistic than the ones in the 1990s, and the bureau-
cratic authority over capital certainly decreased towards the end of the New Order regime. 
Nevertheless, it still gives us analytical clarity to regard the politico-bureaucrats as personifi-
cation of the state, because the political institutions remained under their complete control un-
til 1998. Therefore, investigating the characteristics of the relations between Chinese busi-
nessmen and the state elite helps to reveal the general conditions of the state’s power struc-
tures.  
Hence, to explain the New Order, I propose a perspective that addresses the state as an 
autonomous actor, thereby integrating important insights of both instrumental and structural 
approaches, but further expanding on the latter. On the one hand, I concur with the instrumen-
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talist assumption that the state can be used as a tool. However, in the case of the Soeharto re-
gime it was not the instrument of the capitalist class, but of the politico-bureaucrats. On the 
other hand, the bureaucrats’ policies were confined to favouring capital accumulation, thereby 
fulfilling the needs of the Chinese capitalists. The important deviation from conventional 
class-based approaches, however, was that the state managers’ support of capital was neither 
an end in itself nor forced upon the state by the capitalists, but a means to an end for the bu-
reaucrats, which was to stay in power and to enrich themselves. Block (1987: 84) suggested 
that ‘state managers collectively are self-interested maximizers, interested in maximizing their 
power, prestige and wealth’. This view corresponded with Skocpol’s (1979) historical-
institutionalist approach, in which she emphasised the disjunctures between state and capital. 
States – with their ‘administrative and coercive organizations’ as ‘the basis of state power as 
such’ (Skocpol 1979: 29) – should not be seen as ‘mere analytic aspects of abstractly con-
ceived modes of production, or even political aspects of concrete class relations and strug-
gles’, but ‘actual organizations controlling (or attempting to control) territories and people’ 
(Skocpol 1979: 31). In order to focus on the class character of state power, it then makes 
sense to define the bureaucratic authority over the state apparatus as a ‘means of production’, 
as Budiman (1988: 124) suggested. It was the politico-bureaucrats who controlled the most 
relevant source of power to satiate and further their own interests. Only incidentally did they 
look after the interests of the capitalists. As Anderson (1983: 478) maintained, ‘the policy 
outcomes of the “New Order” […] are best understood as maximal expressions of state inter-
ests’. The strong state of the New Order, therefore, was a rather autonomous actor in its own 
right, independently managed by the politico-bureaucrats, and relatively sovereign vis-à-vis 
capitalist power. 
The New Order should thus be regarded as a bureaucratic capitalist state (Budimann 1988) 
– ‘bureaucratic’, because the state managers appropriated the state apparatus and were the 
dominant part of the ruling class; ‘capitalist’, because the state subscribed itself to relatively 
unlimited capital accumulation. The role of the Chinese capitalists inside such a state was 
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ambivalent: They benefited from the capitalist system, but were harnessed by the all-
encompassing politicians. As long as the New Order regime fared well, there was no reason – 
and no practical possibility – for big business to change the internal hierarchy of the oligar-
chy, for their interests coincided with those of the rulers. But the moment the system got into 
a crisis – as it happened at the end of the 1990s – the stakes had to be renegotiated. The typol-
ogy that I will develop in the following section will classify the New Order and outline possi-
ble future constellations of the Indonesian state.  
 
Forms of capitalism 
As pointed out before, for an analysis of the New Order it is necessary to expand the concept 
of the ruling class by not only including the top personnel of the bureaucracy, but also attrib-
uting a hegemonic position to it. It is thus constructive to factor the state managers into the 
equation.  
In this vein, Hutchcroft (1998) introduced a useful ‘heuristic typology of capitalist sys-
tems’ (see Figure 1). For this, he applied Weber’s ideal types of rational-legalism and patri-
monialism very insightfully to categorise different capitalist states, further differentiating be-
tween relatively stronger and relatively weaker state apparatuses vis-à-vis business interests. 
He classified most western states as more rational-legal and thus either as developmental or 
regulatory states, and the more patrimonial Southeast Asian states as either ‘patrimonial ad-
ministrative’ or ‘patrimonial oligarchic’, referring to Weber’s (1978: 1041) definition of 
patrimonialism: ‘Practically everything depends explicitly upon the personal considerations: 
upon the attitude toward the concrete applicant and his concrete request and upon purely per-
sonal connections, favors, promises, and privileges’.  
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Figure 1: Typology of capitalist systems 
 
(Adapted from Hutchcroft 1994: 221)20 
As the character of state power represents the ruling class as well as the relevant mode of pro-
duction, Hutchcroft further typified the systems of capitalisms determined by the respective 
states. More patrimonial states with relatively weak state managers enabled a system of capi-
talism he termed ‘booty capitalism’, while relatively strong states facilitated a ‘bureaucratic’ 
form of capitalism. 
Hutchcroft (1994: 220) considered Indonesia to belong to the latter category, as ‘rents are 
most commonly grabbed by a bureaucratic elite based inside the state’. The politico-
bureaucrats thus benefited disproportionately from the patrimonial administrative state, un-
hindered by an initially limited and marginalised capitalist class. In the Philippines, on the 
contrary, ‘a powerful oligarchic business class extracts privilege from a largely incoherent bu-
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 To depict both axes of the typology as continua – as Hutchcroft (1998: 20) explicitly emphasised in a 








































reaucracy’ (Hutchcroft 1994: 230). It is thus the principal direction of rent extraction that de-
termines the nature of capitalism.  
This typology is indeed very helpful to describe state–business relations due to its two-
dimensionality that incorporates the relative strengths and the nature of states, although it fails 
to consider the possibility and direction of change. Instead, it relies on a Weberian approach 
that widely neglects the structural dimension. However, the characterisation of the state as 
patrimonial – taken as a symptom deriving from specific power structures – illustrates the an-
tipodal resilience of oligarchic interests vis-à-vis ‘rational-legal’ reforms very well. While it 
was widely expected that post-New Order Indonesia would change from a strong patrimonial 
bureaucratic state into an either developmental or regulatory state, capital obviously found a 
more conducive shell to achieve a more efficient representation of its interests. The reforms 
weakened the bureaucrats in relation to business interests, but did not endanger the whole 
static of the ruling oligarchy. Therefore, even in a more democratic regime, patrimonialism 
prevailed and enabled the politico–business oligarchy to remain in power. However, inside 
the ruling class, the hierarchy had changed. The politico-bureaucrats lost in strength, while 
the capitalists – as I will empirically substantiate later – had become more assertive towards 
the state. 
The new regime will be based on a plutocratic state where power is mainly derived from 
capital. During the New Order that can be rightfully termed as ‘bureaucratic capitalism’, the 
state was dominated by its managers who, however, had to face an increasingly independent 
capitalist class. Both factions joined hands in a predatory oligarchy controlled by the politico-
bureaucrats. In the years after the crisis there might still be an equivalence of power inside the 
oligarchy that was forced to reorganise itself in 1998. The trend, however, is moving in fa-
vour of the Chinese capitalist class which decreasingly needs the politicians at the levers of 
formal power. What we observe in Indonesia is therefore an assimilation of the state to the 
Thai and Philippine types. Figure 2 illustrates this development very schematically – and with 
it the major hypothesis of this study. 
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Figure 2: Development of capitalism in Indonesia 
 
 
2.3 From bureaucratic to plutocratic capitalism 
This chapter positioned this study within the broad range of research on the Chinese minority 
as well as on capital in Indonesia and developed an analytical framework to be used for the 
subsequent historical and empirical chapters. Because, ‘as always, neither economics nor cul-
ture can explain everything’ (Reid 1997: 37), I made clear that I regard ethnicity as an impor-
tant variable that, however, has to be embedded in a structural discussion based on the mate-
rial politico-economic conditions. Only then is it possible to adequately inquire about the 
power of the bureaucrats and the role of capital during the New Order and outline potential 
developments for the post-Soeharto time.  
In general, the study is in agreement with classical social conflict theories of the capitalist 
state that regard capital as the ruling class, with either instrumental or structural power over 
the state apparatus. In fact, I argue that after 1998, the capitalists have increasingly been able 
to loosen the reins that used to hold them down, while the politico-bureaucrats have much less 
of an uncontested, instrumental grip on the state and its apparatus.  
For the New Order, however, we have to reconsider the position of the Chinese capitalists. 
Given their ethnic ascription, they can hardly be seen as the ruling class. Instead, it makes 
more sense to define the state managers as the dominant part of a politico–business power 
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quasi autonomous from capitalist power lay in the effective limitations they put in place 
against the (Chinese) capitalists through (1) the marginalisation of Chineseness, (2) the accu-
mulation of an own capital base (that, however, derived from within the state), and (3) the co-
optation of the capitalists in their bureaucratic oligarchy, in which they were the dominant 
fraction (see Chapter 3). Capital was structurally important (particularly towards the end of 
the New Order), but politically so much handicapped that it could have never translated its 
structural power into direct political action. 
The end of the New Order can thus be seen as the end of a deviation and as a ‘normalisa-
tion’ of capitalism. With the help of Hutchcroft’s typology of capitalisms, it is possible to de-
scribe the shift of Indonesia’s political economy from a bureaucratic form of capitalism to-
wards a more distinctly plutocratic form. This change, however, merely reflects a modifica-
tion of the internal hierarchy of the oligarchy in favour of capital, but not a disruption of the 







CHINESE BIG BUSINESS AND THE STATE BEFORE 1998 
The often turbulent history of Indonesia had one constant element: a predominantly Chinese 
capitalist class characterised by economic strength and political weakness. This chapter seeks 
to make sense of this contradiction, explaining the reasons for Chinese big business’ incapa-
bility to translate economic power into political power. At the same time, I will explore why, 
since colonial times, the economic vigour of Chinese capitalists remained unimpaired. More 
pertinently, how did they maintain and even expand their economic power despite being per-
manently branded and treated as ‘foreign Orientals’ by successive governments? Or did the 
perpetuation of their pariah status constitute the necessary conditions for their success?  
Culturalist accounts perceived Chinese business success as an inconsistency difficult to 
explain, because in most regimes the rhetoric as well as the corresponding policies of the re-
spective rulers were targeted against ethnic Chinese. Hence, many culturalists attributed the 
prominent economic role of Sino-Indonesians to their primordial business acumen that pre-
vailed over all political adversity (e.g. Mackie 1989; Suryadinata 1997). In contrast, I argue 
that the ‘Chineseness’ of the capitalists was indeed the most important factor, not because it 
referred to innate ethnic abilities but to a feature that could be purposefully constructed and 
instrumentalised by the state. It is suggested here that ethnic Chinese businessmen, as mem-
bers of a marginalised minority, were deliberately placed in the position of what I term ‘lim-
ited capitalists’ – wielding structural power through their ownership of capital, but remaining 
politically handicapped due to the marginal social position of the ethnic group they were as-
signed to. Through this they constituted an ideal, rather harmless bourgeoisie to be co-opted 
as willing financiers and junior partners in mutually beneficial predatory alliances with state 




By tracing back the structural conditions for the emergence and existence of Chinese big 
business, this chapter will show that colonial patterns of state–business relations persisted 
throughout Indonesian history. Every regime maintained and used these historical legacies, 
which singled out the Chinese capitalists as ‘foreign’; and they themselves as ‘essential out-
siders’ (Reid 1997) benefited from these arrangements no less than the holders of bureaucratic 
power. I will focus on the symbiosis between the conglomerates and the state during the New 
Order, which will provide detailed observations on the power structures that were rooted in 
colonialism and – at the same time – remain immensely significant for contemporary Indone-
sia’s political economy. 
 
And even if they seem to be busy revolutionising 
themselves and the conditions, creating something 
which has never been there before, exactly in such 
epochs of revolutionary crisis they conjure anx-
iously the spirits of the past to be of their service, 
assume their names, battle slogan, costume, to en-
act, in such time-honoured disguise and with such 
borrowed language, the new scene of world history.  
(Marx 1960: 115)21 
3.1 Determinants: Chinese capital in historical perspective 
The relationship between the state and capital can only be understood in regard to histori-
cally-rooted developments, tensions, and contradictions in Indonesian society. It is thus nec-
essary to analyse the economic history of Indonesia with reference to the role of Chinese capi-
talists by going back to pre-colonial times during which particular social and political tenden-
cies and patterns were forged that remain relevant to current issues and problems. It is in pre-
colonial society that we find the beginnings of many of the social processes that came to posi-
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 Original (published 1885): ‘Und wenn sie eben damit beschäftigt scheinen, sich und die Dinge um-
zuwälzen, noch nicht Dagewesenes zu schaffen, gerade in solchen Epochen revolutionärer Krise be-
schwören sie ängstlich die Geister der Vergangenheit zu ihrem Dienste herauf, entlehnen ihnen Namen, 
Schlachtparole, Kostüm, um in dieser altehrwürdigen Verkleidung und mit dieser erborgten Sprache 
die neue Weltgeschichtsszene aufzuführen.’ 
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tion the Chinese in a particular way during colonialism and early independence so that Chi-
nese capitalists played the role we associate with them during the New Order.  
 
Pre-colonial times (From the ‘dawn of history’ to 1600) 
The first Chinese are believed to have arrived in Java as early as the Tang period (618–907) 
or, as historian Onghokham (2003: 183) put it, ‘probably as far back as the dawn of history’. 
However, it was the intensification of trade during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) that led to 
an increased migration from the Southern provinces of China to the so-called nanyang (south-
ern seas), today’s Southeast Asia (Heidhues 1974: 6).  
Reid (1988) has referred to the time before industrialisation and modern imperialism as 
‘the age of commerce’ in order to emphasise the importance of trade, which was, on the one 
hand, the main motivation for Chinese to leave their homes, and on the other hand, the occu-
pational niche that was not already monopolised by indigenous social groups (Wertheim 
1965: 43). These protocapitalist activities thus gave the Chinese a possibility to fit into the 
pre-colonial societies whose economic gap they could bridge. 
This went well with the preferences of many local regents who liked to appoint foreigners 
as intermediaries between them, the indigenous population, and outside markets. The advan-
tage of such constellations – that were also imposed by mediaeval European rulers upon the 
Jews (Reid 1997: 44) – was that trade as a necessary but unpopular task was being assumed 
without the risk of letting indigenous people rise to positions that might challenge the local 
regents. Chinese merchants were not mere stopgaps, but ideally situated for this role. They 
could facilitate trade with China, the largest market for Southeast Asian goods at that time 
(Reid 1992: 464). They were already present in substantial numbers and very mobile, moving 
from the coast to the interior in ways only sojourners could. Most importantly, they were a 
minority without a local homeland and without the resultant political rights of people re-
garded as indigenous, coming from far away without the intention to remain permanently.  
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The assigned role was utilised and well expanded by the Chinese, most significantly 
through the monetisation of the subsistence and cash crop economy that gave them a clear ad-
vantage above other groups. This also prevented the development of an indigenous merchant 
class, as the required licences were too expensive and thus out of reach for local entrepreneurs 
(Kathirithamby-Wells 1993: 133-4). Chinese traders as partners or agents therefore became 
indispensable for many rulers who established strong symbiotic patronage networks that fur-
thered the political ends of the local aristocrats and the economic targets of the Chinese so-
journers, thereby launching persistent patterns of relationships in Java and elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia (for the Thai case, see Hewison 1989: 34-5).  
However, this basic structural framework differed from future regimes in one decisive 
condition: In pre-colonial times, the Chinese had the possibility to completely assimilate 
within the native population, which brought about an absorption into the local elite and thus a 
rise in social status (Wertheim 1965: 46; Skinner 1960). Albeit having certain economic func-
tions, the Chinese were not as excluded from broader society in ways that would occur under 
the European colonialists who neither allowed assimilation of the Chinese into their caste, nor 
encouraged them to blend into the native society.  
  
Colonial rule (1600–1949) 
As the Dutch arrived in Java in 1596, they were only one group amongst other traders (Ong-
hokham 2003: 151). In 1602, they founded the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC – 
Dutch East India Company) and established Batavia in opposition to the prospering Sultanate 
of Banten as the centre of its operations in 1619 (Blussé 1986: 73-96). This city that later be-
came Jakarta was built around the Chinese settlement, today’s Glodok. The proximity to the 
Chinese was not coincidental. The Dutch utilised the existing political structures (Robison 
1986: 5) through which they were able to benefit from the intermediary position of the Chi-
nese as much as the local rulers did before. The Chinese merchants were essential and irre-
placeable in setting up and later supporting the economic infrastructure, because the VOC 
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could not advance into the intermediary trade; thus the Chinese with their already established 
networks and infrastructure of commerce complemented them ideally.  
Initially, the VOC officials tried to populate Batavia with their fellow citizens from the 
Netherlands, but soon they changed this plan, as Dutch people were regarded to be more criti-
cal towards the authority of the VOC, the authoritarian political structure, and its trade mo-
nopoly (Onghokham 2003: 184; Blussé 1986: 25). The Chinese, however, were no immediate 
threat for them, as long as they could be separated as a distinct group and curbed in their eco-
nomic range. The Dutch thus tried to lure Chinese merchants to their trading post; they even 
sent out expeditions to China to kidnap some Chinese and populate Batavia with them (Liem 
1980: 131). Positioned as ‘outsiders at the center’ (Reid 1997: 34) who were occupying essen-
tial niches in the economic system, they were, from the nineteenth century, restricted from 
owning land or, later on, joining the civil service, thus being left with only few alternatives 
but to engage in trade, tax-farming, and other activities regarded as morally questionable 
(Diao & Tan 2001: 125). This special economic position as entrepreneurial middlemen minor-
ity paved the way for them to becoming crucial agents of a slowly emerging state (Reid 1997: 
43), but – simultaneously – led to their social exclusion as ‘foreign Orientals’, an image that 
reinforced the gradual perception of Chinese ethnicity as most prominent boundary marker 
(see Carey 1984). 
It was already in the beginning of the eighteenth century that the Dutch began to fear the 
increasing market power of the Chinese settlers. The intensity of migration as well as the 
growth of their economic activities went beyond the control of the Dutch. This led to anti-
Chinese regulations like head taxes, deportations, and a ban on owning agricultural land. 
Whoever was caught without a letter of permission (Permissiebriefjes) was to be sent to Cey-
lon as a slave (Blussé 1986: 94). Dutch paranoia about the growing Chinese dissatisfaction 
with these measures as well as their general economic advancement, led to the killing of 
10,000 Chinese in the massacre of Batavia in 1740 – almost the whole Chinese population of 
the city (Blussé 1986: 94-5; see also Setiono 2003: 107-19). However, the Company soon re-
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alised that these measures were a big mistake, as the economic life of Batavia broke down af-
ter the pogrom. They had to recruit new Chinese to take over the now vacant positions in the 
intermediary trade (Liem 1980: 139). The lesson learned by the VOC officials was that the 
Chinese were essential for the colony and, as middlemen, served the colonialists’ very own 
interests. Moreover, if necessary, it was always possible to constrain the economic power of 
the Chinese through acts of repression, thereby corroborating their subordinate position. From 
1800 on, after the VOC was dissolved and taken over by the Netherlands monarchy, the ob-
jectives of colonialism shifted from trade to the exploitation of raw materials. This modern 
form of imperialism required a more effective administrative framework and economic infra-
structure. However, the state itself was too weak for these tasks, lacking an appropriate appa-
ratus. Therefore it sub-contracted the sovereign right of tax collection and revenue farming to 
private interests, preferably to already wealthy and well-connected Chinese businessmen 
(Dick 1993: 3-9). The benefits for the colonial state were obvious: It neither needed to own 
capital, nor bankroll an existing bureaucracy for this task. Moreover, power did not have to be 
shared with Javanese aristocrats (Reid 1993: 78).  
Many new intermediary positions in the economy were thus created, accelerated through 
the expansion of foreign trade. The Chinese were the natural partners in this ‘alliance of con-
venience’ (Dick 1993: 3). They already had an advantage as first-comers through their mid-
dlemen status (Wertheim 1969: 94). A good example is provided in the case of So Bin Kong, 
who became the first opsir Tionghoa (Chinese officer) 22 after having been a trading partner 
with both the VOC and local regents for many years. However, at least from this time on, we 
have to carefully differentiate between Chinese petty traders and Chinese big business, as 
only the elite of the Chinese business community was eligible to play an important role in the 
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 The Chinese officers had to oversee the administration and internal regulations of the Chinese com-
munities, explaining and carrying out political decisions of the colonialists as well as collecting taxes 




colonial system (see Fernando & Bulbeck 1992: 77). Wealth and political connections were 
the basis for an appointment as revenue farmer or Chinese officer, for which huge sums had 
to be paid up-front; such positions in turn intensified the concentration of economic and po-
litical power in a few Chinese hands and were therefore out of reach for most (Onghokham 
2003: 189). 
In the colonial administration and economy these businessmen had several possibilities to 
accumulate capital: as Chinese officers or tax collectors, through opium farming, monopolies, 
gambling dens, or pawnshops. The basic premise of what Kwee (2006) called ‘elite synergy’ 
between Chinese merchants and VOC officials was the acceptance of Dutch pre-eminence. To 
be as close to power as possible gave a small group of Chinese towkays the much needed se-
curity and access to business opportunities. Through the consequent emergence of private 
capital the Chinese were prepared to take part in the more developed capitalism and colonial 
administration starting in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The capital accumulation 
process of the Chinese reveals the main contradictions of the colonial economy: The state 
needed the Chinese middlemen and tax collectors, but it was inimical to its interests to let the 
Chinese become a powerful capitalist class, whereas the Chinese owed their existence to a co-
lonial state that could not do without them. Their actions, however, nurtured a state, that, in 
the end, found it expedient to place restraints on their economic role. Clearly, there are paral-
lels to be drawn here with some of the patterns of state–Chinese capital relationships in New 
Order Indonesia. 
From 1850 onwards, however, several Chinese families accumulated capital that they 
could invest elsewhere. In 1892, Chinese were in possession of, for instance, 45 per cent of 
land that could be legally owned by non-‘natives’, 63 per cent of all private estates, 31 per 
cent of buildings and premises on land not privately owned, 22 per cent of tonnage of ships 
and vessels, 18 per cent of the sugar mills, and 32 per cent of timber concessions (Diehl 1993: 
202). This undoubtedly indicated the magnitude of Chinese commercial influence, giving 
them a relatively autonomous base of social power – a development that the colonial rulers 
  
48 
saw as a threat. The Company’s attitude towards and treatment of the Chinese economic elite 
therefore changed significantly, leading to their perception as the ‘foremost enemy’ of the 
state (Phoa 1992: 14), even though there was still plenty of collaboration going on. Again it 
boiled down to many restrictions against them, discriminatory regulations, and clashes under 
the label of ‘ethical policies’ – a programme implemented to better the situation of indige-
nous, which was explicitly directed against the Chinese (Wertheim 1965: 58). This forced 
many Chinese businessmen into informal, illegal operations such as smuggling, gambling, 
and the illicit opium trade. In the meantime, however, the whole economic and administrative 
system was dependent on Chinese and their investments, taxes, revenue collections, and trade 
activities, which were urgently needed by Dutch businesses. This exemplified a theme which 
was to recur in history. Chinese were indispensable in the running of the economy, but they 
could not be allowed to have any significant social and political influence exceeding the au-
thority of individuals (e.g. the Han family in East Java; see Salmon 1991). It was an intended 
vicious circle. By emphasising the Chinese as a functional group consigned to trade, Chinese 
exclusivity was fostered, which in turn cultivated anti-Chinese sentiments among the local 
people and manifested itself as ethnic segregation. 
After 1900, the major paths to wealth for Chinese capitalists were in sugar production, tin 
mining, rice milling and trading, retail and wholesale trade, shipping, and rubber cultivation 
or trading (Mackie 1996: xxvi). The economic competition of Chinese businesses with Dutch 
corporations as well as with indigenous traders increased significantly due to amplified recip-
rocal interferences into formerly exclusive economic sectors and ‘a gradual breaking down of 
traditional occupational dividing lines’ (Wertheim 1965: 76). The Depression in 1930 finally 
weakened many Chinese businesses, but it also damaged – in an even more devastating way – 
their competitors, thus boosting Chinese’ dominance over domestic trade (Geertz 1965: 59). 
The subsequent decade until 1940 saw the increasing importance of Chinese capital, a decline 
of the estate sector, and a growth in the manufacturing industry (Robison 1986: 9-10), which 
enabled the Chinese businessmen to leave the shady niches once provided by colonial capital-
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ism. They could henceforth invest in new, innovative sectors like estates, mines, factories, 
steamships, and banks (Onghokham 2003: 181). 
To conclude, a few Chinese established strong relationships with the holders of political 
power under Dutch rule. The Chinese officer system – despite being abolished after 1916 – 
was the pattern of accommodation for the future, preparing the ground for the patronage net-
works between political and economic elites to come. Despite all anti-Chinese measures, the 
existence of the capitalists was never endangered, as an eradication of the Chinese element 
would have meant an annihilation of one of the pillars upon which the whole system was 
built. However, as Rush (1991: 24) observed, the perception of the Chinese as collaborators – 
even though they played a crucial role in the early awakening of Indonesian nationalism23 – 
also linked ‘a powerful wave of sinophobia […] with the embryonic stages of the Indonesian 
nationalist movement, a movement whose heirs would build the new state and decide who, 
exactly, was truly Indonesian. And who was not.’ The considerable implications of this will 
be discussed below. 
 
The post-colonial state (1949–65) 
A modern capitalist state requires a union of political and economic power in the hands of the 
ruling class, as Twang (1998: 318) emphasised in regards to the young Indonesian nation. 
However, as a legacy of colonialism, the Chinese economic elites and the Indonesian political 
leaders were divided into antagonistic racial blocs, thereby complicating the nation-building 
process. Nevertheless, during the struggle against the colonialists some indigenous revolu-
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 The Chinese contributed to the nationalist movement in several ways: First, through the participation 
of a few Sino-Indonesians as Indonesian nationalists (Pramoedya 1998; see also his Buru novels, e.g. 
Pramoedya 2001), second, by constituting the pivotal counterpart (see Anderson 1991), especially 
through the simultaneously emerging Chinese nationalism (see Suryadinata 1978: 63-79), and third, by 
providing the technical and infrastructural means, e.g. newspapers (see Suryadinata 1978: 129-41), as 
well as an inspiring model to organise and agitate against the colonialists (Purcell 1965: 446).  
  
50 
tionaries already overcame the incongruity between ethnic sentiments and economic necessi-
ties and co-operated with some Chinese capitalists (Twang 1998: 324). This reconciliation of 
mutually exclusive political and economic forces under the umbrella of business operations 
led to the realisation that both groups’ interests were compatible and that their cooperation 
would benefit both parties. Twang (1998: 325) interpreted these business alliances as a nas-
cent multi-ethnic bourgeoisie, in which political protection was given in return for economic 
co-operation. This, however, risks being misunderstood. The loose coalition was not a fusion 
of political and economic power; it was not more and not less than a pragmatic solution to se-
cure the existence of both groups.  
The benefits deriving out of it convinced the Indonesian political elite to leave the Chinese 
capitalists in their colonial position and to take over the general structures of the old regime. 
Elements of the colonial state were incorporated with apparent ease into the succeeding na-
tion-state, as Dick (1993: 4) observed: ‘The state as an institution seems to have been more 
durable and more significant than the garments in which it is clothed, be they of the colonial 
state or of the nation-state.’ In particular, the post-colonial state inherited a class structure in 
which power was concentrated in the state apparatus and thus confined to the bureaucracy and 
army, who were given a certain degree of autonomy due to the economically weak indigenous 
classes and the politically limited Dutch and Chinese bourgeoisie (Robison 1982: 139-41). 
For the Chinese, this also meant a continuation of their status as aliens. Indeed, as a minority 
group, they were regarded as the ‘others’ in relation to an ‘indigenous’ majority; in that way 
they constituted the crucial counterpart necessary to define the non-Chinese ‘imagined com-
munity’ (Anderson 1991) of the newly built Indonesian nation. There was thus no legitimate 
place in the young republic for the Chinese capitalists. This combination of economic strength 
and political impotence, however, secured the survival of the essential but innocuous Chinese 
capitalist class in an environment that desired stabilisation and rehabilitation. The social os-
tracising of Chinese capital thus served two ends: (1) To contain the economic power of Chi-
nese business as much as it was acceptable for the whole economy, and (2) to weaken the 
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bargaining power of the Chinese capitalists vis-à-vis the indigenous officials who had taken 
over the political positions from the Dutch.  
After the Indonesian republican state assumed sovereignty at the end of 1949, policy-
makers made a move against foreign and Chinese merchant capital, with the intention of alter-
ing the colonial economy into a more self-sufficient industrial economy based on indigenous 
ownership of capital. By that they could give in to demands of the aspiring indigenous busi-
ness class that regarded Chinese merchants as immediate competitors. The first measure was 
the benteng (fortress) programme, implemented in 1950 to counter Dutch and Chinese eco-
nomic interests. Import licenses and credits were given exclusively to indigenous importers 
(Thee 1996: 317). Chinese businessmen, however, benefited from this regulation through the 
‘backdoor’ by using indigenous license holders as substitutes, thereby effectively contraven-
ing the efforts. In 1959, the Peraturan Pemerintah (presidential regulation) No. 10 forbade 
the alien Chinese to conduct retail businesses outside the cities (Heidhues 1974: 24-5). How-
ever, the ones who suffered through these policies were mainly the poorer Chinese, not the 
more established Chinese businesses (R. Brown 2000: 8). Significantly, most political actors, 
such as Vice President Hatta, prioritised focussing on the lower levels of the economy and, 
for instance, the transfer of small shops and business opportunities to non-Chinese coopera-
tives (Heidhues 1988: 122). Sectors that did not require too much capital and experience were 
seen as an ideal starting point to form an indigenous business class (Robison 1986: 86). How-
ever, as I will demonstrate, neither did the latter materialise, nor was it the political will of the 
powerholders to nurture pribumi capitalists.  
Indeed, the state leaders around President Soekarno did not intend to fully eliminate Chi-
nese capital, even though they tried to keep their promises of economic nationalism that they 
gave during the struggle for independence and the process of nation-building. However, the 
push for indigenisation turned out to be undeliverable. The state could have fostered the 
emergence of an indigenous capitalist class through state credits. Further, it could have trans-
ferred the Dutch enterprises that were confiscated in 1957/1958 to pribumi businessmen. In-
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stead, however, they were seized by the state and handed over to the military to manage. 
Moreover, the ruling elite could have proceeded with Chinese businesses as they did with for-
eign capital, but no major centre of power really wanted to get rid of them, because this would 
have caused irreparable economic damage to the Indonesian economy as well as to individual 
alliances between state managers and Chinese capitalists (Robison 1986: 87). Furthermore, it 
served the interests of the former best to leave the economic power in the hands of the latter 
instead of an indigenous bourgeoisie, as Robison accurately assessed:  
The particular importance of indigenous businessmen as opposed to Chinese is essentially po-
litical. Whereas a dominant Chinese capitalist class may impose the general interests of capital 
upon the state, an indigenous capitalist class possesses the potential for direct and public politi-
cal action. Chinese capital may impose constraints and imperatives upon the policies of the 
state, but a powerful indigenous capitalist class has the potential to transform the very structure 
of power.  
(Robison 1986: 88) 
Following this argument, the continuing economic strength of Chinese businesses was an ex-
pression of a political interest in keeping the post-colonial state relatively free from bourgeois 
dominance, leaving state power as the domain of state bureaucrats. The position of Chinese 
capitalists, who had neither aspiration nor the possibility of entering the state bureaucracy, 
was thus relatively secure, providing them with an ‘inbuilt resilience in the face of political 
assault’ (Robison 1986: 87).  
During the last years of the ‘Guided Economy’ regime (1957–65) the military emerged as 
the most powerful politico-bureaucratic force (Robison 1986: 96). As the Soekarno regime 
further stagnated, at the same time that the president was forging an ever closer alliance with 
the army’s arch-nemesis, the Indonesian Communist Party, the army took its chance to appro-
priate state power (Crouch 1978). All the while, some of the generals had already started to 
forge alliances with Chinese entrepreneurs during and shortly after the independence struggle 
(see Twang 1998: 254-316), of which the most famous and momentous connection was that 
between Soeharto and Liem Sioe Liong. These future powerholders were well aware of the 
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inherent contradictions in the position of Chinese capital, and, from historical experience, re-
alised the potential value to them of Chinese businessmen in the post-Soekarno set-up. The 
temporary hibernation of Chinese big business before 1965 that neither destroyed nor particu-
larly furthered Chinese capital thus came to an end, while its contradictory status was to be 
amplified.  
 
3.2 The New Order accommodation 
In 1965, the military took over executive power, terminating a politically and economically 
dilapidated regime. The appropriation of state power was so comprehensive that the generals 
around Soeharto were increasingly able to use the state apparatus in the most instrumental of 
ways (see Chapter 2). To uphold and broaden the social and financial base of their power, an 
authoritarian, centralised, and predatory system was put in place that secured the hegemony of 
the politico-bureaucratic rulers, thereby replicating patterns of relationships between the state 
and Chinese capital that were rooted in the dynamics established during the colonial period. 
One essential component of bureaucratic authority – and the main subject of this chapter – 
was the subordination and co-optation of capital. Hence ethnic Chinese businessmen, who 
were still regarded as ‘non-indigenous’, were seen as ideal partners for collusion. The poli-
tico-bureaucrats had to ensure that the social status of these Chinese remained weak. I will 
demonstrate how the state managers successfully turned them into pariahs and, at the same 
time, designated them as their main business partners. They thus succeeded in intensifing the 
contradictions of Chinese capital’s economic strength and its political weakness. I will show 
that the limitations of the capitalists were a key pillar of the bureaucrats’ watertight system of 
societial dominance, which could neither be challenged by an indigenous bourgeoisie nor by 
the Chinese outcasts, thereby securing for the politico-bureaucrats unimpeded control of the 
state apparatus.  
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Subsequently, I will analyse the complex arrangements between capital and the state in In-
donesia during the years spanning 1965 to 1997. I will demonstrate how an economically sig-
nificant class of politically limited capitalists came into being and disclose the role it played 
inside the New Order regime. The reason why this sophisticated system of ‘bureaucratic capi-
talism’ with Chinese conglomerates being dominated by a politico-bureaucratic elite could 
last for more than 30 years can be found in the establishment of a mutually beneficial poli-
tico–business oligarchy, a process that Robison & Hadiz (2004: 47) described as ‘a metamor-
phosis that was to transform the New Order from a regime serving the interests of its own of-
ficials into a regime that produced and served a growing and complex business and political 
oligarchy’. Its chronological anatomy is the focus of the following discussion. 
 
Conditions: The creation of a pariah business class 
The policies of the New Order towards the Chinese minority were inexplicable for most ob-
servers. Why did some ethnic Chinese manage to become the leading businessmen of a coun-
try that was so overtly anti-Chinese? Mackie (1999: 188-9) regarded this inconsistency as 
‘laissez-faire strategy’ of the powerholders. He argued that ‘Soeharto’s government ignored 
the broader problem almost completely for over 30 years’. Harry Tjan Silalahi (CSIS, inter-
view 22 September 2004) even claimed that ‘there were no minority policies during the New 
Order’. It will be shown that this was not the case. On the contrary, I will demonstrate that the 
policies towards the Chinese were purposeful and for the most part perfectly orchestrated to 
aggravate the contradictions of Chinese capital.  
Soeharto did not have to start from scratch. The Chinese as a minority and non-indigenous 
group were already defined and segregated for centuries. As mentioned earlier, the tradition 
of exclusion can be traced back to colonial times in which the Chinese were positioned as 
middlemen. Their exclusion was continued by Soekarno’s relatively successful attempts to 
build an Indonesian nation based on an imagined pribumi community, largely leaving out the 
non-pribumi (Chua 2002: 83-114). The New Order’s Chinese policies were thus a consistent 
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take-over and expansion of pre-1965 patterns of state–business alliances, aiming at the estab-
lishment of a pariah business class. This was done in three steps that will be discussed in the 
following three subsections. (1) An important condition for embedding the Chinese capitalists 
into the master plan of the New Order was to extinguish Chinese culture and thus marginalise 
the ethnic group the tycoons were associated with. (2) Then, discriminatary policies and state 
sanctioned violence against the Chinese minority relegated the Indonesian Chinese to second 
class citizens and limited their social radius. (3) Finally, the powerholders succeeded in stig-
matising ordinary orang Tionghoa as rich expropriators. Through this they dichotomised so-
ciety into pribumi and non-pribumi groups and thus linked the capitalists inextricably to a 
marginalised, restricted minority. Together with all Sino-Indonesians they hence attained the 
status of social outcasts. MacIntyre summarised the results of the anti-Chinese policies in the 
following way: 
The uncertain social position of the Chinese has generally been seen as depriving the business 
community of the capacity to project collective political interests in any direct or organised 
manner. Along with other segments of society, it has been regarded as effectively excluded from 
political participation by the state. 
(MacIntyre 1990: 3) 
An analysis of the process of exclusion will provide insights into reasons and motivations of 
the powerholders to place their partners into such a fragile social position. 
Marginalisation: Extinguishing Chineseness 
The desired marginalisation of the Chinese minority was to be achieved by what was euphe-
mistically termed the ‘assimilation programme’ that the state oversaw in a relatively coherent 
and straightforward way, striving to eliminate everything that was traditionally seen as ‘Chi-
nese’. The officially proclaimed goal was to completely absorb the Chinese in society and 
thus to solve the so-called ‘masalah Cina’ (Chinese problem). The government justified the 
rigorous steps taken to force the Chinese to assimilate by referring to their supposed incom-
patibility with the Indonesian people. Hence, it was said, the Chinese posed a threat to na-
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tional unity and security. Their perceived cultural difference was presented as the main obsta-
cle to ethnic harmony. The rage of the people, resulting in anti-Chinese riots during the first 
years of the New Order, was used as a proof for the incompatibility of Chinese and Indone-
sians. Thus the blame for the ‘Chinese problem’ was put on the Chinese themselves (Hery-
anto 1998: 103). Accordingly, the Badan Koordinasi Masalah Cina (BKMC – Coordinating 
Body for the Chinese Problem) gave the following instructions: 
Guidance in assimilation in the framework of the realization of unity of the nation should be 
geared towards the establishment of unity in the value system. […] All forms of cultural affinity 
based on the country of origin should be removed, in order to give all elements of culture in In-
donesia the opportunity to develop according to the Pancasila. 
(BKMC, cited in Tan 1991: 115) 
This was the outline for an extensive process of cultural genocide that started right at the be-
ginning of the New Order. Everything that was suspected of maintaining Chinese identity was 
to be removed. In the first year of its rule, the new Indonesian government thus published a 
decree in which it urged the Chinese to change their names into ‘Indonesian’ sounding ones to 
accelerate the assimilation process (see Coppel 2002: 33-4). In order to avoid further difficul-
ties and in a bid to escape anti-Chinese discrimination, many Sino-Indonesians followed this 
demand. By the middle of 1969, about 250,000 Chinese discarded their names (Heidhues 
1974: 83-4). Moreover, the public practice of Chinese religion and customs was prohibited:  
Chinese religion, beliefs and customs [in Indonesia] originated in their ancestral land and their 
various manifestations may generate unnatural influence on the psychology, mentality and mo-
rality of Indonesian citizens and therefore impede natural propensity [for assimilation]. 
(Presidential Decree No. 14 of 1967, cited in Suryadinata 1986: 160) 
For fear of being perceived as communists, many Chinese converted to Christianity, the more 
so as Confucianism lost its status of being an official Indonesian religion later in 1979 (see 
Coppel 1983: 164).  
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In 1966, the People’s Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia (MPR) forbade 
the use of media in the Chinese language (Tan 1991: 117). Chinese characters were removed 
from shops or other public displays. Chinese newspapers24, literature, and documents became 
subject to the same import restrictions as pornography, weapons, drugs, or dynamite.25 In this 
atmosphere of fear, one did not dare to speak Chinese languages even in the private sphere. It 
is reported that people were publically slapped by passers-by if they were caught using Chi-
nese or one of its dialects. Officials monitored and interrupted telephone calls and conversa-
tions in Chinese (Heryanto 1999: 327). The ‘Guidelines for the Implementation of Presiden-
tial Instruction No. 14 of 1967’ (see Coppel 2002: 37-9) revealed that the government pro-
ceeded with the utmost care to completely extinguish the ‘characteristics and features of Chi-
neseness (ke-Cinaan)’ of the Chinese minority, even prohibiting the barongsai (dragon 
dance) or Indonesian plays based on Chinese fables (Tan 1991: 118). Public celebrations of 
the Chinese New Year were not allowed, and in Semarang even the sale of Chinese cookies 
was forbidden (Heryanto 1999: 327). Mandarin-speaking schools were closed in July 1966 
(Tan 1991: 117). All Chinese associations were dissolved, leaving the minority group without 
the main elements of social coherence and communal identity (Heidhues 1998: 166). To-
gether with the other regulations and measures directed against Chineseness a radical forced 
indigenisation of the Sino-Indonesians took place.  
The result of these policies was the near-extinction of Chinese culture and with it, as the 
original objective, a marginalisation of about 3 per cent of Indonesians who were defined as 
Chinese. However, the officially stated aim, to assimilate the Chinese, and its logical implica-
tion to let them eventually become part of the majority, was never an element of the New Or-
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 There was still one single Chinese paper (Harian Indonesia from Jakarta) which served as a platform 
for propaganda and advertisements, or, in the wording of the ‘Instruction of the Cabinet Presidium No. 
40 of 1967’ as a ‘channel for information and fostering of Indonesian residents who only understand 
the Chinese language, in the framework of overcoming subversive activities and foreign propaganda 
that is hostile to the Indonesian Government’ (see Coppel 2002: 47). 
25
 This regulation only disappeared from the embarkation forms in the beginning of 2003. 
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der’s solution of the ‘Chinese problem’, as Wertheim already analysed with great foresight in 
the beginning of the 1960s:  
Lack of assimilation is not the real motive force for the campaign: it is a convenient rationaliza-
tion. It provides an excuse to select a special group of ‘foreigners’ as the target. If this group 
should actually decide to try collectively to assimilate, it would not provide a solution accept-
able to the competitors. 
(Wertheim 1965: 79) 
In the following section, I will provide proof of Wertheim’s claim and thereby demonstrate 
how the Chinese were refused integration on the social and structural levels. 
Discrimination: Making the Chinese visible 
Coppel considered discrimination against the Chinese to be no more than the ‘consequence of 
the ideological imperatives of the assimilationist policy’: 
The logic of the assimilation policy required the ethnic Chinese to lose their Chineseness and to 
be absorbed without trace into the wider Indonesian population. […] A policy which requires 
one particular ethnic group to be assimilated into the rest of the population cannot help but be 
discriminatory, no matter how sincerely the government which formulated it may profess to 
guarantee equality of rights for all citizens.  
(Coppel 2002: 27) 
With this statement he risks being interpreted as implicitly justifying the measures against the 
Chinese while misjudging the intentions behind it. Many scholars of the ethnic Chinese in In-
donesia agreed with him in principle, while others only diverged in their interpretations of the 
New Order policies by describing them as inconsistent or arbitrary (e.g. Tan 1991: 118; 
Suryadinata 1998).  
However, if we acknowledge that the regulations decreed to discriminate against the Chi-
nese eventually even increased their visibility, it becomes obvious that the ‘Chinese problem’ 
was not to be ‘solved’ but kept alive to prevent an amalgamation of the Chinese and the 
pribumi majority. Therefore – and it will become even more obvious in the next section when 
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looking at the reasons for these measures – the minority policies of the New Order state were 
indeed consistent and full of determination, albeit very different in motivation from Coppel’s 
understanding.  
The existence of the Chinese as socially stigmatised and politically marginalised outcasts 
was in fact politically useful. Many regulations were thus produced to ensure that there was 
no complete assimilation. The identity card of Indonesians of Chinese origin carried a certain 
code, on their birth certificate was a note about their Chinese descent, and they always had to 
prove the legal acquisition of Indonesian citizenship with the respective documents (Tan 
1991: 123). This marking opened the flood gates to bureaucratic arbitrariness. Whoever had a 
Chinese name and/or looked Chinese and/or could be exposed by official documents or ques-
tioning as a Chinese had to pay higher fees or bribes (Heidhues 1998: 167). This illustrated 
that name changing was of limited use in decreasing discrimination. As a further example of 
bureaucratic obstacles, access to state universities was restricted for Chinese. Usually only 5 
to 10 per cent of the students could be of Chinese descent. This meant that many Sino-
Indonesian parents sent their children to private universities or to study abroad. Likewise, 
parts of the job market were blocked for them. Unwritten and unexpressed barriers excluded 
the ethnic Chinese from working as civil servants, in the army, the parliament, and the MPR 
(Mackie 1999: 191). With these occupational constraints the Chinese were confined to busi-
ness. As a result, the bureaucratic and political spheres of the state remained inaccessible for 
them.  
The main consequence of these limitations was that the Chinese, after being marginalised, 
became visible again. On the one hand, their traditional Chineseness disappeared by the 
elimination of what was perceived to be ‘Chinese culture’; on the other hand, they were still 
branded as Chinese in identification documents, in dealing with the bureaucracy, universities, 
and the job market. The request in 1979 for all persons of Chinese descent to register, regard-
less of their citizenship (Coppel 1983: 156), illustrated very clearly that there was no way for 
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the Sino-Indonesians to achieve complete assimilation in terms of being unreservedly in-
cluded in the imagined community of Indonesians.  
On the contrary, their distinctiveness was not only kept alive, it was redefined since ‘Chi-
neseness’ had an unambiguously negative meaning by this time. Significant for this was the 
1967 regulation to label the Chinese with the pejorative ‘Cina’ instead of ‘Tionghoa’, which 
was used up to then and considered to be neutral (Coppel & Suryadinata 1978). The official 
decision made at a gathering of army leaders in Bandung containted the following wording:  
Particularly in order to remove a feeling of inferiority on the part of our own people, while on 
the other hand removing the feeling of superiority on the part of the group concerned within our 
State, [...] the seminar has decided to use again as the term for the People’s Republic of China 
(Republik Rakjat Tiongkok) and its citizens, ‘Republik Rakjat Tjina’ (People’s Republic of 
China) and ‘warganegara Tjina’ (Chinese citizens). 
(Cited in Coppel & Suryadinata 1978: 121-2) 
The implementation of this decision took place comprehensively, and ethnic Chinese in gen-
eral, not only the ones with Chinese citizenship, were from then on called ‘orang Cina’. In so 
doing, the government not only slighted Sino-Indonesians (Coppel & Suryadinata 1978: 124), 
but legitimised racist offences exacted against them. Their position as outcasts became mani-
fest in language and thus justified and normalised anti-Chinese riots which had no legal and 
rarely moral consequences, for the victims have lost any means of articulating or defending 
themselves (Heryanto 1999: 303). 
Stigmatisation: The Chinese as expropriators 
Despite the politico-bureaucratic elite’s direct connections to Chinese big business, Soeharto 
was to cast economically powerful Chinese in a role detrimental to the economic development 
of the Indonesian nation. He wanted to be seen as the champion and defender of pribumi 
rights against the ‘economically strong group’, that is, the Chinese. Such diction ensured that 
the economic gap between rich and poor was perceived as an ethnic gap between Chinese and 
pribumi. Moreover, after the distinction of pribumi and non-pribumi was officially discarded 
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in 1984, ostensibly to lessen discrimination, it became conventional to differentiate between 
the ‘economically weak’ and the ‘economically strong’ group (Coppel 1983: 168). From the 
start the new term took over the function of the old dualism and became a ‘code phrase’ 
(Schwarz 1994: 117) for the officially tabooed discourse of race26, and furthermore height-
ened the impression that all members of the Chinese minority were rich and powerful. Thus 
the New Order succeeded in ethnicising a phenomenon with an originally non-ethnic back-
ground.  
This image of the economically powerful Chinese was intensively fostered by the regime. 
One example was the widespread belief that ‘the Chinese’ were in control of more than 70 per 
cent of ‘the economy’ (see Chapter 1; see also the Kwik-Amir debate in Chalmers & Hadiz 
1997: 208-13). It did not really matter if this was true or merely a myth. Its implications were 
obvious. There seemed to be a disparity of wealth along ethnic boundaries, between ‘the Chi-
nese’ as one monolithic block and the poor rest, consisting of about 97 per cent ‘economically 
weak’ pribumi.27 Another event served the same purpose: the meeting in Tapos 1990, where 
31 heads of the largest conglomerates, all but two of Chinese descent, were ordered to come 
to Soeharto’s ranch. Covered extensively by the media, the president urged them to show 
more responsibility for Indonesian society and to transfer 25 per cent of their enterprises to 
Indonesian cooperatives in order to close the social and economic gap (Schwarz 1994: 98-
102). The end result – they only had to transfer 1 per cent – was relatively unimportant con-
sidering the message delivered by this meeting. Soeharto could not only dissociate himself 
from the patronage networks in which he was deeply involved, but also managed to fortify the 
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 The SARA-policies that forbade talking about suku, agama, ras and antargolongan (ethnicity, relig-
ion, race, and class) can be interpreted as means of the government to control and monopolise the dis-
course on those topics and did not have the objective, as it was often assumed, of protecting minority 
groups. 
27
 Many scholars on the ethnic Chinese tend to base their analyses on this assumption as well (e.g. A. 
Chua 2003b: 152). They either eventually believed it through endless repetition or, which seems to be 
more likely, accepted it willingly and thus even helped in constructing this myth, as it fitted with their 
ethnic frameworks that overstated ethnicity.  
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perception of the Chinese as disproportionately rich and powerful and as the ones responsible 
for social inequalities. Many other politicians repeated this political message and did their 
stint in this ‘ethnic blame game’ (Schwarz 1999: 345-6). 
As political and social outcasts, the Chinese did not have any means to correct this impres-
sion nor prevent being represented by 29 tycoons of Chinese descent. They were at the re-
gime’s mercy and had to put up with these kinds of stigmatisation that were meant to instru-
mentalise them as scapegoats in several ways. On the one hand, problems inherent in the sys-
tem or for which the government itself was responsible, could be veiled in a simple manner. 
For instance, at the beginning of the economic crisis in 1997, the price rises and shortages of 
basic items were explained by referring to the Chinese shopkeepers and suppliers who were 
apparently hoarding products because of their ‘well known’ profit seeking inclination (Purdey 
2002: 72). 
On the other hand, they were blamed for the misery of the pribumi. The discontent of the 
powerless masses and the anger about their economic situation could be diverted from the 
rulers towards the Chinese minority. This happened, for instance, in 1974, when an internal 
government conflict took the form of anti-Chinese riots (Rosser 2002: 107-9), as well as in 
1994 during the unrest in Medan, which was, as Heryanto (1994) observed, in fact an expres-
sion of workers’ demand for better wages and a further manifestation of a more organised ur-
ban poor. However, the mass media and communiqués of the government succeeded in de-
picting the Medan incidents as another anti-Chinese riot, caused by racial prejudices that had 
to be curbed, giving the authorities legitimate reason to arrest labour leaders as alleged insur-
gents. 
By defining the economic problems of the pribumi as the ‘Chinese problem’, the New Or-
der managed to prevent the consolidation of a class consciousness, which would have been di-
rected against the ruling oligarchy in general and against the politico-bureaucrats in particular, 
who nurtured a tiny faction of compliant ‘Chinese’ capitalists for their own benefits. The per-
ception of the social inequalities as an ethnic conflict between weak pribumi and strong Chi-
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nese could not harm the pribumi-elite; on the contrary, they were even seen as ‘economically 
weak group’ since this term became a synonym for indigenous (Coppel 1983: 153).  
Implications for the Chinese capitalists 
The state-defined ‘Chinese problem’ set social barriers for all Indonesians regarded as Chi-
nese. Not only the vast majority of ‘ordinary’ Chinese was affected by the ethnic policies of 
the New Order, but also the big businessmen. Indeed, to associate the major capitalists of In-
donesia with a weak minority through constantly blurring any distinctions between poor Chi-
nese hawkers and rich tycoons was one of the intentional rationales of the government. It was 
part of the political strategy of the bureaucratic power holders to sustain the marginalising, 
discriminative, and stigmatising anti-Chinese policies and stabilise the ethnic dichotomisation 
of society.  
Under such circumstances, it became crucial for the tycoons to turn to the ruling elite for 
defending them and providing the necessary functions and distributions of a state apparatus 
that remained inaccessible for them. The state managers could thus absorb the upper reaches 
of the Chinese capitalists into the ruling oligarchy. This was, as will be shown later, beneficial 
for both sides. Chinese big businessmen were politically and socially handicapped, but eco-
nomically they were given the special right to partake in the predatory networks that ulti-
mately came to be centred on Soeharto himself. 
Certainly, the Chinese tycoons did not benefit equally from the ethnic policies of the New 
Order. Chinese conglomerates were always in a vulnerable position in relation to powerful 
politico-bureaucrats. As the Tapos incident revealed, Soeharto could command the biggest ty-
coons of the country to come to his ranch and threaten to seize a huge portion of their assets. 
It illustrated clearly the authority of the political elite, which capital could not oppose. How-
ever, Tapos disclosed at the same time that the tough stance against the capitalists was merely 
rhetorical and meant to keep up the pro-pribumi Robin-Hood-image of the government. 
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In Tapos, the contribution expected from the conglomerates was eventually reduced to an 
irrelevant amount. This signified that most deprivations for the capitalists were not material 
and that the tycoons indeed remained largely unaffected by the anti-Chinese policies. The ac-
tual sufferers were the ethnic Chinese who were neither that well connected nor represented 
by the bureaucrats. Still, the fate of the Chinese minority had indirect, but important, conse-
quences for the capitalists, codifying their subordinate and dependent role in state–business 
relations. In fact, this was the biggest barrier to a translation of their economic might into di-
rect political power, but simultaneously one of the reasons for being a perfect silent partner to 
rule and exploit Indonesia.  
Through the ‘Chinese problem’ the New Order bureaucrats managed to disempower capi-
tal politically and, at the same time, veil and assure their own dominance. Hence, the political 
and economic measures of the New Order only seem incoherent at first sight. In fact, they 
elucidate a major consistent motivation: the establishment of a frail class of pariah capitalists. 
The way the latter was brought into being will be addressed below.  
 
The formation of the alliance (1966–74) 
Such a marginal business class was well suited to join up with a bureaucratic elite that yet 
lacked a capital base of its own. Here, I will point out how the Chinese capitalists were pur-
posefully raised and installed as junior partners in pervasive patronage networks. It will be 
shown that the establishment of a mutually beneficial symbiosis with Chinese capital was a 
crucial step in the formative years of the New Order that warranted the ascendance of both 
political patrons and their business clients.  
Raising Chinese cukongs 
With Soeharto’s seizure of power after 1965, the politico-bureaucrats, initially dominated by 
its military element, obtained complete control of the state apparatus. Their foremost task was 
to revive the crippled economy with an inflation rate of 636 per cent in 1966 (Thee 2003: 18). 
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They immediately stopped the former government’s economic nationalism and invited for-
eign companies to bring in loans and investments and thus launched an ambitious industriali-
sation programme, drafted by US trained technocratic economic advisors (Robison & Hadiz 
1993: 18-20). In only two years, by 1968, relative price stability was achieved, allowing the 
economic policymakers to shift their focus from stabilising the economy to its rehabilitation 
and long-run development (Rosser 2002: 40-1).  
The Soeharto government had sufficient resources to change the structures of the econ-
omy, especially through the confiscation of assets belonging to capitalists close to former 
President Soekarno as well as through the massive number of state corporations (Robison & 
Hadiz 2004: 54). Moreover, it disposed of the means to allocate these resources, as the new 
rulers were in control of the centralised gatekeeping institutions such as the Forestry Depart-
ment, the Trade Ministry, the state logistics board Bulog, and the national oil company Per-
tamina (Robison & Hadiz 2002: 45). Most enterprises remained in the possession of the state, 
while, as second pillar of the economy, a domestic private business class was to be formed. 
These capitalists were recruited from the ranks of the Chinese minority. 
Chinese businessmen – the so-called cukongs (a Hokkien word used in Indonesia for well-
connected Chinese tycoons) – turned out to be the only group with relevant business experi-
ence, entrepreneurial skills, and networks to generate profits and to support general economic 
growth. A few traders were already partners of the actual rulers long before, such as Liem 
Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan, who were closely linked to the Diponegoro Division of then-
Lieutenant Soeharto (Robison & Hadiz 2004: 54). The political powerholders knew that these 
capitalists were effective and reliable. Through anti-Chinese policies they assured that their 
allegiance would not change. The new economic elite of the New Order was harmless be-
cause it was marginalised, and – if required – further marginalisable (see above); a condition 
that allowed the emergence of Chinese capitalists as key business players. 
Most crucial for their enhanced economic stance was the Foreign Investment Law No. 1 of 
January 1967, followed by the Domestic Investment Law of 1968. The former gave foreign 
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capital guarantees and incentives such as a continuation permit for over 30 years, tax holi-
days, and exemption from import duties (Robison 1986: 138-9). Chinese businessmen became 
the preferred partners in joint ventures with foreign capital that served as incubator for the rise 
of Chinese big business. Hence, the cukongs could shift from trade and distribution to the 
more lucrative sectors the labour based industry provided, being offered an ‘epoch-making 
momentum for potential businessmen with no experience, capital, and technology to jump 
into the manufacturing sector, enter into new fields of industry, and further diversify their 
lines of business even into unrelated industries’ (Sato 1994: 128). 
The second law catering to domestic investors was implemented more than one year later 
following the earlier law on international capital, because ‘pribumi Indonesians were busy 
bashing the country’s ethnic Chinese during 1966 and 1967’, as Winters (1996: 77) explained 
the delay. The investment potential of Chinese businessmen, however, was far too massive to 
be ignored, as stated already in Article 5 of ‘The basic policy for the solution of the Chinese 
problem’ (Instruction of the Cabinet Presidium No. 37 of 1967):  
Different from FOREIGN CAPITAL as mentioned in Law no. 1 of the year 1967, capital which 
has been accumulated and expanded in the territory of Indonesia, which is domestic foreign 
capital is basically national wealth in the hands of aliens; therefore it is to be mobilised, fostered 
and used in the interest of rehabilitation and development.  
(Official translation, cited in Suryadinata 1986: 218) 
The Domestic Investment Law was meant to reanimate specifically domestic Chinese capital, 
as only Chinese businesses had the required financial resources and were thus – even as aliens 
– eligible for the subsidised credits (Winters 1996: 77-8). Therefore, they were given, for the 
first time in history, relative security to invest in Indonesia, while the benefits stipulated in the 
law were out of reach for pribumi businessmen. Winters (1996: 77) remarked that ‘either the 
economic ministers did not know what they were doing with these laws, or they never seri-
ously intended to give a boost to pribumi investors’. The latter assumption appeares to be 
more accurate, as signified by the wealth of economic privileges the state provided for certain 
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Chinese businesses, such as exclusive contracts, licences, and credits (Robison 1996: 91), that 
constituted a further, not less significant factor of their growth. For example, through Bulog 
Chinese businessmen received import and distribution monopolies for food, several ministries 
provided them with concessions and protective trade regimes, and, as former Minister of Fi-
nance Bambang Subiyanto claimed,  
if we were to believe in a conspiracy theory28 at all, then the most important event in fostering 
the Chinese was the special credit scheme masterminded by Soeharto, through which state banks 
willingly gave Chinese businessmen highly subsidised special credits below the market rate, to 
be used for huge investments. 
(Bambang Subiyanto, interview 16 September 2004) 
With tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade and certain restrictions to foreign investment the 
market was sufficiently regulated, resulting in a concentration of Chinese businesses on the 
highly promoted import-substitution industries (Rosser 2002: 34). 
This protectionism facilitated an unrestricted growth. The cronies grabbed every chance 
that they were offered. Anthony Salim described the formative period of the New Order:  
Everything you touch at that time is basically a very big opportunity, everybody is doing it, and 
so the new conglomerates are being born – Salim is one of them. […] This is the period where a 
lot of new companies, new groups are being formed, and a lot of capital formation is taking 
place at that time. 
(Anthony Salim, interview 13 April 2005) 
Possibilities were indeed innumerable; thus the tycoons founded companies in multiple sec-
tors, thereby forming the basis of the diversified shape of Indonesia’s conglomerates. As 
many as 17 of the 30 largest business groups before the crisis – all but one owned by Chinese 
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 Subiyanto (interview 16 September 2004) himself did not believe that there was a master plan of the 
New Order government to foster Chinese big business: ‘That the Chinese were economically so strong 
in the New Order was simply a coincidence, or perhaps the government could not foresee or ignored 
the impact of the 1967 law.’ 
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– were established in 1966–73 (see Appendices, Table 1).29 Considering that three of the 
seven groups that already existed before 1965 were single product companies from the highly 
constant cigarette sector, a comprehensive exchange of capitalists had taken place with the 
advent of the New Order.  
One of these new cukongs was William Soeryadjaya, whose Astra Group capitalised on 
his connections with Pertamina chairman General Ibnu Sutowo, who controlled government 
contracts for supply and construction (Robison 1986: 293). Through the latter, Astra became 
the sole agent for Toyota, Honda, Fuji-Xerox, and Daihatsu (Shin 1989: 337). Another major 
beneficiary of import substitution and exclusive protection by the government was Liem Sioe 
Liong. His close partnership with Soeharto, deriving from long-term business relationships 
with the latter’s military division, secured him two central monopolies – one for cloves and 
the other one for flour, as well as many more privileges (Shin 1989: 352-4; see also case 
study on Salim in Chapter 5.3). By the mid-1970s, these conglomerates formed the largest 
two of the country. According to Robison (1986: 305), it was the windfall profits derived 
from the monopolies and secured through political connections that constituted the basis of 
domestic private capital formation. In the first years of the New Order, the politico-
bureaucrats therefore succeeded in raising a client bourgeoisie that – as will be shown below 
– was to be co-opted in a mutually beneficial symbiosis.  
The foundations of symbiosis 
Most Chinese businessmen used to be only more or less successful traders before the new re-
gime gave them the possibility of becoming major capitalists. They were therefore highly de-
pendent on the political elite that guarded their quick rise and could also decree a sudden fall 
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 Most of the favoured businessmen already had some rather small scale companies before 1965 (see 
Sato 1994: 129). The year of establishment (as indicated in Appendices, Table 1) thus refers to the time 
in which they took the decisive step towards conglomeration.  
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if deemed necessary. The alliance between the state and capital at that time was thus very 
much under the control of the political patrons. 
The networks of patronage between the politico-bureaucrats and their Chinese business 
clients functioned in the following way (see Figure 3): The political elites controlled minis-
tries, state banks, and regulating agencies that could give out licenses, credits, and facilities. 
The Chinese tycoons were the recipients, who were then able to realise a formidable profit, as 
most of the ventures provided opportunities for market domination. In return, the conglomer-
ates offered the politico-bureaucrats shares or business partnerships or simply channelled 
some of the profits back to their political protectors, often via donations to the latter’s ‘chari-
table’ foundations (yayasan) (Schwarz 1994: 133-61). 

















(Based on Chua 2004b: 72) 
For both parties involved it was a win-win situation. Although the political powers lacked the 
economic know-how, connections, and capital, they could access the markets through their 
Chinese cronies from whom they extracted massive gains. These payments acted as bribes to 
open up opportunities, as commission charges for profits, or as protection money for the rela-
tive security the new regime guaranteed. The kinds of trade-offs they received for their rents 
was extensive, as listed by McLeod (2000: 155-6): (1) Favoured companies were protected 
from competition from imports; (2) government departments and state owned enterprises 
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awarded contracts without bidding; (3) state banks including Bank Indonesia gave cheap 
loans at highly subsidised rates with very generous repayment options; (4) close cronies re-
ceived the right to exploit natural resources such as forests or even gold; (5) the government 
bestowed permits to take over land; (6) cronies were further designated to be the obligatory 
partner in foreign joint ventures. (7) Moreover, they were favourably treated when it came to 
dealing with state enterprises, being able to purchase inputs for artificially low prices. (8) Fi-
nally, they benefited from extra low taxes or tax holidays and, (9) in the latter years of the 
New Order, they even obtained the right to collect taxes. This system based on korupsi, 
kolusi, dan nepotisme (KKN – corruption, collusion, and nepotism) became the basis of the 
predatory New Order alliance.  
The patronage networks secured the integration of Chinese capital into a symbiosis be-
tween politics and business. They further provided the bureaucrats with start capital and were 
the foundation of Indonesia’s stunning economic growth. However, these networks were not 
incidental results that could be forged between any partners in arbitrary combinations. This 
kind of alliance was only possible between the politico-bureaucratic authorities and the Chi-
nese capitalists in the given power configuration. Moreover, this coalition required an elabo-
rated authoritarian and centralised system that the state managers developed soon after they 
took over power. The thriving partnership with Chinese capital was the result, but it also un-
derscored the need for a more stable form of regime that could consolidate and remain virtu-
ally unchallenged in the second decade of New Order rule. 
 
The consolidation of bureaucratic power (1974–82) 
The oil boom that started with a sudden rise in oil prices at the end of 1973 massively filled 
the state’s coffers and caused a shift in economic policies from a relativly liberal regime to-
wards increased protectionism and patronage disguised as economic nationalism. An industri-
alisation programme with the aim of developing a self-sufficient economy hampered foreign 
investors’ involvement in certain sectors (Robison & Hadiz 1993: 18-20). The Malari-riots of 
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January 1974, in which middle class protestors demonstrated against the dominant role of for-
eign and Chinese businesses (see Rosser 2002: 107-9), gave the politico-bureaucrats the ac-
cordant political justification as well as the initial ignition to better their own economic 
stance. 
Sato (1994: 136) listed three aims the government announced right after the riots: giving 
priority (1) to national capital instead of foreign capital, (2) to state capital instead of private 
capital, and (3) to pribumi capital instead of Chinese capital. As the policy guidelines and 
their later realisation showed, all three dimensions of capital that were to receive favourable 
treatment, i.e. national, state, and pribumi capital, were under control of – or even synony-
mous with – the politico-bureaucrats. However, the development of private capital remained 
largely unaffected. In the oil boom period, ending in the early 1980s, as many as five of the 
pre-crisis top 30 conglomerates emerged (see Appendices, Table 1). Moreover, despite the 
populist attitude, the politico-bureaucrats did not see their Chinese cukongs as competitors or 
opponents, but rather as the main vehicles for the growth of indigenous capital, which was to 
be represented by the state managers themselves. The collusion between capital and the state 
was thus intensified. 
By means of massive state interventions the powerholders transformed the formerly loose 
business alliance into a politico–business oligarchy and induced a comprehensive ‘metamor-
phosis of state and class power’ (Robison & Hadiz 2004: 43). The Chinese capitalists tran-
scended their role as mere financiers preying on quick profits while the political elites did not 
confine themselves to being only ‘gate-keepers and toll collectors to a class of business sup-
plicants’ (Robison & Hadiz 2004: 53), figuring out that their – widely congruent – interests 
with their Chinese clients could best be promoted in an internally united and structurally 
deeply entrenched oligarchy. The absolute control over the state that became the main catalyst 
for the consolidation of patrimonial bureaucratic capitalism was utilised to actively promote 
the oligarchy’s needs (Hadiz 2001a: 129). 
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In the following, I will illustrate how state power manifested itself in the economically 
protectionist and politically authoritarian and centralised system that turned out to be the best 
– if not the essential – shell for the oligarchy-in-formation. By 1982, the oligarchy had firmly 
established an administrative patrimonial regime, in which the politico-bureaucrats effectively 
ruled in tandem with the still dependent Chinese tycoons. The transformation of the bureau-
crats into indigenous capitalists was the decisive difference to the formative years, firmly 
rooting the state managers’ power over the state – and inside an emerging bureaucratic oligar-
chy that was under their control.  
The system of dominance: Authoritarianism, centralism, and protectionism 
The New Order regime was founded on three pillars: authoritarianism, centralism, and protec-
tionism. This political system that provided the fundamental setting for the unchallenged 
dominance of the politico-bureaucrats and a further rise of Chinese capital became even more 
entrenched through the immense revenues of the oil boom, allowing the government to bask 
in enormous economic growth and depict itself as the engine of a successful developmental 
state (Liddle 1996: 36-42). By means of the hijacked state apparatus that was penetrated by 
the omnipresent bureaucracy and backed by the powerful military, the political powerholders 
had the means and legitimation to rule without constraints.  
Their immediate authority was based upon a ‘regime of state terror’ (Aditjondro 2002: 34), 
whose foundations were laid when between 500,000 to one million alleged communists were 
killed between 1965 and 1966 (Cribb 2001). The military, as the ‘bodyguard of oligarchic in-
terests’ (Hadiz 2001a: 136), with support of paramilitary groups, instigated violence against 
any form of opposition to the state (Wessel 2001). The Gleichschaltung of all other non-state 
social forces was virtually absolute. Political adversaries were murdered, suppressed, or in-
corporated by the system. Although opposition groups existed here and there, civil society 
was on the whole muted and restricted. The lack of avenues to voice and organise criticism or 
opposition forestalled any possible challenge to the regime. The executive forces were abso-
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lutely in the hands of the politico-bureaucrats, and nothing could be done without their con-
sent. 
However, the regime had a broader base than just coercion. With the help of organisations 
which were purposefully established and controlled by the state, a corporatism was put in 
place that channelled and regulated political engagement consensually (Robison & Hadiz 
2002: 17). For business the widely impotent Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(KADIN) provided the platform upon which capitalists could voice out their concerns. Ac-
cording to MacIntyre (1990: 44-7), only a few of the leading Chinese tycoons bothered to join 
it, although they were forced to subsidise its costs. All other social groups as well had to be 
founded on the principles of the state ideology Pancasila that laid out the boundaries of le-
gitimate political activity, emphasising the consent-oriented integralist character of the New 
Order (Robison 1993: 42-4). Any action undertaken against the state and its managers was 
thus interpreted as an attack on the nation. However, economic advancement endorsed the 
politico-bureaucrats. The eradication of poverty – the population living below the poverty line 
fell from 60 per cent in 1970 to 11 per cent in 1996 (Azis et al. 2002: 199) – and the general 
progress in living standards and income that even affected Indonesian villagers in distant re-
gions therefore ideologically sanctioned the idea of a strong state. As long as their pockets 
were filled, most citizens appeared prepared to do without some of their basic rights.  
Another crucial element in the system of dominance was the extreme centralism that bun-
dled all decisions in the hands of the political elite in Jakarta. Through the major gatekeeping 
institutions the bureaucrats monopolised the allocation of licenses and resources, thus ensur-
ing the obtainment of adequate gratification from the beneficiaries. The centralised structure 
enabled the political elite to completely control the economy and determine the recipients of 
favours unimpededly. This so-called ‘dirigisme’ fostered the great leap forward of Chinese 
business groups to big conglomerates and was thus an essential factor for the rise of the capi-
talists (Robison 1993: 58). It also led to the emergence of corporations belonging to the major 
politico-bureaucrats. A key institution for this was the State Secretariat (Sekneg), through 
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which patronage and the allocation of government-funded projects was coordinated, and 
within it Team 10, established in 1979 as a ‘locus of far-reaching government control and an 
enclave for kickbacks to officials and contracts for everyone from backers of the Suharto re-
gime to the president’s children’ (Rosser 2002: 125). Officially, it was supposed to secure 
preferential allotment of government contracts to small and medium pribumi enterprises that 
were badly impaired by the rupiah devaluation in November 1978. This aim was – if at all – 
only partly reached. Instead, as Rosser (2002: 125-39) explained, Team 10 was misused as a 
cash cow for the officials who allocated the contracts and as an instrument to nurture the ven-
tures of politically connected businessmen. It was thus a vehicle that amplified the New Or-
der’s centralism and concentrated it in the closest circles around Soeharto, thereby widening 
the reach and impact of the patronage networks. Perhaps more importantly, Team 10 was the 
decisive midwife to a class of ‘pribumi’ politico-bureaucratic capitalists, enshrining the struc-
tures of patronage even after its dismantling in 1998. 
The third pillar on which the system was based was the unlimited accumulation of capital 
for both political and economic elites. It took place under the protectionism of an interven-
tionist, patrimonial state. Robison & Hadiz (2002: 37) characterised the regime as ‘predatory’, 
a ‘system where the state apparatus and public authority become the possession of a corps of 
politico-bureaucrats whose main objective is their own political and economic enrichment’. 
The state was increasingly turned into an instrument of the ruling class. Through it the politi-
cians hijacked the markets and subjected them to their authority and, at the same time, intensi-
fied the patronage networks with their Chinese cronies (Robison 1993: 44-5). The ever-
growing state sector with capital-intensive upstream activities taken over by state-owned en-
terprises such as Pertamina and Krakatau Steel played a most crucial role in capturing and al-
locating the utmost lucrative downstream activities among political patrons and their business 
clients. As Habir (1999: 179) observed, most of the corporations that benefited from these 
collaborations were owned by ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs. 
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This system of dominance consolidated the New Order regime for the next few decades to 
come. Authoritarianism successfully forestalled any potential internal threat to the oligarchy 
in the form of criticism against the predatory alliance between the bureaucrats and Chinese 
big business, thus presenting a political apparatus that perfectly served the political elite’s 
greedy needs of plunder and control as well as the capitalists’ longing for security and devel-
opment. 
Indigenous capital 
On their way towards the consolidation of their authority as ruling class, it was not sufficient 
for the politico-bureaucrats to control the state apparatus, but further to prevent the rise of a 
class that could challenge their rule. This was to be achieved (1) by impeding the influence of 
other capitalists and (2) by building an own capital base to prevent being used as compradors 
of domestic and international corporations. They wanted the state to be their instrument, and 
not to constitute a mere committee to oversee the needs of capital. 
In accordance with these aims, the government ended the relatively liberal regime in 1974. 
The responsiveness to international capital decreased significantly, as the end of many privi-
leges and incentives as well as new restrictions and conditions for investments from abroad 
showed, leading to a massive reduction of foreign investments (Rosser 2002: 110-6). In addi-
tion, and as outlined before, they further socially marginalised the most significant domestic 
capitalists, the Chinese, thus increasing their dependency and co-opting them in the politico–
business oligarchy. The category pribumi capital, however, which would have been entitled to 
share in the biggest part of the economy, was successfully usurped and monopolised by the 
politico-bureaucrats themselves.  
Pribumisasi, which stood for protectionism in favour of the pribumi in order to have a 
more equal distribution of wealth in society, was the official policy of the New Order. How-
ever, it turned out that this was nothing more than a ‘legitimacy device’ for the predatory self-
enrichment of the ruling class (Robison & Hadiz 1993: 26). Shin identified the ‘unsuccessful’ 
policies of indigenism as an ideological project of the New Order 
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to cushion the effects of a rapid restructuring of the Indonesian economy in which the new capi-
talists, along with the military-dominated state, rose to dominance. The policies, which achieved 
little progress over time, nevertheless had to be created repeatedly, only to make the state appear 
neutral and above class interests. 
(Shin 1991: 142) 
In fact, one main effect of economic policies was to prevent a broad indigenous middle class 
and a more powerful pribumi bourgeoisie emerging outside the realms of the politico-
bureaucratic families. A native entrepreneurship would have had more ‘moral right’ to speak 
out against the Soeharto regime, contrary to the Chinese pariah capitalists. This was the rea-
son why, as Schwarz (1991: 41) justly claimed, ‘the prospect of an indigenous business class 
wielding political power may prove to be more of an obstacle to pribumi business ambitions 
than their access to capital or the quality of their entrepreneurial talents’. Therefore, the po-
litical powerholders did everything to retard the rise of independent indigenous businessmen 
in order to protect their own position and keep a potentially challenging pribumi bourgeoisie 
at bay (Budiman 1988: 121). However, a small number of individuals such as the Bakries 
were allowed to rise as capitalists, making use of the pro-pribumi phrases of the government 
(Robison 1996: 96). They remained, nevertheless, far too few to challenge the system and 
were, indeed, very close and loyal to Soeharto and his family and thus quickly became a part 
of the oligarchy.  
The vacant position through the lack of indigenous capitalists inside the national economy 
was filled by the politico-bureaucrats themselves. Businessmen were recruited from their 
midst. The most significant example was Soeharto’s own clan. Revealingly, the president’s 
son Bambang was amongst the main proponents of pribumisasi, signifying for whom these 
measures were really meant (Hadiz 1997: 206). They facilitated the emergence of the Cen-
dana groups (named after the address of Soeharto’s house) in the 1980s. Bambang Trihat-
modjo’s Bimantara, Tommy’s Humpuss, Tutut’s Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada, Sigit Harjo-
judanto’s Arseto, and Titiek Prabowo’s Maharani Group as well as many other ventures of 
further relatives belonged to Soeharto’s extensive business empire, with Bimantara and Hum-
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puss being two of the largest conglomerates in 1996 (see Appendices, Table 1). Many other 
politico-bureaucratic families also managed to establish their own business groups (Habir 
1999: 188). The examples that Aditjondro (2002: 40-1) mentioned read like a comprehensive 
list of persons of distinction and importance in the New Order, including relatives of former 
Vice President Habibie, former Information Minister Harmoko, and former Development 
Planning Minister Ginanjar Kartasasmita.  
The politico-bureaucrats thus started to accumulate sufficient capital themselves, thereby 
decreasing their financial reliance on Chinese businesses. They could even hope in the long 
run to become their own class of businessmen and eventually be able to substitute for their 
Chinese counterparts. For this the permanently sustained anti-Chinese xenophobia was in-
strumental in several ways: (1) It gave the politico-bureaucratic justification to represent and 
expand pribumi capital; (2) it reproduced Chinese dependence on the state, while (3) it di-
verted criticism against the New Order, blaming the increasing inequalities solely on the Chi-
nese. (4) Moreover, it provided a reason for the ruling powers to re-establish order through 
the military, whereby the army could underline its own indispensability. The implementation 
of new repression against the population could thus be justified, while the demand of the poor 
masses – as well as the populists and indigenous businessmen who supposedly spoke up for 
them – for a larger share of the Indonesian economy was discredited and de-legitimised, link-
ing these postulations to anti-Chinese violence (Heryanto 1998: 102). Thus it was not surpris-
ing that riots were more than once instigated by the military itself (see McBeth & Tripathi 
1998). However, it was a fine line to walk for the government. As will be shown later, social 
unrest could not always be channelled and became increasingly harmful for the rulers (Robi-
son & Hadiz 2002: 52).  
The emergence of politico-bureaucratic capitalists helped the oligarchy to anchor itself 
both politically and economically and to organise the New Order as a regime that gave its 
dominant element, the politico-bureaucrats, nearly absolute power. They managed to subdue 
or co-opt all actual and potential opponents. Foreign investors usually appreciated and sup-
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ported the corrupted system as long as it fulfilled its function as a cash cow, delivering profits 
unthinkable elsewhere. Domestic private capital, as well, took a share in the predatory alli-
ance and was efficiently repressed through the permanently maintained fragile social status of 
the predominantly Chinese business class and the hindrance of pribumi capital. The politico-
bureaucrats therefore succeeded in depriving capital of its general authority and – as is the 
case in many states – even command over the political sphere. Significantly, the only capital-
ists who could overcome the effective separation of money and power were the political elites 
akin or close to Soeharto, who increasingly grew into big business themselves at eye level 
with their main Chinese cronies, occupying an advantageous political position due to their 
family links with the government.  
 
The expansion of oligarchic capitalism (1982–97) 
Robison & Hadiz (2004) characterised the alliance between the politico-bureaucrats and the 
Chinese capitalists as forming a ‘capitalist oligarchy’. In fact, after the collapse of oil prices 
first in 1981/1982 and again in 1986 it became even more obvious that the two groups were 
combined in more than just a partnership of convenience. Although Chinese capital and the 
state managers were still two distinct entities, they constituted a ruling class bound together 
by common strategic interests. Significant for this were the predatory raids on markets that 
became possible through the technocratic policy reforms in the 1980s that were implemented 
to find a replacement for the oil exports (Robison & Hadiz 1993: 20). They ended the protec-
tionist economic policies and relaxed many regulations for foreign investors. However, what 
first looked like a bitter defeat for the oligarchy turned out to be one of its most decisive vic-
tories. The reforms admittedly meant a retreat of the state, but at the same time constituted a 
shift in policies in favour of private capital. Through the deregulation packages that involved 
an opening of sectors formerly closed to investments and a radical liberalisation of the capital 
markets, both politico-bureaucratic and Chinese capitalists were given the opportunity to 
grow domestically. In the 1990s, finally, the conglomerates were liquid enough to engage 
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themselves internationally as well. In the following, I will demonstrate how the capitalist oli-
garchy expanded. We will see, however, that the increasing success also disclosed some signs 
of tension between the two parties involved. The contradictions that became more apparent 
towards the end of the regime reveal the faultlines between the state and capital, helping us to 
determine the respective positions inside the New Order power structures.  
The politico–business oligarchy 
The reforms implemented in the wake of the oil crisis were meant to structurally adjust the 
state-led interventionism of the late-1970s to the requirements of a post-oil recession. Accord-
ing to the technocrats, Indonesia’s international competitiveness would be hard to maintain 
without the immense oil revenues, if the domestic markets were not liberalised (Pangestu 
1996: 141). They hoped that a thorough deregulation would lure foreign direct investment and 
loosen the grip of the politico–business oligarchy on the economy (for a good overview of 
major contending groups in the economic liberalisation process, see Basri & Hill 2004: 647). 
From 1982 to 1986, the financial and tax system was modified and many industries such as 
banking, transport, trade, and manufacturing were deregulated in order to vitalise the private 
sector and non-oil exports as an alternative to the state sector and oil related businesses re-
spectively (Sato 1994: 141). By 1987, the measures yielded fruit. Foreign as well as domestic 
investments rose significantly. 
Contrarily to the reformers’ expectations, however, it was these policy changes that made 
the instruments for an unprecedented capital accumulation available to the oligarchy. Robison 
& Hadiz (2002: 48) observed that the move towards deregulation was only implemented in 
certain economic areas, leaving monopolies in the most lucrative sectors intact and exclu-
sively under oligarchic control. In fact, the capitalists succeeded in grabbing many state ven-
tures that were to be deregulated. It was thus a ‘colonisation of a system of state monopolies 
by state-backed private conglomerates’ (Robison & Hadiz 1993: 26) that took place in Indo-
nesia in the 1980s. 
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Most vital for the massive expansion of big business was the liberalisation of the banking 
sector after the mid-1980s economic crisis (see Rosser 2002: 51-83). This gave the conglom-
erates the opportunity to acquire capital from sources that were not accessible for them be-
fore, enabling them to grow even more rapidly in and beyond Indonesia (Hadiz 2001a: 130-
1). On the one hand it was a huge advantage for them that the Central Bank as well as state 
banks lost their quasi monopoly of giving credits. From 83 per cent of all outstanding bank 
credits in 1982, the ratio of politico-bureaucratic controlled loans fell to only 40 per cent in 
1995 (Rosser 2002: 57). On the other hand, the reforms of the banking sector also terminated 
most special credit programmes for small indigenous companies that constituted half of the 
total credit by the early 1980s (Rosser 2002: 65), resulting instead in a massive increase of 
loans for Chinese big business groups who could easily afford to pay market rates for interest 
(Rosser 2002: 63). In the mid-1990s, preferential credits to small businesses had fallen to 7 
per cent, while 80 per cent of all bank credits went to the conglomerates (Habir 1999: 186-7). 
From 1988 to 1994, the number of private banks more than doubled, while the amount of 
commercial bank loans quadrupled (Rosser 2002: 63). Financial services offered quick and 
lucrative returns on investments, which was, as Hing (1987: 409-35) observed for Malaysia, 
very attractive for a group highly dependent on lenient ethnic policies. Almost every big Chi-
nese group founded one or more private banks, thereby decreasing their dependency on funds 
from state banks. Indeed, in the early 1990s, they intensively made use of intra-group loans 
that, in many conglomerates, rose up to a level of 90 per cent, bringing some corporations 
close to bankruptcy, only to be eventually rescued by the government (Robison & Hadiz 
2002: 49-50). 
A further step was to reform the capital markets. The government increased the impor-
tance of the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX), giving in to the pressure of potential international 
investors (Rosser 2002: 90). From only 24 listed companies in 1988, the number rose to 250 
eight years later (Rosser 2002: 89). With the stock market the conglomerates found a source 
to raise capital, substituting for the decreasing ability of the state to protect and finance them. 
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Moreover, being partly owned by the public enabled Chinese big business to hedge some of 
their companies against confiscation.  
The deregulation measures were thus a process that provided adequate backup, calculable 
risks, and unending possibilities. Indeed, they were an inevitable, necessary step the con-
glomerates had to take to overcome the glass ceiling of growth under the protectionism of the 
1970s. This made them the main beneficiaries of the reforms, as Sato observed:  
Now dominant private capitalists (even those who were developed by patronage) have outgrown 
the initial stage to become the main engine of the revitalization of the economy, regarding liber-
alization not as a threat but as an opportunity. The evidence for this is the recent prominent per-
formance of business groups in every deregulated sector. 
(Sato 1994: 147) 
This resulted in the formation of domestic capital in the hands of a ‘state-sponsored private 
oligopoly’ (Robison 2001: 33). Chinese businessmen could henceforth count on their own 
immense capital base that allowed them to seize the many opportunities created by deregula-
tion. The greater access to capital further allowed them to play an important role globally and 
shift their assets overseas, which, in turn, made them relatively independent from the Indone-
sian market. The second beneficiaries from the reforms were the politico-bureaucrats, espe-
cially the Soeharto family that increasingly replaced the Chinese in the state–business net-
works, thus becoming the main recipients of patronage. They induced power through a fric-
tionless fusion of both political and economic authority. Being combined in one politico–
business ‘capitalist oligarchy’ the state managers and the Chinese corporate moguls had thus 
erected an apparatus of power that was unassailable for outsiders, enshrining their might 
through an ever growing capital base.  
They were an ideal team. In an elaborate division of labour the Chinese tycoons and the 
indigenous political powerholders complemented each other perfectly. There was no need for 
the capitalists to possess own political power, as their interests were well represented by the 
politico-bureaucrats. The latter, on the one hand, needed Chinese capital to finance projects 
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and even invest in various unprofitable sectors which the government wished to see devel-
oped (e.g. steel production; Robison 1986: 314). On the other hand, the Chinese fostered them 
and helped them become capitalists. Therefore, despite the enormous economic growth of 
Chinese conglomerates, the powerholders saw no reason to exchange their partners, the more 
so as the social and political position of the tycoons remained weak. Chinese big businessmen 
were thus unwilling to revolt against their subordinate position, as the system still served them 
very well, and they remained unable to do so due to their pariah status.  
It is not possible to determine the exact degree of the capitalists’ power during the New 
Order. Certainly, their capital resources gave them a structural veto, but they never had to ap-
ply it as their loyalty had never been put to the test. Although some of the government’s deci-
sions were overtly anti-Chinese in character and consequence, the tycoons were aware that 
the discriminatory policies were necessary to mediate, legitimise, and stabilise the system. 
However, for a potential dissension, the politico-bureaucrats had put in place sufficient provi-
sions such as riots or demonstrations to curb a more immediate grip on power of the Chinese, 
whose position was still too delicate to have a stake in Indonesian society and politics. The 
Chinese capitalists were thus reliable partners, whose economic growth did no harm to the po-
litical powerholders. They secured the latter’s political authority and economic rise, for which 
they became stakeholders in a predatory form of oligarchic capitalism. Therefore, both part-
ners benefited immensely from this intensification of the well-established state–capital sym-
biosis.  
Contradictions 
The inherent contradictions between Chinese capital’s economic power and its political vul-
nerability were increasingly difficult to conceal towards the end of the Soeharto regime. On 
the one hand – as has been shown – they constituted the basic foundation of the successful 
oligarchic alliance and were critical for the functioning of bureaucratic capitalism. On the 
other hand, however, they more and more endangered the very existence of the New Order 
accommodation between the state and capital.  
  
83 
One major problem for the government was its increasingly untrustworthy claim to repre-
sent pribumi interests. The more predatory the politico-bureaucrats proved to be, the more dif-
ficult it became for them to depict themselves as an economically disadvantaged group. The 
recurring pronouncements in favour of economic democracy (e.g. Suryadi in Chalmers & 
Hadiz 1997: 199-203) threatened some of the ideological legitimacy of the state, highlighting 
the discrepancy between the political leaders’ egalitarian pretension and rapacious bearing 
(Robison 1993: 69). As it turned out, populist protests against the prominent role of Chinese 
big business became a powerful tool of opposition to the regime, providing an outlet to chal-
lenge the otherwise unassailable position of the bureaucratic powerholders indirectly. As 
mentioned before, the government did not have to fear the critics and had sufficient retaliatory 
actions at hand to curb, channel, or even make use of upcoming dissent with its rule. How-
ever, on the coat-tails of the criticisms some potent opponents rose, emerging out of the ranks 
of the indigenous or Muslim bourgeoisie. They could resort to an increasingly more assertive 
media that moved the conglomerates to the focus of their attention (Habir 1999: 183). The ex-
cesses of capital were intensively monitored and scrutinised, often in a mix of racist and anti-
capitalist attitudes (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4: Anti-Chinese/anti-capitalist cartoons 
 




(Taken from Far Eastern Economic Review 2 May 1991: 39) 
The state managers thus had to take care that they did not overstretch their ethnic policies. 
Anti-Sinicism was only helpful in certain, instrumentalisable doses. Too much of it could 
backfire on them and inhibit the whole regime. 
Another key contradiction that led to strain inside the politico–business oligarchy was the 
unending growth of Chinese capital. As explained earlier, at the end of the day Chinese busi-
ness success had never seriously threatened the durability of the alliance with politico-
bureaucrats. However, it elevated the Chinese into a potentially more assertive position vis-à-
vis the political elite and thus distorted the carefully negotiated balance of power between the 
state and capital. The bureaucrats had to rely on the congruity of interests with their cronies 
and could not be sure of the consequences a clash of interests would bring about. According 
to MacIntyre (1990: 251-2), from the mid-1980s on, business interests were ready to organise 
and act outside the given corporatist structures. This signified a degree of economic matura-
tion of the conglomerates, which obviously could as well do without protectionism. In fact, 
MacIntyre (ibid.) even noted that Chinese businessmen became more and more accepted in 
society, gradually losing the negative image that used to hinder them before. Moreover, 
through their overseas investments and expansion into global markets they became interna-
tional players and hence did not have to confine themselves to Indonesia. The assets that they 
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silently shifted abroad to safer shores gave them an insurance against crisis, social unrest, and 
regime change. They had achieved a certain degree of autonomy, as their fate was neither de-
termined by, nor linked with the political elites.  
In the early post-crisis years, Hadiz (2001a: 131) suggested that ‘it is possible that such in-
ternationalised conglomerates have survived the recent Asian crisis’. By now, almost one 
decade after the crisis, it can be assessed that they indeed did – in contrast to the politico-
bureaucratic business groups that obviously failed to grow beyond the status of mere rentiers 
dependent on political protection. The power of Chinese big business apparently was more 
substantial and structurally anchored, even though the restrictions during the New Order were 
comprehensive, but not absolute. Although they were necessary for the functioning of the 
politico–business oligarchy, before the crisis the capitalists already managed to limit their 
limitations effectively, thus providing successfully for the post-Soeharto era. Eventually, this 
was the ultimate reason that the crisis became the catalyst for a regime change from bureau-
cratic to plutocratic capitalism, with capital claiming a position that better suited its actual 
power.  
  
3.3 The limited power of capital 
The New Order was a sophisticated system based on an authoritarian, centralised, and preda-
tory state apparatus that effectively secured the dominance of the state elite for more than 
three decades. A pervasive ideology and the comprehensive control of executive, legislative, 
and judiciary powers in tandem with enormous economic success shielded the dominant poli-
tico-bureaucrats from any threats to their ascendant position. There were almost no sources of 
effective challenge to the Soeharto dictatorship. Most decisive was the co-optation of Chinese 
capitalists through the predatory networks and their marginalisation with the help of ethnic 
policies, turning them into willing helpers and prospering junior partners. The compliant class 
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of restricted capitalists gave the politico-bureaucrats the much needed financial base to collat-
eralise their rule and prevent the rise of politically more threatening indigenous businessmen. 
In this chapter, I pointed out where this system of dominance had its historically rooted de-
terminants. Already before 1600 the indigenous rulers established relations with Chinese 
traders that bore patterns to be bequeathed for the centuries to come. During Dutch rule Chi-
nese businessmen became indispensable to the colonial economy and especially to the power-
holders, who soon realised the crucial role of non-indigenous entrepreneurs for their own au-
thority and economic endeavours. By the end of colonialism, Chinese capitalists became so 
important that even explicitly anti-Chinese nationalist policies of the independent Indonesian 
republic could not – and did not intend to – do them any serious harm. Chinese big businesses 
maintained their economic power since colonial times; a circumstance economic historian 
Thee Kian Wie (interview 19 April 2004) called ‘the tragedy of Indonesia’ because of the 
fateful repercussions of anti-Sinicism culminating in the May 1998 riots. 
The New Order regime purposefully took over the precarious Chinese position in economy 
and society and further amplified the contradictions. This can be gleaned through four main 
trajectories: (1) The ruling politico-bureaucrats marginalised the ethnic group of Sino-
Indonesians and recruited the major capitalists out of it, thereby linking capital to an outsider 
group that was thus turned into a pariah business class. (2) The Chinese capitalists were co-
opted in patronage networks with the political powers, which laid the foundations for the rise 
of Chinese capital. (3) This symbiosis was consolidated during the 1970s, a time of immense 
revenues for the state due to the oil boom. The politico-bureaucrats secured their dominance 
in a bureaucratic oligarchy and with an authoritarian, centralised, and protectionist system 
that facilitated the emergence of the political powerholders as indigenous capitalists. (4) From 
the 1980s onwards, the politico–business oligarchy managed to exercise and expand class 
power through a rapacious form of oligarchic capitalism, effectuating unlimited capital accu-
mulation of both political and economic elites at home and abroad. At the same time, how-
ever, these successes resulted in increasing tensions and hardly concealable contradictions. 
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This historical overview of Chinese big business and the state before 1998 therefore re-
veals the following power relations: In Indonesia, the bourgeoisie was predominantly Chinese 
and relatively weak until the late 1960s. Political power was first in the hands of colonial and 
later ‘indigenous’ bureaucrats who managed to tame the capitalists and prevent their access to 
direct executive power. Although the state elite succeeded in transforming itself into an in-
digenous capital class in the latter half of the New Order regime, the politico–business ac-
commodation became increasingly unhinged in favour of Chinese big businesses through 
their impressive success at capital accumulation from the 1970s – paradoxically facilitated 
and guaranteed by the state. The growing economic power of the Chinese capitalists thereby 
intensified the need to counterbalance Chinese economic strength through instigating popular 
anti-Sinicism and implementing discriminatory policies. This indicated that a slow transfor-
mation had taken place in Indonesia, in which the hegemony of the politico-bureaucrats stead-
ily lost its material foundations, although, as long as the New Order regime existed, the Chi-
nese capitalists were not willing – and had no need – to apply their structural veto power. In 
the final analysis, however, they succeeded in entrenching themselves as a ruling class-in-
hibernation that could do very well with patronage, but would also survive without.  
Through the crisis, as will be shown, parts of the state apparatus – before under absolute 
control of the administrative rulers – unravelled. Chinese conglomerates, formerly integrated 
in a flourishing regime of bureaucratic capitalism and an integral part of the politico–business 
oligarchy, were not yet sure if they could sustain themselves without protection. The follow-
ing chapters provide some strong indications that they can. Indeed, they were very well 
equipped to thrive in a post-authoritarian regime in many ways, as the reforms offered a more 
congruous setting for an emerging plutocracy in contemporary Indonesia in which the Chi-





CAPITAL IN CRISIS: 
THE CONGLOMERATES AND THE END OF THE NEW ORDER 
The New Order accommodation between the state elite and the Chinese capitalists ended 
abruptly when the economic crisis hit Asia in 1997. Many members of the oligarchy were se-
riously struck by the unexpected dishevelling of the Soeharto regime. The big conglomerates, 
as the financial backbone of the system, were especially affected. Threatened with bank-
ruptcy, they were thought to be unable to survive without centralised KKN and the conducive 
environment of a corrupt economy and authoritarian state. The aim of this chapter is to exam-
ine how these times of economic and political crises affected the conglomerates and to evalu-
ate their impact. To what extent did the state-centred patronage networks disintegrate? Could 
the reforms help constitute a new system that would finally pave the way for an eventual dis-
solution of the oligarchy’s cling to power? Before I discuss in Chapter 5 how the conglomer-
ates reacted to an unknown terrain of democracy, decentralisation, and deregulation30, it is 
necessary to analyse the unravelling of the New Order in some detail.  
I will show that the crisis had indeed been a significant disruption that resulted in a break-
down of the conglomerates’ collusive arrangements. They were affected considerably, many 
of them so much that a recovery seemed to be unlikely. The reforms the crisis triggered were 
powerful enough to destabilise and temporarily paralyse the New Order oligarchy. This chap-
ter seeks to outline the resulting changes and their consequences for the conglomerates.  
                                                     
 
30
 In this chapter, I use the terms ‘democracy’, ‘decentralisation’, and ‘deregulation’ merely in relation 
and contrast to the New Order regime, being aware that in most characteristics the post-Soeharto Indo-
nesian state remains only formally democratic, decentralised, and deregulated. 
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It is important to bear in mind the manifest limitations to historical change, which Marx 
(1960: 111) referred to in his ‘18th Brumaire’.31 The ability of social actors to refashion an en-
trenched social order is encumbered by the historical and structural circumstances they im-
mediately encounter. Here and in subsequent chapters, I will show that so-called ‘democratic 
transitions’ are by no means tantamount to transformations automatically leading to an ideal-
ised world of free markets and good governance, as expected by the IMF, the World Bank, 
and others in the neo-liberal camp (e.g. Sen 1999). I suggest that reformasi in Indonesia nei-
ther resulted in the end of the conglomerates, nor has it been the starting point for a new and 
significantly different system of power relations, as the changes failed to alter the underlying 
structures of power (see Chapter 1.1). Instead, a regime was swept away and replaced by an-
other more democratic, decentralised, and economically liberalised one, while the old power 
elites managed to survive and re-establish themselves in the new post-authoritarian environ-
ment. 
Therefore, it is misleading to consider this transitory period as a kairos, a potential turning 
point where everything was possible. However, even though the modifications to the regime 
were not substantial enough to entirely disempower the New Order forces, the changes in the 
years 1997/1998 were constitutive for the post-Soeharto time and relevant for the future 
stance of capital in Indonesia. They thus deserve detailed elaboration.  
 
                                                     
 
31
 ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please, not under circumstances se-
lected by themselves, but under directly prevailing, given and historically transmitted circumstances’ 
(Marx 1960: 111).  
Original (published 1852): ‘Die Menschen machen ihre eigene Geschichte, aber sie machen sie nicht 
aus freien Stücken, nicht unter selbstgewählten, sondern unter unmittelbar vorgefundenen, gegebenen 
und überlieferten Umständen.’ 
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4.1 The crisis in context 
On 2 July 1997, the Bank of Thailand floated the Thai baht to defend the currency against 
speculation and further capital outflow. This prompted a 7 per cent fall of the Indonesian 
rupiah on 21 July. Many experts did not attach great importance to this plunge and anticipated 
the economy to be back on track soon, believing that ‘Indonesia is not Thailand’ (e.g. Ferid-
hanusetyawan 1997: 8). Indeed, its astonishing boom, which led to forecasts that saw the Ja-
karta stock market index heading ‘for the stratosphere in the period leading up to the year 
2000’ (Faulkner 1995: 11), made it hard to believe that the amazing transformation of Indone-
sia from a formerly poor ‘Third-World’ country into an up-and-coming high-performing 
economy was about to be reversed. The widespread enthusiasm was endorsed by authoritative 
global institutions such as the World Bank, which published its widely anticipated eulogy on 
‘The East Asian Miracle’ only four years before the crisis took place (World Bank 1993).  
In the first half of 1997, Indonesia’s economy still performed as impressively as in most of 
the 30 years before and achieved a growth rate of 7.3 per cent (Soesastro & Basri 1998: 3). In 
July 1997, therefore, nobody wanted to acknowledge the severity of the monetary problems 
which surfaced. However, what was first perceived to be a passing ‘blip’ (Hill 1999) turned 
out to be a major crisis of an enormity unbeknownst before in Indonesian history, as the gov-
ernment’s inability to halt the financial meltdown inevitably transformed the economic crisis 
into a political one with far-reaching implications and consequences. These resulted in futile 
attempts of the powerholders to save their regime, major social upheavals and riots, and ulti-
mately in nothing less than the end of the New Order.  
 
Interpretations 
There have been various attempts to explain this development and the crisis in general. Rodan 
et al. (2001: 2-9) divided them into neo-classical, historical institutionalist, and social conflict 
approaches. The neo-classical approach constitutes the mainstream perspective. It emphasises 
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the functioning of markets, seen as inherently efficient mechanisms that regulate themselves 
and every other aspect of society. Neo-liberalism, the ideology that is derived from this the-
ory, not only makes a distinction between the political and economic spheres, but regards 
politics as naturally antagonistic to the market. Good public policy should thus annihilate it-
self and ‘leave it to the market’ or, at best, ensure that the market is allowed to operate effec-
tively (e.g. World Bank 1983: 47-56; Soesastro 1998). The latter proposition is only partly 
shared by historical institutionalists. For them it is not just the rational choice of individuals 
aiming for higher profits that contribute to economic growth – as assumed by neo-classical 
theory – but also, and more importantly, the institutions and organisations that forge markets. 
The state, therefore, becomes a main focus of such interpretations (e.g. Booth 1995). Institu-
tionalists are especially concerned about institution-building and good governance. Funda-
mentally different from these two perspectives is the social conflict approach. It is based on 
the main assumption that neither markets nor institutions can be insulated from politics and 
interests. On the contrary, specific power relations produce particular institutional arrange-
ments. Markets as well as institutions are thus not neutral, mechanical entities operating in a 
vacuum, but embedded in the hierarchical order of society determined by systemic processes 
of social and political conflict (Rodan et al. 2001: 7-9). 
Based on these basic suppositions, exponents of the various schools of thought analysed 
the crisis and revealed the flaws they held responsible for it. Neo-classical economists 
claimed that the economic downturn corroborated their main assumption about the necessity 
of keeping markets free of political obstructions. The New Order state with its pervasive mar-
ket distortions through corruption, collusion, and nepotism had offended this universally valid 
rule, made worse by wrong decisions and bad policy responses of Soeharto (e.g. Soesastro & 
Basri 1998) as well as ‘the erosion of the quality of technical competence and integrity of 
President Soeharto’s cabinet ministers, as he relied more and more on his family members 
and cronies for advice’ (Nasution 2001: 38). The crisis was thus seen as a ‘wake-up call by 
financial markets, which might – in a relatively painless fashion – curb very high current ac-
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count deficits, induce governments to clean up the financial sectors, and reign in the prolifer-
ating, mostly dubious and off-budget, “mega-projects”’ (Hill 1999: 15). Backed by interna-
tional donor organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank that provided the much 
needed funds, neo-liberals had the leverage to anchor their normative views and solutions so 
that a retreat of the state as well as deregulation and privatisation became the commonly ac-
cepted remedies to which governments were forced to subscribe.  
Institutionalists, on the other hand, blamed the crisis precisely on the insufficient interven-
tion of the state (e.g. MacIntyre 1999). They declared the economic prescriptions of the neo-
liberal camp, i.e. liberalisation and deregulation, as the very cause of the havoc that ruined the 
formerly extremely successful developmental state model of the booming tiger nations in East 
and Southeast Asia. To protect the vulnerable economy from slipping again into yet another 
crisis, institutionalists demanded even more capacity for the state to prevent further market 
failures. However, although both sides varied considerably in their basic assumptions and 
long-term solutions, they were not too far apart from each other in their immediate objectives: 
good governance and institution-building to achieve quick economic recovery and growth. 
The lack thereof inevitably led to the disaster as the economy became more open and interna-
tionalised, because Asian capitalisms32, in particular the Indonesian adaptation, could not 
cope anymore with the demands of a more sophisticated and global market system (Boorman 
& Richer-Hume 2003). The argument between neo-liberals and institutionalists was therefore 
merely about the right form of capitalism and the roles that markets and institutions play 
therein. 
Social conflict theorists rightly dismissed these discussions as bagatelles that do not ad-
dress the core of the problem (e.g. Robison & Hadiz 2004). Concerns about power relations 
                                                     
 
32
 Particular to the Asian versions of capitalism was the role of the state, its links to big business, and 
an aversion to handling economic matters in a laissez-faire style (Beeson & Robison 2000: 9). It was 
planned capitalism, or, as Beeson & Robison (2000: 11-13) called it, ‘coordinated capitalism’ that 
helped a scrupulous power-interested ‘predatory’ regime to get into and stay in power. 
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and interests were lacking in both other approaches. While poor regulation, inadequate super-
vision, and bad governance did aggravate the crisis, works that exclusively emphasised these 
factors and identified the main problems merely as technical or even behavioural ones remain 
inadequate to understand the fundamental dynamics of the Indonesian political economy. Fur-
thermore, such explanations are often ambiguous as it is very uncertain whether appropriate 
institutional arrangements or completely deregulated markets could have prevented the crash, 
or would turn out to be the panacea for the problems. Without a framework that amply con-
siders the contestations within state and society, observers from a neo-liberal or institutional 
perspective had difficulties explaining the severity of the crisis, why it was sequenced with 
the fall of long-time dictator Soeharto, or for which reasons a revitalisation of the Indonesian 
economy did not set in immediately, such as in the cases of Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia 
(see Basri 2004: 40-1). Therefore, this chapter considers the crisis as a social conflict regard-
ing the distribution and (re)configuration of power before, during, and after the collapse of the 
New Order. 
I will also examine how the crisis unsettled the New Order arrangements, particularly in 
relation to the Chinese conglomerates. The social conflict perspective allows us to compre-
hend the development of capitalism as a specific manifestation of its normal cyclical boom–
bust nature (Hewison 2000: 210) and the Indonesian crisis in particular as a significant dis-
ruption of the highly centralised, predatory patronage networks of the New Order. At the 
same time, it also acts as a facilitator and an arena of a new round of power struggles (Robi-
son 2001: 109). I will therefore begin with a brief analysis of the configurations of power be-
fore the crisis commenced.  
 
Capital on the eve of the crisis 
The sudden economic collapse came as a shock. Nothing extraordinary happened in Indone-
sia. There had been no catastrophe, no political incident, or any other event of sufficient sig-
nificance that might have caused the economic ruptures. Nobody anticipated a crisis, and 
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definitely not one in such severity. On the contrary, until the end of 1997, most observers ad-
mired Indonesia’s ‘remarkable record of socioeconomic development’, achieved through 
macroeconomic stability over many decades (Boorman & Richter-Hume 2003). For instance, 
only two years before the crash, Hill (1996) saw no indication of a nascent crisis while still 
emphasising the robust characteristics that by far outweighed the negative ones. The crisis 
took him admittedly by surprise (Hill 2000: xiv). Why were all economic forecasts com-
pletely inaccurate? Why did every early-warning system fail?  
The problem was that most economists were dazzled by the massive growth and convinced 
of the general functionality and effectiveness of the New Order. Their analyses therefore did 
not question the structural system on the whole and scrutinise its constituent powers and in-
terests, but addressed only relatively minor economic policy issues, thereby neglecting the 
immense structural changes that reconfigured Indonesian capital. As described in Chapter 3, 
capital emerged during the early 1970s and became a major social and economic force. How-
ever, these capitalists, who were mainly Chinese, were constrained by being labelled and 
stigmatised as Chinese. They were thus dependent on their partners in the bureaucracy and 
executive. The opening of the financial markets in the mid-1980s eventually gave them the 
possibility to amass sufficient capital to establish an independent power base relatively 
autonomous from the state and its rulers. The conglomerates gained further immunity and se-
curity by transferring enormous sums outside of Indonesia, propelling them into an advanta-
geous bargaining position through which they attained a structural veto that compensated for 
their lack of direct political power.  
However, by no means did the capitalists want to jeopardise the bureaucratic capitalism 
that brought them into being and continued to nurture them. Even though they had to face 
significant limitations, the circumstances they were in were much too convenient and profit-
able to be broken up. It required the Asian crisis to dissolve such collusive arrangements. The 
sudden deterioration of the economy also revealed the inherent contradictions of Indonesian 
capitalism. More than ever, it became obvious that the very bases of the New Order’s boom 
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were also the reasons for its bust. KKN, on the one hand, was a vital precondition for the poli-
tico–business oligarchy – and also for the economy as a whole – to grow. On the other hand, 
it was also one of the attributing reasons for the collapse of the financial system. While the 
socially weak, ostracised position of Chinese capitalists was necessary for the establishment 
and functioning of the New Order regime, it was also the very cause for the tycoons to bring 
their capital to safer havens as insurance for times of political turmoil. This fragile, carefully 
balanced system worked well as long as the economy boomed. The moment the capital mar-
kets in Asia collapsed and capital deserted Indonesia, the New Order tumbled down as well. 
The crisis illustrated most clearly the indispensable position capital had achieved. From 
dependent clients the Chinese tycoons silently emancipated themselves to become a structur-
ally decisive bourgeoisie inside the capitalist oligarchy, which was, however, still restricted 
by the social status of its ethnicity. Whoever was to rule Indonesia required an accommoda-
tion with the forces of capital. At the end of the day, it was the sudden pull-out of Chinese 
capitalists from the Indonesian economy, along with the diminishing international investor 
confidence, that triggered the unravelling of the economic and political arrangements which 
had been so beneficial for them. 
 
Monetary crisis 
Most conglomerates emerged in the 1970s and 1980s out of virtually nothing more than their 
good connections with the political elite (see Chapter 3). By the mid-1980s they started to be-
come global players, financed by their domestic, extremely lucrative patronage networks. 
Many monopolies and exclusive contracts were bestowed on them without much competition. 
Through these arrangements they grew and contributed to enormous growth rates. As the 
main engine of Indonesia’s economic boom, the conglomerates became megalomaniac. The 
unending possibilities for reaping giant profits lured them to invest in increasingly gargantuan 
projects. For this, they needed money that they borrowed from banks outside of Indonesia or 
from their own banks, neglecting all legal lending limits. In only eight years, the private sec-
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tor debt rose more than six times, from US$12.4 billion in 1989 to US$80.1 billion in 1997, 
which even surmounted the public sector’s debt (see Nasution 2001: 27). Most of these li-
abilities were unhedged and denominated in US dollars, thus making the Indonesian corporate 
sector very vulnerable to depreciations of the rupiah. Relatively minor disturbances in the 
capital market could therefore demolish the conglomerates’ impressive looking empires like a 
house of cards.  
The problems became acute as Indonesia’s big businesses panicked through the currency 
problems in Thailand and started to buy US dollars to minimise the effects of a devaluating 
Indonesian currency. The haemorrhaging of capital further intensified the fall of the rupiah, 
which led to a collapse in confidence in the general economic situation, aggravated by the 
perceived helplessness of the government. The result was, in turn, an even larger scale of 
capital outflow, as private enterprises sought to prevent insolvency, fearing that their widely 
unhedged liabilities, denominated in foreign currencies, would exceed the value of their 
rupiah based assets.  
To alleviate the exodus of capital, the government floated the rupiah on 14 August 1997 
(for a chronology of events, see Hill 1999: 11-14) and announced several packages to rescue 
the currency. This, however, did not keep the stock markets from plunging on 28 August 
1997, thereby compelling the government to turn to the IMF for assistance. On 31 October, it 
signed an agreement with the Fund that provided US$43 billion financial aid package, which 
was tied to demands for strengthening monetary and fiscal policies, a major restructuring of 
the financial sector, significant deregulation measures, and trade reforms, as well as the pro-
motion of transparency and openness (IMF 1997). On 1 November, 16 banks were closed at 
the request of the IMF, a step that increased uncertainty and further worsened rather than 
helped the situation (Cole & Slade 1998: 63). None of these ‘ambitious reforms designed to 
equip Indonesia’s economy for the challenges and opportunities of globalization in the com-
ing decades’, as the IMF (1997) praised them, could either prevent the rupiah’s devaluation of 
– by September 1998 – eventually 78 per cent against the US dollar (Evans 1999: 119), or 
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stop the massive capital flight that reversed the net inflow of US$16 billion in fiscal year 
1996/1997 to a net outflow of US$13 billion the year after (IMF 2002). 
Certainly, the conglomerates did not do this voluntarily, arbitrarily, or even purposefully. 
They were in existential distress to safeguard the value of their assets by seeking shelter in 
other, more stable currencies. The latent flaws of the whole financial system, i.e. the lack of 
appropriate macroeconomic management, regulation, and governance, which they had previ-
ously profited from, induced them before to increase their external debts and the level of mo-
bility of their capital, thus amplifying the harshness of the situation. At the same time, it ob-
structed any effective and immediate solution of the problem.  
Through the sudden absence of economic growth the regime lost the main foundation of 
its legitimacy. Not being able to redress the situation further strengthened the impression of a 
fundamentally weakened government, which lost its authority and credibility to the IMF that 
determined the necessary actions to be taken to solve the crisis.  
 
Regime crisis 
Soeharto realised quickly that the foreign-led initiatives to save the Indonesian economy were 
harmful to the continuing existence of his regime. The recommended reforms not only con-
signed him to the role of one who was vanquished, but also threatened directly the bases of 
the patronage networks he had carefully built over the years, as well as the politico–business 
alliances that lay at the heart of the New Order oligarchy. Not surprisingly, the president was 
not committed to the intentions he was forced to declare. He thus decided to stall for time. 
The Letters of Intent (LOI) signed by the Indonesian government (IMF 2003: LOI 31 October 
1997, 15 January 1998, 10 April 1998) complied with the demands of the IMF, but appar-
ently, the concessions were mainly tactical in nature. By acceding, he intended to divert the 
attention of IMF from him and receive some urgently needed money to circumvent the imme-
diate doom of his order. However, he increasingly ignored the suggestions of reformers, as 
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the constellation of his last cabinet of March 1998 showed. This included free-spending re-
search and development minister B.J. Habibie as Vice President, Soeharto’s business and 
golfing buddy Bob Hasan as Trade Minister, and his daughter Tutut as Minister of Social Af-
fairs, accomplishing ‘the unusual feat of offending nearly everyone’, as Schwarz (1999: 351) 
remarked. The formerly invulnerable dictator desperately tried to save the old apparatus – an 
objective destined to fail as the remaining stakeholders were about to shift their stakes from 
the road to ruin to a rather unpredictable future. The Chinese capitalists, as pointed out before, 
had already deserted the sinking ship by transferring parts of their capital abroad. 
As the oligarchy fell into a spin, the rudiments of Indonesia’s civil society, which was effi-
ciently disorganised and suppressed under the New Order, seized the opportunity to stage pro-
test against the regime. Prompted by inevitable price rises due to the devaluation of the cur-
rency, impoverished people were starting to show their displeasure openly. In January and 
February 1998, the first serious riots were directed mainly against Chinese Indonesian shop-
keepers in small towns of Java (Purdey 2002: 73-5). The elimination of fuel subsidies as part 
of the IMF stabilisation programme (IMF 2003: LOI 15 January 1998) and the immediate in-
crease in price of petrol after implementation on 1 April led to outbreaks in Medan and other 
cities.  
This social unrest got out of control, even though some fractions of the powerholders, 
amongst them most likely elite units of the military around Soeharto’s son-in-law Prabowo 
Subianto (Schwarz 1999: 355), played the ‘Chinese card’ once more to direct the anger of the 
people away from the government towards the Chinese minority that served as ideal scape-
goat (see Chapter 3.2). This was a well tried method the New Order government periodically 
resorted to, such as during the anti-Chinese demonstrations in Jakarta and Bandung in 1973 
and 1974 (Setiono 2003: 1001-6), during the riots in Solo in 1980 (Setiono 2003: 1025-8), 
and in Medan in 1994 (Heryanto 1994). This time, however, things got out of hand. Instead of 
being satisfied with seemingly obvious explanations for the crisis that blamed the Chinese 
shop-owner for the shortage of rice or the Chinese tycoon for the economic deterioration, the 
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instigated rage of the mob did not stop at burnt-down cars, houses, shopping centres, and 
murdered or raped bodies of Sino-Indonesians, but was intensified and re-orientated against 
the actual powers by demonstrators from the universities. If there was any hidden master plan 
to save Soeharto through initiating chaos, it failed entirely. On the contrary, the fragility of 
the system increased and it became clear all the more that Soeharto had gradually lost control 
over the situation. 
It would be an exaggeration to assert that it was the students and other protestors who 
overthrew the regime (as suggested by, e.g., Sukardi 1999: 204). However, they exposed that 
the system had no means anymore to contain the unrest. This contributed to the more decisive 
factor: Old stalwarts and former reliable bases of Soeharto’s power turned away from their 
leader in the moment in which a new person on the apex of the system seemed to be a better 
alternative to ensure their own survival. The treason of his most loyal allies such as the erst-
while Golkar chair and Speaker of the MPR Harmoko, then-Housing Minister Akbar Tand-
jung, or former Coordinating Economy Minister Ginandjar Kartasasmita (see O’Rourke 2002: 
118-35) symbolised the new divide of the power elites who were lining up for better starting 
positions in a new round of power allocation in a new regime. The same applied to his one-
time business partner Sofjan Wanandi who voiced his concerns and had to bear the discipli-
nary sanctions (Schwarz 1999: 346-7). 
Soeharto finally stepped down on 21 May 1998. The oligarchic powerholders saved their 
system by sacrificing its main architect. This was very risky, largely because the president’s 
dismissal could potentially affect or cause the deterioration of their links with the political-
economic bases. Without him, would the whole apparatus disintegrate? How did the end of 




4.2 Economic impact: 
The dismantling of the business empires 
The economic and political changes generated by the crisis disrupted the symbiotic accom-
modation that had been achieved by state and capital during the Soeharto regime. The New 
Order’s unsettling caused immense distress to the conglomerates, who were perceived to be 
largely responsible for the whole crisis (Rosser 2002: 95). It appeared to put an end to an ex-
traordinary economic success story and deprived the business groups of the networks and ar-
rangements from which they had profited. Before I discuss the breakdown of the very suppor-
tive and protective environment the authoritarian, centralised, and collusive New Order re-
gime provided, I will show in this section how the capitalists’ material base eroded, making 




The economic damage caused by the sudden and deep plunge of the Indonesian currency 
massively disrupted the corporate world, whose composition was regularly depicted in the 
annual Top 222 of Warta Ekonomi and other magazines. Despite the lack of such rankings for 
post-crisis Indonesia (see Chapter 1.3), it is certain that an actual configuration and order 
would vary significantly from the last list compiled in 1997 (Warta Ekonomi 24 November 
1997: 32-5; also Appendices, Table 1). It is safe to assume that today’s key data of most busi-
ness groups, i.e. the value of assets, the number of companies and employees, and the turn-
over rate, are now by far more modest than before. Economist Chatib Basri estimated that the 
conglomerates lost 25 to 30 per cent of their assets (interview 12 May 2004).  
Data Consult (1998: 184) assessed that 55 per cent or 138 of the 250 conglomerates it 
monitored have to face ‘the fate of being removed from business stage’ (Data Consult 1998: 
152), because ‘those which were very close to the political elite in the New Order Era and en-
joy[ed] special facilities and privileges, are now being investigated, scrutinized and cornered’ 
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(Data Consult 198: 145). Eight business groups out of the largest 30 pre-crisis conglomerates 
were not mentioned in the list of surviving conglomerates, i.e. Gajah Tunggal, Argo Manung-
gal, Barito Pacific, Humpuss, Danamon, Metropolitan, Matahari, and Ometraco (Data Consult 
1998: 184-90).  
Certainly, it was inevitable that some groups faced bankruptcy. Danamon Group, for in-
stance, lost its bank and was therefore not able to sustain its operations in the financial sector 
that used to be by far the core business of the group. While Bank Danamon, which was later 
sold to Singaporean DBS and German Deutsche Bank, continued to exist, former owner Us-
man Admajaya was banned from leaving the country and had to face prosecution (Data Con-
sult 1998: 176). The end of the regime also meant the loss of economic power for Soeharto’s 
closest cronies. First, the president’s family enterprises under the Cendana group were placed 
under great pressure. Tommy was convicted of fraud, while his brother Bambang’s group 
Bimantara owed US$2.5 billion to state banks. Most of his major partners cancelled joint ven-
tures and contracts, as Bimantara lost its main appeal, the direct access to the president. The 
market capitalisation of Bimantara Citra, the publicly listed companies of the group, dropped 
from US$2 billion in 1997 to US$40 million in 1999 (Far Eastern Economic Review 13 May 
1999). Another prominent casualty was Soeharto’s close friend, timber baron Bob Hasan, 
who forfeited all his monopolies, concessions, and positions and eventually was jailed for 
cheating the government out of US$75 million.33 
Other conglomerates at least had to declare huge losses and struggled to repay their do-
mestic and external debts as well as the loans Bank Indonesia had provided for their banks. 
For the non-recoverable domestic loans, which well-connected business groups received 
mainly from state-owned banks, the tycoons had to negotiate with the government (see fol-
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 Both Tommy Suharto and Bob Hasan were released early. The latter, because ‘he showed a good ex-
ample in prison by organizing a business in which inmates turned volcanic rock into jewellery for sale 
to tourists’ (Far Eastern Economic Review 4 March 2004). 
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lowing section). To illustrate the immenseness of the amounts in question: Texmaco and 
Barito Pacific, for instance, had outstanding debts of Rp17.3 billion and Rp8.4 trillion respec-
tively, while Bakrie defaulted on Rp6 trillion (Sato 2004: 30). The external debts were even 
more gargantuan. As of the end of 1997, the three largest, most highly diversified and global-
ised conglomerates, Salim, Astra, and Sinar Mas, were estimated to owe US$5.5 billion, 5.1 
billion, and 3.8 billion respectively only to foreign creditors (ibid.). The Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review (14 February 2002) reported that Sinar Mas Group’s ‘prize asset’ Asia Pulp & 
Paper (APP) alone had to repay US$13.9 billion in total. Furthermore, it disclosed the struc-
tural deficiencies of these groups, such as APP’s decentralised procurement of supplies and 
its inefficient and costly marketing and distribution network tying up capital and inventory, 
which was regarded as a ‘mess with hundreds of subsidiaries and affiliated companies scat-
tered around the world’ (ibid.). The biggest problem for most conglomerates, however, was 
the debts of their private banks. Due to unresolved structural weaknesses in the real estate and 
banking sectors, where the level of unhedged short-term debts was high and the one of capi-
talisation low, a serious liquidity crisis developed that brought many of the 238 pre-crisis 
banks on the brink of collapse, such as Liem Sioe Liong’s BCA, which was indebted by 
Rp52.7 billion, Sjamsul Nursalim’s BDNI, Rp28.4 billion, and Usman Admadjaja’s Bank 
Danamon, Rp12.5 billion (Tempo 27 January 2002). 
Through the financial breakdown of the conglomerates ‘an important split was now driven 
into the business/state relationship’, as Robison & Hadiz (2004: 154) observed, because this 
not only put an end to the patronage networks, but also tied up enormous financial resources 
of the government that was forced to bail out the defunct business groups. The old ways of 
collusion were henceforth not feasible anymore. On the contrary, to prevent its own bank-
ruptcy, the state established the Indonesian Banking Restructuring Agency (IBRA) in January 





The thorough restructuring of the banking sector began with the closure of 66 banks by 
IBRA, the take-over of 11 banks, the merger of 14, and the recapitalisation of 9 others as-
sessed as viable (Adiningsih 2001: 180). With this, the government had three explicit objec-
tives, namely to rehabilitate the banking sector, reduce the debt burden, and restructure the 
private sector debt (IBRA 1999: 5). Through IBRA, in cooperation with the Indonesian Debt 
Restructuring Agency (INDRA) and the Jakarta Initiative (jointly established by the Govern-
ment of Indonesia, the World Bank, and USAID), it implemented a guarantee scheme and re-
habilitation programme for the banking sector and undertook corporate debt restructuring, 
shareholder settlements, assets divestment, and the recovery of government funds (IBRA 
1999: 11-17).  
IBRA soon became the largest creditor of the conglomerates by buying the non-
performing loans (NPLs) that crippled the banking system. These loans were the consequence 
of an anarchic financial sector without prudential regulations, which allowed 23 of the top 30 
business groups to have one or more of their own affiliated banks (Sato 2004: 30). Banks 
were not only status symbols and flagships, but also used as internal cash cows by channel-
ling funds to other businesses inside the conglomerate, complementing the enormous sums of 
loans already received from state-owned banks. According to Bambang Subiyanto, Minister 
of Finance under Habibie (interview 16 September 2004), most of the banks in Indonesia 
should have been liquidated due to an overall quota of 80 per cent NPLs (Rp320 trillion) of 
the Rp400 trillion in total liabilities. As this was economically and politically not feasible, the 
government gave blanket guarantees that accumulated – including interest – to Rp650 trillion 
in government bonds by the end of 1999, through which in effect private losses were trans-
ferred to the public. Additionally, the ailing business groups received Rp146 trillion of Cen-
tral Bank Liquidity Funds (BLBI) from Bank Indonesia for the recapitalisation of their banks 
(Hadiz & Robison 2005: 227).  
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IBRA’s main task was to recoup these contingent liabilities from the conglomerates. To 
force them to liquidate assets, it had several instruments at its disposal: It could threaten de-
faulted debtors to bring them to trial before the new commercial court on the basis of a re-
vised bankruptcy law implemented in April 1998 (Rosser 2002: 183), or simply seize the 
needed assets, a sanction which IBRA was authorised to mete out. Hence, debt settlement and 
corporate restructuring were closely interwoven. IBRA was therefore in a potentially very 
powerful position that some politicians – such as the Minister for Cooperatives Adi Sasono – 
wanted to use to expropriate the conglomerates and redistribute their assets to cooperatives 
(Murphy 1998). The tycoons were thus in the dock, a situation further intensified by their 
huge foreign debts (see Sato 2004: 27, 30). The immense losses caused by the economic crisis 
and the plans the government tentatively devised to recoup them gave the tycoons an unambi-
guous signal that times had changed. IBRA’s rules were the new norm with which the busi-
ness groups had to comply, removing their immunity and hindering them from proceeding as 
they used to. To survive, they needed to make this new institution subservient to their needs. 
In 1998, it still looked as if the conglomerates were not able to do that and to recover fast and 
easily, as not only their economic empires collapsed, but also the political regime in which 
they had emerged. 
 
4.3 Political impact: 
The dissolution of predatory arrangements 
As outlined in Chapter 3, the New Order was based on authoritarianism, centralism, and col-
lusion, thereby enabling the oligarchic elites to maintain their dominance. It was this political 
environment that bore and moulded Chinese big business. The crisis terminated the quasi ab-
solutist, openly predatory characteristics of the old regime. Suddenly both businessmen and 
politicians were exposed to reforms that sought to undermine the foundations of the New Or-
der (Bhakti 1998: 174-5). More specifically, reformasi was intended to reconfigure the power 
structures in three areas: shifting power away, first, from the president and the political elites 
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to the people and society; second, from Jakarta based gatekeeping institutions to provincial 
parliaments and regional decision makers; and third, from the major cronies and parasitical 
capitalists to free markets and international investors. I will examine and analyse the struggles 
to democratise, decentralise, and economically liberalise Indonesia that took place right after 
the breakdown of the old regime, and evaluate the consequences for the conglomerates the 
demise of the New Order brought about. I will show that the implementation of the reforms in 
1998 seriously threatened the business groups by dismantling the foundations of the old oli-
garchy.  
 
The end of authoritarianism 
Authoritarianism was imperative to uphold the New Order. Not being hindered by any note-
worthy opposition, the ruling state elite around President Soeharto could engage in predatory 
capitalism without checks and balances (see Chapter 3). The Chinese cronies especially 
needed a strong, protective state that defended them against populist racism (that, in turn, was 
instigated by the government itself). This situation changed tremendously with the advent of 
the formal-institutional and the civic sphere of democracy, i.e. parliamentarism and the awak-
ening of civil society.  
With the fall of their leader, the politico-bureaucrats were suddenly confronted with at-
tempts to install a new democratic framework designed to override their former centralised 
institutional power. This suddenly became possible because the army that safeguarded the old 
system had only one feasible option during and after the final days of the New Order: to sub-
mit itself to civilian supremacy. The alternative would have been to use violence openly to 
break down the student movement, which the military leadership under Wiranto deemed un-
wise (Schwarz 1999: 363-4). Thus, the soldiers retreated partially from the political sphere 
they had dominated for decades. This paved the way for some important reforms that included 
the reduced powers of the presidency and the state party Golkar, which were formerly the 
main political centres of the old regime.  
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After 32 years of Soeharto’s rule, the legislative period of presidents was limited to five 
years with the possibility of one re-election. Significantly, none of Soeharto’s immediate 
three successors – Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati – managed to remain in of-
fice for a prolonged period. Indonesia’s sixth president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, became 
the fourth head of state in only six years after Soeharto’s resignation. He has to share power 
with many other political institutions at various levels, above all with the DPR (Dewan Per-
wakilan Rakyat/House of Representatives), formerly a rubber-stamp parliament par excel-
lence (O’Rourke 2002: 88). The DPR has grown so much in power that it is able to control 
the executive body and even hold the president accountable for his actions. The impeachment 
of Abdurrahman Wahid in July 2001, for instance, exemplified the shift of power from the 
executive to the legislature.  
The strengthening of parliament led to the emergence of politicians and parties. The num-
ber of the latter rose from only three government funded and largely impotent ones to more 
than 140 by end of 1998, out of which 48 were eligible to compete in the national elections 
(Fealy 2001: 100). Golkar, the undisputed political instrument of the politico-bureaucrats, 
suddenly had to face serious competition and was forced to transform itself from a govern-
mental state party with 75 per cent of the vote in 1997 to an ordinary participant in the strug-
gle for votes with only 22 per cent in 1999 – which made it a distant second to the PDI-P (Fe-
aly 2001: 101). Most notably, two leading former opposition politicians, Abdurrahman Wahid 
and Megawati, assumed the post of president and vice president following the first free elec-
tions of post-Soeharto Indonesia. Parties and candidates were now forced to appeal much 
more directly to the electorate. This was a considerable renunciation of the formerly rigged 
electoral procedure that took place every five years, which had been merely in place to sustain 
the appearance of a democratic system. Through the new regime of parliamentarianism the 
elected politicians needed and obtained democratic legitimacy, thereby ending the monopoly 
of unlimited authoritarian power. 
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This was a major drawback for the conglomerates. The time of guaranteed political protec-
tion was over and a new era of great uncertainty had begun. Without their main patron, Presi-
dent Soeharto, the architect and integral facilitator of the New Order patronage networks, they 
suddenly lacked the reliable political backing necessary to uphold the well established symbi-
otic arrangements between capital and the state. Furthermore, they lost their access to unlim-
ited funds, which, during the New Order, merely depended on the proximity to Soeharto and 
his family. Additionally, due to their ethnic ascription, they became assailable to populist de-
mands for a ‘redistribution of assets’ – a code-phrase for the expropriation of Chinese con-
glomerates (Murphy 1998), best epitomised by Amien Rais’ attempts to define the Chinese 
tycoons as parasites:  
We must respect the economic achievements of our Chinese brothers and sisters. But at the 
same time we must tell them frankly that in the future we would like a fairer distribution of the 
national wealth. I can say that 95% or more of the Chinese love Indonesia like I do. Only a very 
small percentage are absorbed with economic greediness. They have become parasites. 
(Amien Rais, cited in Asiaweek 29 May 1998)  
Thus the appointment of Soeharto’s confidante B.J. Habibie – known for his anti-Chinese 
sentiments – as his successor was met with consternation. At the beginning of his presidency, 
he wanted to replace Chinese businesses and ‘give the opportunity to the pribumi, who make 
up the largest population and build them up’ (cited in Suryadinata 1999: 11). Commenting on 
the exodus of Chinese businessmen and their capital, Habibie noted: ‘If the Chinese commu-
nity doesn’t come back because they don’t trust their own country and society, I cannot force, 
nobody can force them. […] But do you really think that we will then die? Their place will be 
taken over by others’ (cited in Washington Post 19 July 1998). He was backed by the parlia-
ment that called upon the government in November 1998 to shift assets and preferential atten-
tion away from the conglomerates to cooperatives and small and medium enterprises (Em-
merson 1999: 341-2).  
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The many unknown parties, politicians, and administrative authorities that the reformed 
framework brought about were even more disconcerting than the new president, who was in 
the end himself a product and one of the main protagonists of the New Order. As former PAN 
General Secretary Faisal Basri (interview 14 September 2004) reported, many businessmen 
relied heavily on Golkar to which they felt indebted, because it protected them and provided 
them with economic privileges. However, the politico-bureaucrats who used to penetrate the 
state apparatus through Golkar were forced to take a back seat. It therefore became very un-
clear for the conglomerates whom to choose as a suitable partner. Politicians, and even presi-
dents, were appearing and disappearing quickly. For the immediate post-Soeharto years, no 
distinct power centre inside the party system was able to establish itself. Thus, it became 
problematic to identify what the important positions were and who filled them, making the re-
turn on investment in bribes very unpredictable. 
A similar threat to them was the emancipation of the civilian sphere from the former all-
embracing state that – rather than the formal aspects of democracy – made a real difference to 
the populace. The newly achieved liberalisation of society was in stark contrast to the former 
corporatist regime of the New Order, in which a suppressive state apparatus with the help of 
the pervasive ideology of ‘integralist developmentalism’ (Bourchier 2001: 116) either co-
opted or dismantled all societal groups and muted every kind of serious dissent (see Chapter 
3). With reformasi, civil society regained two of its basic rights, namely the freedom of asso-
ciation and the right to express opinions openly.  
An increasingly critical population started to organise itself through numerous new and 
older NGOs to fight for human rights, equality, transparency, or other concerns, thereby di-
rectly or indirectly balancing the ones in power. A few groups were explicitly geared towards 
controlling big business. One example was the ‘Koalisi Masyarakat Anti Skandal Bank Lippo’ 
(people’s coalition against the Lippo Bank scandal), led by prominent figures such as Lin Che 
Wei and Faisal Basri, that closely monitored the Lippo Group and aimed to prevent excessive 
fraud (Agam Fatchurrochman, Programme Manager Partnership for Governance Reform in 
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Indonesia, interview 2 September 2004). Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) was another 
group that effectively exposed many cases of KKN. According to its Vice Coordinator 
Danang Widoyoko (interview 7 September 2004), ICW’s strategy against systemic corruption 
was to create publicity for shady dealings and arrangements, thereby minimising any form of 
secrecy possible, which would henceforth change the overall business culture.  
This reveals the second characteristic of a more vibrant civil society. Public opinion sud-
denly became an important factor which could be used by NGOs and other critics to mobilise 
for their aims. The growing media industry also gave them an appropriate platform. The free 
press could print opinions in unrestrained, critical ways unknown before and still alien to the 
media of some other countries in the region. Kontan journalist and Head of Aliansi Jurnalis 
Independen (AJI – Alliance of Independent Journalists) Eddy Suprapto (interview 8 Septem-
ber 2004) emphasised that most of his collegues were eager to prove their indispensability for 
a liberal society and saw themselves as guardians of the new, weak democracy. The press 
constituted ‘the fourth power that has to substitute for a non-existent system of checks and 
balances’, as the Executive Editor of Rakyat Merdeka, Teguh Santosa (interview 14 June 
2004), described the role of his newspaper.34 Through the media, liberal reformasi ideas be-
came ascendant in the public discourse. The unanimous goal was to strive for an open, de-
mocratic society. 
This objective, of course, was not at all in accordance with the interests of the conglomer-
ates. Indeed, it was detrimental for them. In the eyes of many activists, the corrupt Chinese 
tycoons disqualified themselves through their behaviour and could hardly play a role in a 
people-based democracy. In a few cases, anti-conglomerate sentiments became emotionally 
or instrumentally mixed up with anti-Chinese resentments, creating a politically powerful tool 
                                                     
 
34
 Rakyat Merdeka is one of the most outspoken daylies that ‘gained prominence as a result of its gritty, 
often abrasive, style, with articles and caricatures that frequently strongly criticize the political estab-
lishment’ (Amnesty International 2003). As such, it was sued for defamation of then-Speaker of the 
DPR Akbar Tandjung and then-President Megawati. 
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at the disposal of populist politicians or indigenous competitors (e.g. Jusuf Kalla, see Wibowo 
2004).  
Chinese big business was under close supervision of the media and under public scrutiny. 
Economic historian Thee Kian Wie (interview 19 April 2004) stated confidently that, with a 
freer press, the same kind of cronyism would not be possible anymore. Businessman Sofjan 
Wanandi (interview 8 June 2004) agreed and lamented that ‘the conglomerates cannot expect 
anything from the government anymore. It […] cannot just give monopolies because we now 
have so many watchdogs here and there that are complaining all the time.’ Elsewhere, he de-
plored that ‘the overall environment for business is far from being favourable. In the case of 
some, most likely Soeharto’s children and cronies, there is a witch-hunt taking place’ (Wan-
andi 1999: 131). An anonymous ‘consultant who works with many Chinese conglomerates in 
Jakarta’, cited by The Wall Street Journal (22 May 1998), claimed with justification that the 
tycoons would ‘much prefer martial law. […] They at least know how to get along with the 
army.’ Hence, with the end of the New Order style of authoritarianism, they had to face an ac-
tive, organised, and critical civil society that treid to make their lives more difficult. 
 
The end of centralism 
The highly centralised and unitary New Order state ensured Jakarta’s institutional and politi-
cal authority over the provinces and districts. Demands for greater regional autonomy were 
not tolerated during the Soeharto years. As the dominance of the centre faded in 1998, several 
regions started to demand more rights; some of them, such as Aceh or East Timor, called for 
independence more intensively than before. To prevent the balkanisation of Indonesia, the 
central government had no other feasible alternative than to give in to demands for greater 




decentralization may create a geographical focus at the local level for coordinating national, 
state, provincial, district, and local programs more effectively and can provide better opportuni-
ties for participation by local residents in decision making. Decentralization may lead to more 
creative, innovative and responsive programs by allowing local ‘experimentation.’ It can also 
increase political stability and national unity by allowing citizens to better control public pro-
grams at the local level. 
(World Bank 2001) 
In essence, decentralisation was seen as a means to increase the efficiency, immediacy, and 
accountability of governance to secure political stability and national unity. In this sense, 
many responsibilities were handed over to more than 400 local governments, and the distribu-
tion of revenues from natural resources was renegotiated in favour of the districts of origin 
(Brodjonegoro 2004: 128). Kabupaten (districts) and bupati (district heads) thus became 
newly powerful in relation to many institutions and ministries based in Indonesia’s capital 
(see Bünte 2003: 129-41). Another step in this direction was to take away the right of the 
president to virtually approve every single investment. Authorisation was only required for 
huge projects worth more than US$100 million (Rosser 2002: 183). This symbolised that the 
conglomerates’ main vehicles for the allocation of favours that used to be based in Jakarta 
were considerably threatened to be vitiated by Indonesia’s move from centralism to decen-
tralisation.  
These structural adjustments were anticipated to be paralleled by fundamental changes in 
the way that power operates. For the World Bank (2004a), the decentralisation of power was 
the precondition for an ‘ambitious program to tackle corruption in Indonesia from the ground 
up’ by implementing its ‘good governance initiative that may pave the way for a major im-
provement in accountability, transparency and participation at the local level in Indonesia – 
and it is hoped the economic and poverty reduction performance in the selected regions’. For 
this, the Bank appealed to local authorities with the prospect of substantial funding and in-
vestments for the ‘50 to 60 of the best local governments’ in the amount of more than US$200 
million per year, in so far as they adhered to ‘good governance’ reforms and participated in 
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anti-corruption initiatives (Laksamana.net 10 April 2004). As the World Bank’s Chief Gov-
ernance Advisor of Indonesia, Joel S. Hellman (interview 16 September 2004), pointed out, 
decentralisation did not only yield new institutions, but also led to ‘a vastly different range of 
political actors and entirely different interactions with institutions’. The traditional strategies 
of the conglomerates were thus no longer apposite. 
Corruption had become less predictable in its outcomes. As economist Faisal Basri (inter-
view 11 September 2004) stated, ‘there is no guarantee, no certainty anymore that your busi-
ness is successful, because power is more distributed and you have to deal with more than one 
instance’. He expected that this eventually would result in cleaner companies. Analyst and 
politician Sjahrir (interview 24 September 2004) concurred and asserted that the conglomer-
ates were being forced to change their behaviour, because in a decentralised Indonesia sub-
stantial capital accumulation through corruption was not possible anymore. Businessmen, 
such as Pharos boss Eddie Lembong (interview 21 October 2004), confirmed that ‘the situa-
tion now is difficult. Power is scattered and not concentrated, which makes it complicated for 
businesspeople to deal with’. The boss of Artha Graha, Tomy Winata, declared that 
During the New Order, everything was easy for Chinese big business: There was one pot of 
money, contracts and opportunities, and the pot was with the Cendana; now the pot is spread to 
thousands of people. The political landscape has changed a lot and is more complex than before. 
Now the social cost of doing business in much higher. 
(Tomy Winata, interview 17 September 2004) 
Thus, the end of centralised authoritarianism spelled the end of the New Order’s centralised 
system of patronage, from which the conglomerates benefited immensely before. 
 
The end of protectionism 
As long as the state–business oligarchy allowed others to take a share in the huge profits gen-
erated during the New Order, predatory and instrumental control of the Indonesian economy 
on the part of Soeharto’s family and his Chinese business cronies was tolerated. Indonesians 
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outside the immediate power circle as well as foreign investors were not too worried about the 
hijacked markets that still yielded sufficient revenues for them. Driven by internal techno-
crats, external creditors, and a poor macro-economic environment, Indonesia experienced 
some market-oriented reforms in trade, investment, and the financial sector from 1986 to 
1988 and from 1994 onwards (Soesastro 1998). However, the areas in which the predatory in-
terests of the ruling alliance were most thoroughly entrenched in remained untouched by the 
deregulation measures. In general, they enabled the state–business oligarchy to seize new 
monopolies (Hadiz & Robison 2005).  
Nevertheless, Indonesia was held up as an example of an economic miracle (World Bank 
1993), despite massive corruption and widespread overregulation of the economy. Indeed, it 
was the successful Indonesian case which the neo-liberal World Bank premised for an ad-
justment of its stance on capitalism and the state (World Bank 1997). However, as soon as the 
economy crashed, the former apologists resorted to their old neo-liberal recipes, which, from 
their perspective, obviously proved to be superior. Therefore, Indonesia had to undergo a 
thorough process of deregulation to free the markets, preceded by institution-building, to en-
force and safeguard the contentious economic liberalisation. 
In fact, after the crisis the paradigm of economic policies changed dramatically. While lib-
eralism used to engender negative connotations in society (Hadiz 1997: 139; Hill 2000: 250) 
and was highly contested in Indonesian history (see Rosser 2002), it became the cure-all for 
the crisis and the detrimental effects of KKN, which was regarded as nothing more than a 
‘debilitating luxury Indonesia could not afford’ (Borsuk 1999: 140). The still highly regulated 
economy was to be transformed into a liberal market system. Through much needed injec-
tions of funds and the implementation of programmes from neo-liberal institutions such as the 
IMF or the World Bank, reformers suddenly had the leverage to push for their economic vi-
sions of transparency, competition, equal access to opportunities, and a less distorted market 
that was deemed to be self-regulatory (e.g. Simanjuntak 2000). Many Indonesian economists 
as well as international organisations pointed out that liberalisation, deregulation, and privati-
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sation were imperative to regain international business confidence and eradicate unproductive 
and costly rent seeking (e.g. Basri 2004: 55-6; Boorman & Richter-Hume 2003). The media 
rejoiced that Indonesia’s doors were finally wide open for foreign investors, a condition 
which was supposed to further foster free markets (Bisnis Indonesia 29 July 1998). 
As a first step, the acceptance of the new rules of capitalism had to be ensured by creating 
an appropriate institutional framework. During the New Order, supervisory boards that lim-
ited the cruising radius of the oligarchy were non-existent. Thus a system of checks and bal-
ances was urgently needed that set out the rules and kept the market free from entrenched 
predatory interests. Being aware that ‘the strengthening of prudential rules and regulations is 
essential to rebuild the banking industry’ (Nasution 2003), and that international investors 
needed an accountable, reliable, and predictable business environment, the new government 
had to install effective watchdogs, reform the courts, and implement laws that stemmed cor-
ruption. 
A few measures in this direction were carried out decisively. The authority of former ‘stra-
tegic gate-keeping terminals’ (Robison & Hadiz 2004: 76) such as the State Logistics Agency 
(Bulog) or the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) was significantly cut 
down. New institutions such as IBRA (see Chapter 4.2) or the Business Competition Supervi-
sory Commission (KPPU), modelled on the German Kartellamt, were put in place to scruti-
nise and prevent business practices aimed at the establishment of monopolies or market 
dominance, as KPPU Commissioner Faisal Basri (interview 11 September 2004) pointed out. 
They acted on the basis of a new anti-monopoly law that sought to maintain and promote 
market competition as a means to achieve economic efficiency, and thus improve the welfare 
of the general public (Thee 2002: 333-5). Notwithstanding the elusiveness of these guidelines, 
they signalled to the conglomerates that they finally had to deal with a modified regulatory 
framework that made it difficult for the capitalists. New people (such as economist Faisal 
Basri), some of them very idealistic, were appointed in new boards that were crafted espe-
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cially to inspect the behaviour of big business, with new rules to protect the market from dis-
tortions. These cumulatively connoted an end of the conglomerates’ immunity.  
The post-KKN economy could not be used as the personal playground of the oligarchy 
anymore. This especially became clear through the abolition of privileges. Most special gov-
ernment projects in, for instance, the automobile and aircraft industry, and all state-sanctioned 
licences for the import and marketing of commodities ranging from cement and food to ‘silly 
things like garlic’ (Bambang Subiyanto, former Minister of Finance, interview 16 September 
2004) were revoked. Licences, reserved for well-connected businessmen, including bank 
credits, were annulled. All government contracts were reviewed and dismantled in case they 
had been concluded through KKN (James & Nasution 2001: 199). Huge SOEs like Pertamina 
that served as generators of collusive contracts and cartels were dissolved or subjected to 
gradual privatisation (Laksamana.net 21 September 2003). Significantly, as suspected by 
Tempo (10 November 1998), the Salim Group wanted to dispose of its flour producer, 
Bogasari, due to the abolishment of the lucrative flour monopoly it enjoyed over the decades. 
Former President Abdurrahman Wahid (interview 17 September 2004) maintained that Indo-
nesia was on the way towards an ‘improved capitalism’, in which businessmen could not 
count anymore on their close connections with the government and had to subordinate them-
selves to the needs of the market and the people. 
It is useful to recount Wallerstein’s (1988: 103) premise about the inherent interest of capi-
talists in monopolies. As he suggested, ‘capitalists do not want competition, but monopoly’, 
because they ‘seek profits, maximal profits, in order to accumulate capital, as much capital as 
possible’. They are thereby not merely motivated but structurally forced to attain monopoly 
positions. Thus, a liberal economy – from this perspective – obstructs big business particu-
larly. Economist Chatib Basri (interview 12 May 2004) pointed out that, with the implementa-
tion of regulations leading to free markets, ‘old-style business groups’ would cease to exist. 
Reformers such as Sjahrir (interview 24 September 2004) were ‘quite sure that there was no 
way [for the conglomerates] to enjoy the sort of facilities they had in the Soeharto era.’ In-
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stead, it was widely expected that they had to adapt to western norms of corporate govern-
ance, transparency, and professionalism to exist in a liberal economy. Similarly, Gunadi 
Sindhuwinata, President Director of Indomobil, contended that  
since the environment has become liberal and you are a part of the international society, the way 
of doing business has to be tuned up and trimmed accordingly. We now have to let professional 
people run the business. 
(Gunadi Sinhuwinata, interview 22 September 2004) 
The conglomerates that survived the crisis had to realise, according to Farid Haryanto (Lippo 
advisor, interview 21 June 2004), that growth was only possible through the market.  
Sofjan Wanandi (interview 1 July 2003) was not alone in his prediction that the conglom-
erates of the New Order would disappear sooner or later if they stuck to their old patterns of 
collusion. Sampoerna’s Angky Camaro acceded:  
Now everything is open, licences are available for everyone. The conglomerates have to com-
pete in the free market. That leads to a change. […] Who has the mentality of the New Order 
cannot survive. 
(Angky Camaro, interview 17 September 2004) 
If they were right – and in 1998 there were not many indicators that contradicted them – big 
business in Indonesia indeed had to transform itself fundamentally to be able to carry on in 
deregulated markets without the help of protectionism and KKN. But were the conglomerates 
able to survive in those new, even alien conditions? 
 
4.4 The end of the conglomerates? 
The political environment in Indonesia changed immensely after the crisis. From predatory, 
centralised authoritarianism, the country moved towards deregulation, decentralisation, and 
democracy. Economic liberalism, safeguarded by various watchdogs, was expected to replace 
the collusive appropriation of the markets by the oligarchy. Regional autonomy was also sup-
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posed to shift more power to the districts and away from Jakarta. Moreover, political parties 
and civil society groups seemed to thrive in new ways that were not possible under the old 
dictatorship. All these reforms – at least in intention – were potentially harmful to a continu-
ing existence of the conglomerates, as they ‘swept away the financial and political arrange-
ments that held this system together’ (Robison & Hadiz 2002: 39). Thus, it was widely ex-
pected that the unravelling of the old regime was equivalent to an end of Chinese big busi-
ness, as many observers assumed that the conglomerates were not suited to survive in an 
open, transparent political and economic setting (e.g. Sjahrir 2004). Capital was believed to 
be economically and politically in a deep, severe crisis. Therefore, political risk consultant 
Kevin O’Rourke concluded that  
the conglomerates are longing to have the New Order back, because for them the succeeding re-
gime is neither efficient nor reliable. They are forced to pay off too many persons, while being 
constantly harassed by critics, media, and politicians. 
(Kevin O’Rourke, interview 6 September 2004) 
As the President Director of Indomobil, Gunadi Sindhuwinata, confirmed: 
Under the New Order the directions were clear: I give you opportunities, you develop that, in re-
turn you get some amount of money. […] Suddenly you are confronted with all this profession-
alism, with all the ways to do business by, first thing, non-corruption, second, non-nepotism, 
and third, non-collusion. Under the New Order it was very easy, and people felt also at that time 
that it was safe and secure because of the strong hand of the regime.  
(Gunadi Sindhuwinata, interview 22 September 2004) 
He certainly missed the convenience and security of the former regime. However, there was 
nothing to be done. The New Order was irrevocably gone for good, and with it the political 
environment without which the conglomerates were left unprotected. This chapter has shown 
in detail how democratisation, decentralisation, and deregulation brought about many changes 
that initially were totally unfavourable for big business.  
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However, much of this turned out to be just a temporary setback. Only a few years later, 
Anthony Salim (interview 13 April 2005), boss of Southeast Asia’s formerly biggest business 
group, praised the new business environment and called it ‘encouraging and much more bene-
fiting than harmful’. The crisis, obviously, did not at all terminate the conglomerates. It was 
an enormous shock that hurt them significantly and destroyed some of them, but it did not 
obliterate them. On the contrary, most were able to reorganise and adapt, but not necessarily 
through business practices that were any more transparent than during the New Order. It is 
thus necessary to take a closer look on the sort of markets that were to be established.  
As will be discussed in the following chapters, the reforms were eventually and paradoxi-
cally even advantageous for the capitalists. They removed the barriers designated for ‘Chi-
nese’ big business and enabled capital in general to emancipate itself from the dominance of 
the politico-bureaucrats, whose intertwined system of political hegemony disintegrated. To 
those observers who expected real structural change and the dissolution of the economic and 
political foundations of entrenched oligarchic interests, the outcomes of the crisis were disap-
pointing. However, behind the surface of the lingering status quo, a major shift in the balance 
of power between the political and economic elites is taking place, which would allow capital 
to gain an upper hand over the political sphere. Chapter 5 will show how the capitalists re-
sisted, diverted, or took instrumental control over the reformasi process and thus laid the 












THE SURVIVAL OF THE CONGLOMERATES 
The reforms that were meant to change Indonesia seemed to be the end of the road for the 
conglomerates. The crisis threatened their economic empires and unravelled the political ar-
rangements that had underpinned them. It was widely assumed by observers (such as Mackie 
1999: 189) that Soeharto’s cronies would not be able to carry on in an environment lacking 
the formerly crucial authoritarian, centralised, and protectionist features of the New Order. 
However, the fact is that most of them obviously survived the end of the old regime. The ob-
jective of this chapter is to explore how they managed to do so and what implications their re-
silience had for the actual state of Indonesia.  
I suggest that the main reason for the conglomerates’ survival was the indispensability and 
importance of Chinese capital for a recovery of the Indonesian economy. The tycoons could 
thus prevent their impending collapse and ensure that the whole reformasi process took place 
under the premise of structural continuities that did not endanger their existence. As I will 
show, the reforms were too incoherent and superficial to completely destroy the power bases 
of the New Order forces and to subordinate them to a substantive reform agenda. The elites, 
their interests, and institutions that constituted the old system did not completely vanish into 
thin air. On the contrary, as long as the more fundamental power structures of a predatory 
form of capitalism remained intact, the New Order oligarchy had time and opportunity to re-
store its collusive politico–business networks and to silently reinvent itself in a post-
authoritarian environment, in which the majority of the conglomerates quickly re-emerged 
from the brink of oblivion.  
Before I point out in Chapter 6 how the capitalists utilised the possibilities of the new re-
gime to emerge as an autonomous bourgeoisie, I will focus on their reaction to Indonesia’s 
democratisation, decentralisation, and deregulation. I argue that reformasi weakened the state 
considerably, but failed to impede the conglomerates sufficiently, although, in such a situa-
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tion, they had to operate in the context of a much more decentralised and diffused system of 
power. Businesses eventually got back on track, as I will demonstrate through the discussion 
of two case studies, Lippo and Salim, which – as two of the largest conglomerates – can be 
regarded as generally representative to illustrate the economic recovery of the big groups. 
This chapter will show how the state gradually lost the means of control over capital and de-
liberate upon the conglomerates’ future status, revealing how they achieved a favourable posi-
tion, which they employed to engage in the reorganisation of power in post-Soeharto Indone-
sia. 
 
5.1 Reformasi in Indonesia: Economic and political contexts 
Enormous changes occurred in Indonesia following the fall of the New Order. As demon-
strated earlier, the foundations of previous Chinese big business success were disrupted, 
thereby inflicting a severe crisis upon the conglomerates that pushed them to the brink of fi-
nancial and political collapse. However, the post-Soeharto government decided to focus on 
economic revival instead of economic restructuring. Most urgently needed for this was capi-
tal, whether domestic or foreign. Thus, the conglomerates – by hook or by crook – were able 
to protect themselves from the harmful effects of reform initiatives, which included the areas 
of bank restructuring and debt repayment. Ultimately, economic and political developments in 
the post-crisis phase were to be closely interrelated and shared one fundamental, somewhat 
paradoxical feature – the consolidation of the conglomerates.  
 
Economic necessities: The indispensability of the conglomerates 
Economic growth rates fell more drastically in Indonesia than in any other country affected 
by the Asian economic crisis of 1997/1998. Only after the third quarter of 1998 did the econ-
omy begin to slowly recover, while Malaysia’s or Korea’s growth, for instance, was already 
above pre-crisis level by the end of 1999 (Bird 2001: 46). According to the IMF (2001), the 
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crisis in Indonesia was the worst of its kind in the twentieth century worldwide. To overcome 
it, investments were needed, which shrank to less than 60 per cent of their 1997 volume in 
1999 (Basri 2004: 42). Foreign direct investment was especially sought to contribute to eco-
nomic recovery (James & Nasution 2001: 198) in order to thoroughly reform and modernise 
the Indonesian economy and thus validate the technocratic assumption that ‘pressures for re-
form generally emerge from some crisis’ (e.g. Ali Wardhana, cited in Borsuk 1999: 165). 
However, due to the problematic business environment, there was hardly any foreign com-
pany willing to invest in Indonesia (Simanjuntak 2000: 60-1), which was, according to a re-
port of the World Bank (2004b), rated as one of the most difficult places to do business35. 
Therefore, it became imperative to lure back the ones who were well used to the way the In-
donesian economy worked: the Chinese capitalists.  
For many economists and politicians, a dilemma was whether the country should plan its 
reconstruction with or without the conglomerates. On the one hand, the massive exodus of 
Chinese capital was regarded as the cause rather than the effect of the crisis. A new beginning 
with small and medium enterprises instead of Chinese big business and KKN was the future 
most reformers envisioned (e.g. E. Salim 2001, Republika 17 February 1998). On the other 
hand, they were aware that the return of Chinese capitalists to Indonesia was the only practi-
cal and quick solution to get out of the situation of lack of investments to stimulate economic 
growth. In July 1998, Abdurrahman Wahid stated that ‘we should not dream that we will be 
able to improve our economic system without them’ (cited in Suryadinata 1999), after he 
tasked tycoon William Soeryadjaya to persuade the ethnic Chinese to return to Indonesia 
(Kompas 23 June 1998). Megawati, as then-Vice President in 2000, was also convinced that 
the ‘repatriation of domestic funds placed abroad would indeed be a great breakthrough to 
                                                     
 
35
 For Indonesia, the report listed legal uncertainty, security issues, poor implementation of regional 
autonomy, red-tape, and corruption as major turn-offs to investors.  
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save the country from crisis’ (cited in Bhui 2004). Chinese capital was the urgently needed 
fuel the stuttering Indonesian machine lacked and required to jump-start the economy. 
According to Sofjan Wanandi (cited in Ching 1999), the tycoons could bring back US$5 to 
10 billion of private capital that left Indonesia in 1997/1998. Other sources even estimated a 
much higher sum, ranging from US$80 billion (Jakarta Post 26 Oktober 1999) to even 
US$165 billion (Merdeka 6 June 1998). Although the actual numbers are impossible to de-
termine, it is clear that a substantial amount of money was abroad with the Chinese conglom-
erates and needed to be attracted back to Indonesia to be used for economic reconstruction. 
Policy-makers (e.g. Abdurrahman Wahid, former President, interview 17 September 2004) 
expected the Chinese tycoons to adjust themselves to the new environment of reformasi and 
to submissively contribute with their capital to economic recovery and political reform.  
However, this was obviously too optimistic, as it naïvely underestimated the leverage capi-
tal had. It was then-President Habibie who had to experience the severe repercussions of anti-
Chinese rhetoric. The following day after he told the Chinese capitalists that Indonesia was 
not dependent on them (Washington Post 19 July 1998), the value of the Indonesian currency 
plunged by 5 per cent. This severe reaction proved the total opposite of Habibie’s supposition 
and caused an immediate change of pronouncements and policies. The president quickly real-
ised that there were serious limitations to any populist, anti-Chinese endeavours. Chinese 
conglomerates were materially too essential for Indonesia’s recovery as well as for his own 
political survival and financial well-being. With personal friends such as the corporate moguls 
Ciputra and Eka Tjipta Widjaya, he soon adjusted his attitude towards Chinese big business 
and courted them to secure their support, as Umar Juoro (former advisor to President Habibie, 
interview 6 September 2004) confirmed. Habibie even appointed James Riady as his ambas-
sador-at-large to bring in Chinese investors (Merdeka 4 July 1998). The same efforts to entice 
the conglomerates were undertaken by subsequent presidents, thus demonstrating the con-
straints to ruling against Chinese capital. 
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The indispensability of the conglomerates was the major structural condition of the refor-
masi era. This provided them with immunity against expropriation, because, as CSIS econo-
mist Pande Radja Silalahi (cited in Newsweek 3 February 2003) annotated: ‘If you release and 
discharge, the money comes and the economy rolls.’ It therefore became ‘a question if we 
want cash or justice’ (Dasa Sutantio, IBRA Vice President, cited in Solomon 2000), and In-
donesia decided that it could not afford the latter. I will show how this enabled capital to in-
strumentalise the reform process for its own consolidation, thus determining the extent and di-
rection of reformasi. From a position of weakness, the conglomerates eventually managed to 
secure their own survival and dictate the terms of their recovery. 
  
Structural continuities: The limits of political reform 
Structural continuity was a precondition for Chinese big business to come back to Indonesia. 
At the same time, it was a requirement the tycoons could demand because of their capital, 
which was urgently needed. Hence, the capitalists and other entrenched interests did not have 
to worry too much. Indonesia’s major donors such as the IMF and the World Bank merely 
urged the Habibie government to strengthen institutions and focus on good governance in or-
der to consolidate initial stabilisation gains, to sustain economic recovery, and to ‘embrace the 
two sweeping forces of globalization and democratization’ (World Bank 1999: i-ii). Thus, by 
focusing on rather superficial reforms, political change in Indonesia could only have a transi-
tory effect on the conglomerates. This strategy of meddling with the symptoms gave them 
sufficient leverage not to become marginalised by reformasi. 
Many aspects of the old system endured, although there were significant fatalities such as 
the Soeharto family’s Cendana empire (see Chapter 4.2). Furthermore, the two other pillars of 
politico-bureaucratic power, i.e. the military and Golkar, were considerably weakened as 
well. Therefore, Soeharto’s successor, Habibie, who personified the New Order like no one 
else in the political scene at the time, had to start from a very defensive position. The only 
way he could survive was to cultivate the credentials of a reformer who wanted to put an end 
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to the authoritarianism of the Soeharto era and democratise Indonesia. However, many inci-
dents revealed that the new president used reformasi merely as camouflage, most embarrass-
ingly exposed through the scandal regarding a taped conversation between him and attorney 
general Andi Ghalib, in which they plotted on how to spare Soeharto from investigations into 
his crimes and fortune (O’Rourke 2002: 219-21).  
Eventually, Habibie failed to stay in power, but managed to anchor the old apparatus in the 
new regime. His successor, Abdurrahman Wahid, who once had the credentials of a genuine 
reformer before he assumed the presidency in October 1999, was finally perceived as just an-
other power broker who tried to direct lucrative and influential posts to his own cronies (see 
Mietzner 2001). Wahid himself (interview 17 September 2004) blamed the difficulties of his 
reign on reactionary and power-hungry forces in other parties and in the army that coerced 
him to put their proxies in his cabinets and finally ousted him in July 2001. Megawati’s presi-
dency also did not cause any substantial changes to the ‘persistence of predatory politics’, as 
Robison & Hadiz (2004: 244) argued.  
From a notably weaker position than before, the old powers – without Soeharto – were 
given the time and space to gradually reorganise themselves under the modified conditions of 
a new regime. In less than one decade, Golkar once again became the most successful party in 
Indonesia’s electoral democracy. The actual president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, elected 
in 2004, came from the ranks of the military that regained much of its importance, and the bu-
reaucratic status quo forces made themselves comfortable in all parties, slowly but surely 
marginalising the liberal intellectuals (Robison & Hadiz 2004: 240). FEUI economist Faisal 
Basri (interview 11 September 2004), for instance, resigned from his post as General Secre-
tary of the PAN and left the party after he realised that it was assimilating too many elements 
of the New Order, leaving him no space in advocating more progressive ideas.  
Even before Soeharto’s resignation the limits of any potential transition were apparent. 
Significantly, it was the then-high ranking general Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who cau-
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tiously advocated reform, as quoted in Jakarta Post in April 1998, but only in a ‘constitu-
tional, conceptual, and gradual manner’:  
The mechanism of reform is already prearranged in our political system. There is mechanism at 
the DPR/MPR level, there is also a set of established processes of implementing development 
programs, and there are proposals about political life, programs to increase political communica-
tion and programs to increase the quality of the general elections. All those things constitute the 
mechanism of reform, and they are constitutional. 
(Then-Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, cited in Buchori 2001: 74-5) 
The style of the regime, but obviously not the structural substance of the system was to be re-
arranged, explaining why the term for change was ‘reformasi’ (and not ‘revolusi’). This al-
lowed a commitment to this process of even high ranking New Order officials who hence – in 
tandem with the conglomerates – succeeded in using the dynamics of reform to secure their 
own positions in a post-authoritarian regime. 
 
5.2 The conglomerates and the new regime 
Foreign organisations in particular that supported the Indonesian democratisation process 
with material and non-material help were very optimistic in their evaluation of the post-
Soeharto situation (e.g. for the German Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Kleine-Brockhoff 2004). 
They hoped that the existing problems would be solved eventually through institutionalisation 
and further reforms, following the way outlined by the reformasi movement in 1997/1998. 
The changes I discussed in the previous chapter and the difficulties that emerged for the state–
business oligarchy seemed to substantiate this perspective.  
However, a closer look will reveal the actual outcomes of democratisation, decentralisa-
tion, and deregulation – the three major objectives of reformasi that were purported to put an 
end to the New Order’s authoritarianism, centralism, and KKN-protectionism. I will show 
that they were not the foundations of a regime without entrenched interests, but provided the 
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very vehicles that transported the conglomerates into a new social and political order in which 
many of the old forces had been able to reposition themselves favourably. The first step had 
to be to halt the reforms that could be prevented and modify the ones that were already im-




As I pointed out elsewhere (Chua 2004a), the holding of free elections in Indonesia in 1999 
was often portrayed by observers as the ultimate indicator for the success of the democratisa-
tion process, despite the fact that the majority of the population was still excluded from sub-
stantive participation in the political process. Indeed, the struggle for power was confined to 
only a small group of people, a ‘melee of the elites’, as O’Rourke (2002) remarked. They re-
arranged themselves in hardly distinguishable parties whose only ideology was the acquisition 
and maintenance of power and access to state resources. Hence, coalitions amongst the major 
parties were possible in any arbitrary combination. Most of the political actors were also in-
terchangeable, with only very few new faces in the limelight. Since 1998, many leading poli-
ticians – ‘former apparatchik, military men, entrepreneurs, and assorted political hustlers, 
peddlers and enforcers of the old New Order’, as Hadiz (2004: 699) described the personnel 
of the PDI-P – had already played a role in Soeharto’s corporatist regime, in which even op-
position politicians were an immanent part of the system (Aspinall 1996). During the ensuing 
years after the collapse of the New Order, they simply moved from the periphery to the actual 
centres of power. Having arrived there, the new protagonists – most importantly former high 
profile critics of Soeharto such as Abdurrahman Wahid, Amien Rais, and Megawati – obvi-
ously did not want to dissolve the old regime completely, but to reform the state only to the 
extent that its previous crew was reshuffled. The revamped institutions could then serve as 
shells for the recent powerholders and their followers. It was thus a competition for the cap-
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ture of the vehicles of KKN, and not for their abolishment or total reform (see Robison & 
Hadiz 2004: 223-52). 
 This basic principle of the post-Soeharto power struggles allowed the conglomerates to be 
more than just passive outsiders. They observed the new regime for a while, but their shock 
about the loss of their main protectors, who were once organised in the state party Golkar, 
soon gave way to confidence that electoral democracy was by no means tantamount to struc-
tural change and could not do them much harm, especially as it was characterised by major 
continuities in relation to the kinds of interests that would preside over the political process. 
In fact, the cost-intensive electoralism provided the setting in which capital became a neces-
sity, without which candidacy for political office was not affordable. According to Hadiz 
(2004: 714), even a local election required several billions of rupiah, let alone presidential 
campaigns, which Tempo (21 June 2004) estimated to require between Rp140 billion to 
Rp500 billion per team just for the first round in 2004. Thus, the political parties were de-
pendent on large donations from the business world, from where the Megawati camp received 
about Rp66 billion in legal contributions, while Rp16.4 billion reportedly went to Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla (Tempo 30 August 2004). 
Many NGOs therefore trusted in the new strength of civil society rather than in such kind 
of parliamentarianism (Danang Widoyoko, Vice Coordinator ICW, interview 7 September 
2004). The emergence of a non-state sphere that efficiently controlled and restricted the for-
merly unchecked activities of the conglomerates set certain standards which entrenched busi-
ness interests had to uphold. It was impossible for them to take no notice of or even contain 
the new openness of society. Their only chance was to adjust – which they did, although in 
ways reformers envisioned otherwise. Indeed, the new modes of representation offered by 
civil society provided the tycoons with genuine democratic means that they could utilise for 
their own purposes. For instance, demonstrations were staged to protest against foreign com-
petitors that wanted to take over their companies (Roland Haas, former President Director 
Lippo Investments, interview 21 September 2004). Riots, as the ones against the Tempo 
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headquarters by a mob supporting Tomy Winata, could be easily organised – supposedly by 
the businessman himself (see Taufik 2003). The alleged puppeteer consistently recognised, 
that ‘it’s much easier to influence decision making in a democratic environment specifically 
in Indonesia. Famished and poor people will do everything to maintain their survival’ (Tomy 
Winata, interview 27 September 2004).  
A further decisive undertaking was to manipulate public opinion. The Salim Group, for in-
stance, was eager to get back into the media business, repurchasing its former television 
broadcasting company Indosiar through proxies (Kwok 2002). According to Ahmad Taufik 
(Tempo journalist, interview 1 September 2004), Tomy Winata was also keen on entering the 
media business: ‘Tomy Winata is becoming very big in the media. First, he tried to pressure 
the press not to write negatively about him. Now he makes media himself.’ Besides the police 
radio station 911, the newspaper Harian Jakarta, and Jakarta TV, he established the maga-
zine Pilar, positioned in direct competition to his arch-enemy Tempo, thereby revealing a 
possible motivation to crush the latter in order to increase Pilar’s market share (ibid.). Futher, 
Winata could revert to his allegedly good relations with individuals like the son of Jakob 
Utama, owner of the influential daily Kompas, and with the TV station Lativi, owned by for-
mer New Order Minister Abdul Latief. To his critics, allegations of such relations were cor-
roborated by the nature of the coverage of the two media of the notorious tycoon, which 
tended to be mild at best (ibid.). Lippo, as another example, had a relationship manager for 
extraordinary public relations efforts such as taking journalists around in helicopters, bringing 
them to the nightclubs of Kota on an all inclusive joyride or, openly, increasing their income 
(Roland Haas, interview 10 August 2004). During my fieldwork, I experienced myself how 
they were even concerned with what would be written about them in PhD theses, which sup-
posedly was the main rationale for granting interviews to me in the first place. One respon-
dent threatened to sue me in the event that I wrote unfavourably about him. At the same time, 
he offered to pay for a trip throughout Indonesia for me and ‘20 of my NGO friends’, so that 
  
129
we could observe that his expositions were accurate. This illustrated clearly the tycoons’ per-
ception and handling of civil society. 
The same carrot-and-stick methods were applied to establish a complaisant journalistic 
culture favourable to business interests. Besides bribes, some businessmen counted on vio-
lence and lawsuits. For instance, in an angry reaction to a Tempo article which implied that 
Winata was behind a fire at the market in Tanah Abang (Taufik et al. 2003), the tycoon alleg-
edly sent his mob to the Tempo headquarters (Taufik 2003), then sued the journalist Ahmad 
Taufik, subeditor Teuku Iskandar Ali, and editor Bambang Harymurti for defamation, and 
took the magazine to court in seven other cases, where Tempo had to face penalties totalling 
US$40 million (McCawley 2003). The decision of the courts to use criminal legislation in-
stead of the press code and the subsequent conviction of Bambang Harymurti (Laksamana.net 
16 September 2004) revealed the fragility of press freedom and liberal elements in society in 
general. The conglomerates, forced onto the defensive, could obviously count on corrupt, in-
competent judges as well as on sections of the media itself. They also used many other tools 
at their disposal to intimidate journalists. Most effective – though rather conventional – was 
the threat to withdraw advertising (Teguh Santosa, Executive Editor, Rakyat Merdeka). A 
more eccentric method, as Far Eastern Economic Review correspondent Jeremy Wagstaff re-
ported (interview 11 June 2004), was to send a dead cat’s head to the editor of an online news 
magazine that investigated some of Lippo’s more shady businesses. The journal was later ac-
quired by Lippo boss James Riady, which was yet another way of keeping the media report-
ing favourable to Chinese big business. 
Thus, the ‘democratisation’ in Indonesia did not at all anchor the kind of norms hoped for 
by reformers. On the contrary, parliamentarianism as well as the civil society were regarded 
and treated by the conglomerates as simple instruments to legitimise their dubious business 
practices that could henceforth be hidden behind a democratic façade. Indonesian post-





There is no doubt that regional autonomy has helped to make unfeasible the kind of heavily 
centralised patronage networks that characterised the New Order. The conglomerates’ previ-
ous partners as well as the formerly guaranteed gains receded into a dim distance, as the pow-
erful politico-bureaucrats in Jakarta were replaced by regional authorities, who were increas-
ingly in charge of the allocation of resources. The New Order dimensions of KKN were ap-
parently only possible in a centralised, authoritarian regime. However, although many busi-
nessmen initially deemed their business model obsolescent due to the new complexities of de-
centralisation, otonomi daerah (regional autonomy) could neither meet the expectations of 
eliminating corruption, nor offer a more transparent and immediate decision making process 
regionally. In contrast, new decentralised, diffuse patronage networks emerged that, in many 
ways, replicated the old systems of patronage in miniaturised forms. With the shift of author-
ity to regional bodies, KKN was also transferred to the corresponding lower levels. According 
to disillusioned reformers, this was ‘the only real democratisation that happened’ (Sjahrir, 
Head Partai PIB, interview 24 September 2004). The centralised KKN was merely replaced 
by decentralised collusion. 
In fact, it was highly unrealistic to expect corruption to be eradicated by relying on the in-
tegrity of the new officials in charge of the local or regional institutions. Although Pharos 
boss Eddie Lembong (interview 21 October 2004) anticipated that the behaviour of the bupati 
would change by and by, actual developments did not seem to reflect his optimism. Other 
businessmen complained that the district heads behaved like absolute rulers over their little 
fiefdoms, which was regarded as a general problem that furthered KKN and hindered profes-
sionalism (Angky Camaro, Managing Director Sampoerna, interview 17 September 2004). 
Far away from Jakarta, it was even more difficult to impose effective controls. One example 
from West Sumatra illustrated this very well: Almost all members of the legislative council 
were jailed for misusing budgets, while eight more councils in other districts had to face graft 
probes (Jakarta Post 3 July 2004).  
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Such politicians, extremely prone to seeking extra-legal funding, were therefore ideal for 
the conglomerates. The new decentralised environment turned out to be even cheaper and eas-
ier to help accelerate the realisation of projects with financial injections, because a bupati 
could not ask for as much money or shares as high-ranking bureaucrats used to do (Joel S. 
Hellman, Senior Advisor The World Bank, interview 16 September 2004). The major diffi-
culty – to identify the right persons – could be solved within a short time. It did not take long 
until the conglomerates found out whom they should deal with. Anthony Salim (interview 13 
April 2005), for instance, was sure that his group mastered the new, confusing situation of 
post-Soeharto Indonesia, stating: ‘I think we adapted ourselves.’ Obviously, he was not both-
ered by the greater unpredictability of corruption and contently noticed that his managers fig-
ured out whom to address: ‘All the directors of my company must have relations with each 
political department. If it’s about distribution, of course, they have to talk to the trade depart-
ment. If it’s about plantations, they have to talk to the local government.’ 
Thus, regional autonomy did not end corruption at all, but provided – notwithstanding the 
measure of uncertainty and unpredictability – a relatively favourable environment for big 
business that, as I will show in the following chapter, leveraged the conglomerates in an ad-
vantageous position vis-à-vis their former political patrons.  
 
Deregulation 
The neo-liberal economic policies that Indonesia adopted created a dilemma for the conglom-
erates. On the one hand, the market offered plenty of new opportunities for businesses. On the 
other hand, with the termination of state sanctioned protectionism, they lost their exclusive 
business opportunities, including the immense guaranteed profits. Therefore it was, for the 
time being, more convenient and less risky for big business to retain as many elements of the 
KKN economy as possible. 
The more transparent, equally accessible system was indeed very unfamiliar to the struc-
tures in which the conglomerates originated. Many well-established entrepreneurs, such as 
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Sofjan Wanandi (interview 8 June 2004), initially expressed their dismay, complaining that 
‘sometimes Indonesia is too liberal’. He feared that too much competition might decrease the 
margins of profit or, even worse, put the conglomerates out of business. Therefore, the capi-
talists – quite successfully – tried to revive the networks of patronage and collusion, as the 
still rampant usage of corruption illustrated (Indonesia Corruption Watch et al. 2004). Ac-
cording to a rating of the Political Economic Risk Consultancy (PERC), post-Soeharto Indo-
nesia was assessed as the most corrupt country with the worst achievable score – 9.9 points 
out of 10 (Castle 2004: 76). The same applied to the perceived inadequacy of the legal sys-
tem, which was significantly worse than during the period under Soeharto (Castle 2004: 77). 
Reformasi obviously did not manage to structurally anchor effective checks and balances. 
Thus, reform was perhaps doomed to fizzle out without real impact, as change solely de-
pended on the persons inside the institutions. Moreover, it was not in the interest of these 
people to renounce KKN. The post-Soeharto regime’s personnel, therefore, constituted a vul-
nerable flank for the capitalists to invade, allowing them to subordinate the new watchdogs 
that were put in place to supervise them.  
Indeed, the impact of deregulation was highly volatile and superficial, allowing the capi-
talists to pledge themselves to it but to proceed otherwise. Many old practices were simply 
renamed. Instead of ‘collusion’, businessmen talked about ‘lobbying’ (Eugene Galbraith, 
BCA President Commissioner, interview 8 September 2004) or ‘communication’ (Anthony 
Salim, interview 13 April 2005), thereby seemingly adopting practices associated with ‘west-
ern-style’ capitalism, leaving former corrupt ways behind. The truth was, though, that the new 
economic environment was paradoxically even more infused with money politics. This appar-
ently turned out to be the most practical way for the capitalists to secure political support and 
protection, which they still needed to compensate for the loss of certainty. 
However, compared with the New Order economy, these informal – and now illegal – 
channels were rather insecure, ineffective, and risky. In contrast, for pribumi capitalists, it 
was easier to demand the adoption of protectionist policies in favour of ‘indigenous’ busi-
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nesses. Aburizal Bakrie, for instance, wanted the government to use the ‘golden opportunity’ 
to redistribute Chinese Indonesian property (Eklöf 2002: 232), while Jusuf Kalla planned to 
help ‘small and medium enterprises’, because ‘90 to 95 per cents of the small businessmen 
are pribumis’ (cited in Harsono 2004). Past experiences corroborated their concerns against 
liberalisation: Through the economic reforms of the 1980s, the big Chinese conglomerates 
became the main winners of deregulation and privatisation (see Robison & Hadiz 1993). At 
that time, public monopolies simply became private ones, further strengthening the domi-
nance of Chinese Indonesian business groups and catapulting many of them into the league of 
multi-national enterprises. This historical trauma fuelled the opposition to the neo-liberal ap-
proach favoured by the IMF and others, especially from pribumi business groups that have 
always been suspicious of ‘free-fight-capitalism’ as a disadvantage to indigenous capitalists 
(see Kwik in Chalmers & Hadiz 1997: 239-41). They feared further marginalisation and an 
impending verification of A. Chua’s hypothesis (2003a) that minority groups will dominate 
the markets in democratic, liberal economies. Populism – in Indonesia usually referring to 
economic nationalism, i.e. protectionism for pribumi – became an important instrument in po-
litical debates, which was powerful enough to prevent noted economist and regional IMF 
head Sri Mulyani from taking up the post of the Minister of Economics in 2004 (Jakarta Post 
20 October 2004). Instead of her, pribumi entrepreneur Aburizal Bakrie was put in charge of 
the economy. Together with Vice President Jusuf Kalla, two businessmen-turned-politicians, 
who suggested ethnicity-based redistribution programmes such as those in Malaysia, occupied 
key positions in the new government. Free markets, therefore, were highly contentious. 
Thus, the conglomerates had to carefully balance their apprehension against IMF proposed 
economic liberalisation and deregulation, since a swing of the pendulum in the other direction 
would cause much more discomfort. It was better for them to deal with and in an economic 
environment that was perceived as neutral and conducive than with one that was basically 
hostile towards them. In fact, they soon found out that less nepotism meant a certain inde-
pendence from the Cendana clan. One businessman, cited by the Far Eastern Economic Re-
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view (Cohen 1998a), expressed a collective sense of relief about the downfall of the Soeharto 
family: ‘Before we were afraid to do business. The family could take over anytime. Now, we 
don’t have to feel afraid’. Moreover, economic liberalism provided new opportunities of 
growth for the capitalists, as deregulation followed the simple logic of capitalism to favour 
capital-rich incumbents. Thus the Chinese conglomerates were best equipped to start the new 
era of post-crisis economy from a pole position, with still significant funds at their disposal. 
Most tycoons therefore became fervent supporters of free markets, such as Anthony Salim 
(interview 13 April 2005), who asserted that all conglomerates with a clear market orientation 
were successful in the new competitive environment. He claimed that his company Bogasari, 
for instance, the world’s largest flour producer, became even more profitable than with its 
former wheat monopoly, as did Indomobil and Indocement, compared to pre-crisis growth. 
Angky Camaro, former Salim manager and actual Managing Director of Sampoerna, con-
firmed this:  
The Salim Group is still the biggest group in terms of assets, because now everything is based 
on a market economy and there are no special licences like before. And that is positive for the 
Salim group. Take a look at Bogasari. Before it had a special license for the processing of flour. 
Now there is a free licence for everything and everyone. And Anthony Salim prefers Bogasari 
now.  
(Angky Camaro, interview 17 September 2004) 
In the first years after the crisis, the conglomerates tried to undermine the new regime wher-
ever possible by reverting to KKN. In the long run, however, they will take even more advan-
tage of the freer markets. The neo-liberal deregulation efforts, another project intended to take 
market shares away from the New Order cronies, therefore turned out to effectuate the oppo-




You see Anthony Salim, he has not been called to the at-
torney-general till today. Salim and Lippo have never 
been investigated. Tell me why? You think they don't 
have very good relations with the past government and 
the present government and the future government? 
(Marimutu Sinivasan)36 
5.3 Economic recovery: Recouping the losses 
The ultimate litmus test to ascertain whether the conglomerates could be held accountable for 
their plundering of resources – and thus be made to submit to the new regime – was the set-
tlement of their debts. It was of utmost symbolic as well as financial importance for the state 
to force its main 21 defaulters to repay their Rp650 trillion of non-performing loans, which 
were taken over by IBRA, and offset these against government bonds (Bhui 2004). However, 
the way IBRA, the institution entrusted with the task of recovering the gargantuan debts, dealt 
with its debtors, demonstrated clearly the continuities of relations between the new power-
holders and old business interests, indicating the newly achieved strength of the conglomer-
ates vis-à-vis the weakness of the state. Instead of viewing the tycoons as criminal defaulters 
obliged to pay, IBRA became the major instrument for nursing the ailing business groups.  
Although the rules of restructuring were rather straightforward – debts had to be settled in 
cash or in assets, which were to be sold to investors unrelated with the former owners (Sato 
2004: 34) – there remained several ways for the capitalists to get around the worst conse-
quences, as the slow pace of IBRA’s programmes indicated: Up until end of the year 2000, 
only 15 per cent of the total private debt had been restructured (Bird 2001: 63). In 2002, 
IBRA still expected to recover 42 per cent from assets disposals and loans cash settlements, 
emphasising that this ‘recovery rate achieved by IBRA/government in relative term, could 
hardly be considered as disappointing’ (IBRA 2002: 3). However, as its five year mandate 
came to an end in February 2004, IBRA merely recouped 28.5 per cent of the total debt, 
thereby failing to reach its own modest targets by far (IBRA 2003). 
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 Texmaco boss Marimutu Sinivasan, interview in Far Eastern Economic Review 9 August 2001. 
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The whole process of debt settlement began quite promisingly in September 2000 with 
several Master Settlement and Acquisition Agreements (MSAA) between the Agency and its 
main debtors, where the payment obligations were put on record. Soon, however, it became 
clear that, despite the MSAAs, the conglomerates were free to do whatever they wanted to do 
(as will be shown through the case studies in this chapter). They were in a strong position, 
protected by the IMF, supported by the government, and unimpeded by courts that regularly 
sided with them and refused to declare them bankrupt.  
The patterns of the indebted groups in dealing with the state were broadly the same: As 
they became insolvent, IBRA as their creditor only had the option of seizing some companies 
of the liquidated conglomerates to recoup at least a portion of the money. The tycoons, how-
ever, still owned the strategic assets privately and held on to them, while the companies they 
transferred to IBRA were worth much less than initially stated, heavily indebted, and without 
the respective licences, thus being of no use and value. IBRA, having to recover as much of 
the debts as possible, recapitalised the companies to turn them into saleable assets or bonds 
and tried to sell them for a fraction of their actual prices. Due to the inscrutability of the real 
composition of the companies and the generally opaque business environment in Indonesia, 
external investors were not enthusiastic about taking over the assets on sale. Thus, IBRA of-
ten had no other choice but to give the companies to whomever was willing to pay for them – 
and these were in many cases the old owners, either disguised as offshore buyers, through 
third parties, or their overseas companies – as they themselves were officially banned from 
repurchasing their firms. Putting back the missing pieces into their corporations thus resulted 
in a valorisation of the assets whose debts were mainly undertaken to be paid by the govern-
ment. 
Many debtors further utilised the opportunity to blatantly make money through the recapi-
talisation programme, as they took cash out of the US$11 billion in Bank Indonesia Liquidity 
Support (BLBI) credits, provided by the government in order to save some of the banks. They 
used it for overseas investments, currency speculations, and debt servicing on other compa-
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nies in the group (Hadiz & Robison 2005: 227). This money deprived Indonesia of much 
needed funds and gave the conglomerates the possibility of getting some high returns for 
cheap loans (Eugene Galbraith, President Commissioner Bank Central Asia, interview 8 Sep-
tember 2004). 
Although initially regarded as the main losers of the economic downturn – and some un-
questionably were (see Chapter 4.2) – many conglomerates managed in various ways to sur-
vive and even benefit immensely from the crisis. The more time passed, the better their 
chances were in striking a deal with IBRA, due to a lack of interest and competition from out-
side. Under these circumstances, the debtors were able to determine the conditions of their 
debt settlement and the price of the assets that they wanted to buy. Hence, many corporate 
moguls that were thought to be economically finished were left in charge of their conglomer-
ates and propped up through generous amortisation terms. A few high profile cases (such as 
Texmaco, Far Eastern Economic Review 9 August 2001, or Lippo and Salim) were subject to 
intensive press coverage; other groups have survived without causing much of a stir.  
IBRA’s staff usually had no way of examining the cases they had to deal with and of ex-
posing the financial tricks and concealment of the assets they were holding, the financial 
situation of their debtors, or the identity of the bidders, though they were certainly aware of 
the rumours or often even had evidence that old owners were also the buyers of the shares on 
sale. In fact, former IBRA Deputy Chairman Farid Haryanto (interview 21 June 2004) openly 
admitted: ‘Perhaps IBRA knew who was buying back the assets, but it did not want to know’, 
thus confirming that immediate money was more important than a long-term reorientation of 
the economy. 
The process of bank recapitalisation, debt settlement, and asset sales hence turned out to 
be the lifeline for the conglomerates. As I Putu Gede Ary Suta, who later became Head of 
IBRA, accurately observed, it was a successful attempt to ‘reconstruct an obsolete and defec-
tive structure’: ‘Instead of rigorously separating ownership of private banks from borrowers, 
there is an eagerness to return banks to their original owners – as long as they can raise capital 
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to repay government loans’ (cited in Hadiz & Robison 2005: 227). The request of Lippo Bank 
boss Mochtar Riady for the government to rescue the banking sector, and not to clean it up 
(Jakarta Post 28 July 1998), was thus granted. The conglomerates’ indispensability, together 
with compliant officials, thus paved the way for Chinese big business to a soft landing after 
what at first seemed to be a massive nosedive. I will illustrate this point with two detailed 
case studies that depict the survival of the Lippo Group and the Salim Group, two leading In-
donesian conglomerates. 
 
The principles of good corporate governance, 
transparency, and effective communication are go-
ing to establish a stronger trust amongst the gen-
eral public and international investors.  
(Mochtar Riady)37 
The Lippo Group 
In 1996, the Lippo Group38 was the fifth biggest conglomerate in Indonesia with a turn-over 
of Rp9 trillion/US$3.8 billion per year. Its survival – especially the methods its owners ap-
plied to sustain – demonstrate that, despite all changes, the new regime still provided plentiful 
opportunities for capital to conjoin with decision-makers and proceed in old ways that ought 
to have been vanquished through reformasi. Founded in 1976 by Mochtar Riady, a successful 
banker who built up Liem Sioe Liong’s Bank Central Asia, this group was centred on its 
bank, the Lippo Bank, which, in 2001, had more than 2.4 million customers with 3.5 million 
bank accounts and 366 branch offices in Indonesia (Lippo Bank 2002: 3). Besides its core 
business, the group was involved in stock brokerage, retail, insurance, and property, which it 
expanded after 1989. From the early 1990s, a gradual handover to Mochtar’s son, James, took 
                                                     
 
37
 Original (cited in Lippo Bank 2002: 8): ‘Prinsip-prinsip good corporate governance, transparansi 
dan komunikasi yang efektif akan mewujudkan kepercayaan masyarakat publik dan investor 
internasional yang lebih kuat.’ 
38
 The information reported here, unless specified, is gathered from several interviews (in June, August, 
and September 2004) with actual and former Lippo executives as well as external observers who did 
not want to be mentioned. 
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place. As compared to his media-shy father, he was described as a ‘flamboyant, outgoing, and 
an extremely good marketing person, but less interested on the operational side’ (Roland 
Haas, former President Director Lippo Investments, interview 31 August 2004). Although 
Lippo mainly focussed on the domestic market, it achieved international prominence through 
the campaign-financing scandal in the United States, where James Riady illegally donated 
more than US$1 million to the election campaign of Bill Clinton (Solomon & Holloway 
1996; Gatra 26 July 1997). 
Before the crisis, Lippo was, as every successful business venture in the New Order, suffi-
ciently close to the political powers. However, the Riadys never belonged to the innermost 
circle of Soeharto’s cronies, as one occasion in 1996 revealed. According to a Lippo execu-
tive (interview July 2004), the president’s children wanted to take over Lippo Bank. As Mo-
chtar Riady refused to sell, stakeholders and clients were pulling their money out of the bank, 
causing a severe liquidity crisis that led to a restructuring of the whole conglomerate. Hence, 
a vertical structure was implemented, where Lippo Securities owned Lippo Life, which in 
turn owned Lippo Bank, making it exorbitantly expensive for anyone to buy the group or 
parts of it.  
This emergency solution eventually turned out to be very functional for the group during 
the crisis in 1997/1998 and decreased its vulnerability, providing it with lots of cash and low-
ering its debt rates (Djisman Simandjuntak, Commissioner Lippo Bank, interview 27 Febru-
ary 2004). Thus, Lippo was only relatively mildly affected, although it had to sell its life in-
surance business, ‘Mochtar’s new baby’ (Roland Haas, interview 31 August 2004), to AIG. 
The Riadys, however, could forestall a loss of their bank. By calling in related party loans that 
were settled by means of handing over group-related properties, which were owned by the 
debtors, to the bank, they managed to prevent Lippo Bank from breaching the legal lending 
limit. This averted a classification of Lippo Bank as a takeover bank and Riady’s inclusion in 
the DOT (daftar orang tercela), the list of former bank owners who were banned from bank-
ing. It was of utmost importance for the Riady family to stay off the black list, as this would 
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have been the end of the whole business group, because Lippo was not a very diversified fi-
nancial group with export business that could survive without banking at that time. Thus, the 
Riadys were the only ones who were legally allowed to buy back their bank – although this 
was difficult to convey to the public and to most politicians who wished for a clear cut solu-
tion that excluded any involvement of the former owners. Therefore, the methods Mochtar 
used to pull the strings inside the group, and the means which James eventually employed to 
regain control of Lippo Bank, were characterised by rule-breaking and deception, as shown 
below. The Lippo experience reveals the relative ease with which the conglomerates dealt 
with the new regime. 
Many competitors complained that the Lippo Group received privileged treatment, as it 
obtained US$500 million in recapitalisation funds before other qualified banks even knew 
that this money was available (Shari 1999). Indeed, Lippo Bank was the first bank to do an 
IMF sponsored rights issue in December 1998, in which the government, through IBRA, took 
over 80 per cent of the new shares (Kontan 21 December 1998). For this – against all tradition 
and usual procedures – the bank only offered Rp10 nominal instead of Rp500 nominal shares 
(Bisnis Indonesia 22 December 1998), thereby diluting the shares of minority shareholders 
and intentionally squeezing them out (Suara Pembaruan 22 December 1998). Public shares 
thus went back to Lippo Life, which was – with 65 per cent – Lippo Bank’s majority share-
holder before the recapitalisation (Suara Karya 24 December 1998). This first round, which 
was hardly noticed by the market, was carried out so early and quickly that nobody under-
stood the process. The sole participants were the government and the old owners, who fi-
nanced the remaining 20 per cent.  
The second recapitalisation took place in July 1999. This time, the Riadys were not par-
ticipating because they assessed that the crisis would take a longer time than expected and 
that the shares would go down in the long run. In fact, they were even clandestinely, but ag-
gressively selling their shares while they continued to convince others and the government to 
put money in the recapitalisation, triggering a strong demand by investors. One interviewee 
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suspected that the old owners determined their strategy (see below) at that point in time, and 
thus did not want to put any of their own money into a bank that they were going to deliber-
ately run into the ground. Another observer called this an ‘abuse of tax-payers’ money’ and a 
‘clear breach of law’, as a secret selling of shares was against the regulations of the Capital 
Market Supervisory Board (Bapepam). 
Altogether, the bank received cash injections by the government of Rp7.2 trillion (Jakarta 
Post 19 February 2003), raising the state’s costs to up to more than Rp10 trillion including the 
interest it had to pay for the recapitalisation bonds. From the end of 2002, one year before the 
planned divestment of IBRA’s Lippo Bank shares, the Riadys began to engineer the recapture 
of their bank, leaving their marks with a trail of scandals. Their most effective instruments to 
obviate a takeover of the bank by others were the foreclosed assets or AYDA (aset yang 
diambil ahli) that the bank had previously received from debtors related to the group in order 
to be within the legal lending limits, supposedly worth Rp2.4 trillion (Tanjung 2003: 53). No-
body but the former owners of these assets was able to assess their actual value, making it dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to sell them. However, as long as they kept on appearing on Lippo 
Bank’s balance sheet, their undeterminable value was a deterrent for potential investors. De-
pending on the Riadys’ needs, the value rose and fell, with audited sums ranging from Rp1.1 
trillion to Rp2.1 trillion – 46 or 88 per cent of the officially stated figure. As Hadiwinata re-
marked, 
this was because the former owners of Lippo Bank were actually playing two roles, both that of 
potential buyer as well as that of seller. In other words, it was suspected that they could adjust 
the value of the AYDA assets in line with their own interests: raising or lowering the value to 
suit themselves. 
(Tempo 6 October 2003) 
These tricks, or ‘financial engineering’, as Faisal Basri (interview 11 September 2004) called 
them, required the assistance of Lippo’s Dutch partner and ‘best-practise’-advisor ING, which 
was needed to overstate the foreclosed assets and to manipulate the annual reports to keep the 
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value of the property high. After ING left, the assets were devalued massively and were sup-
posed to be sold for Rp500 billion (Koran Tempo 15 January 2003), only via internet, during 
the New Year-vacations and within 10 days – a plot that made the media suspect that the Ria-
dys were behind this as well (e.g. Bisnis Indonesia 03 January 2003). By writing off a signifi-
cant portion of the property values, Lippo Bank could not meet the central bank’s CAR (Capi-
tal Adequacy Ratio) requirements and requested a third recapitalisation round (Republika 22 
February 2003) in order to dilute the government’s stake and increase the Riadys’ ownership 
at a cheaper cost (Jakarta Post 17 February 2003), to which IBRA chairman Syafruddin Te-
menggung had already privately agreed (Roland Haas, interview 31 August 2004). Following 
severe public scrutiny, he prohibited the write-off of AYDA values and publicly argued 
against the third rights issue (Koran Tempo 28 February 2003). As such, the bank’s CAR was 
actually still acceptable (Suara Karya 28 February 2003). 
Another means to buy the bank back cheaply from IBRA was the issuing of two versions 
of the same financial report in 2002, one submitted to the general public, showing a profit of 
Rp98 billion, and the other one to the Jakarta Stock Exchange with a loss of Rp1.38 trillion 
(Bisnis Indonesia 20 January 2003), thereby reducing the sales price of Lippo Bank shares 
while misleading the public. Additionally, the price of the shares was systematically cornered 
from 4 November 2002 until 10 January 2003, as a concerned minority shareholder reported 
(interview August 2004). The latter revealed this scandal by sending letters under the pseudo-
nym of ‘Scott Ashton’ to the press (Koran Tempo 19 February 2003) as well as to all in-
volved authorities such as Bapepam, IBRA, Bank Indonesia, Jakarta Stock Exchange, IMF, 
the World Bank, and the police – without receiving any serious or apposite answer, which led 
him to assume that ‘they were all on Riady’s payroll’. The public only took notice after well-
known analyst Lin Che Wei (interview 22 September 2004) repeated these allegations in a 
Kompas article (Lin 2003). The investigation that Bapepam consequently carried out only re-
sulted in a fine for the Lippo management, although Mochtar Riady’s critics expected him to 
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be jailed or at least put on the black list (Koran Tempo 19 March 2003). Instead, he was con-
firmed as President Commissioner (Kompas 16 April 2003). 
As IBRA finally decided to divest its 52 per cent share in Lippo Bank at the end of 2003, 
hoping to reach at least 1.1 to 1.4 times of the Rp590 book value (Tempo 6 October 2003), the 
three remaining consortia that took part in the tender were not willing to offer more than 
Rp470 per share. The Riadys were believed to be involved in all three bidding parties (ibid.), 
while one consortium, the Eurocapital Asia Limited Bank, evidently belonged to them (Koran 
Tempo 26 September 2003). In the end, Swissasia Global, which was, according to an insider 
(interview August 2004), a ‘very dubious consortium from Switzerland with their main office 
in a shoe-shop and staff who looks like the mafia’, bought the bank at Rp592 per share and, 
significantly, did not change the management; an indication that it was indeed ‘Lippo’s Swiss 
proxy’ (ibid.). This was the final victory of the Riady family, which thus ‘managed to still 
control the bank through one or the other way’ (Sofjan Wanandi, interview 08 June 2004).  
This whole operation only became possible through the active collusion of Lippo and the 
government, i.e. the finance ministry, the central bank, the president, Bapepam, and IBRA. 
The case illustrated the means through which an established conglomerate was able to survive 
in the initial tumult of the demise of the old regime by using long-standing methods of cor-
ruption, collusion, and nepotism in the context of the new one.39 In the modified conditions, it 
was at least as important as ever for the Lippo Group to have access to the new powerholders 
and establish helpful political connections. It is true that democracy was perceived as a possi-
ble threat to the interest of the conglomerates, with the critical public being a major source of 
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 Intriguingly, while most business groups were eager to depict themselves as reformed and profes-
sionalised, Lippo’s advisor Farid Haryanto (interview 21 June 2004) was not able to give a clear an-
swer, whether Lippo had changed or not. It must have been a sensitive question, as he told me to ask 
James Riady himself.  
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discomfort.40 However, the Riadys managed very well to manoeuvre through the difficulties 
the more transparent environment imposed upon them. With their proximity to decision mak-
ers, financial engineering, and tricks, Lippo could continue to be ‘involved in the murkiest of 
murky fields’, as one Lippo executive (interview August 2004) remarked, and has yet to lose 
out to its critics. But KKN, particularly in post-Soeharto Indonesia, requires enormous re-
sources and is immensely time- and money-consuming. In an ever changing democracy, the 
costs and risks of building up close personal relationships with new political patrons are very 
high, as partners might vanish after the next elections. Therefore, one analyst was sure that 
Lippo would not benefit greatly with every change in the highest office. Nonetheless, this as-
sertion remains questionable, as the Riadys would have by now established new links with 
new repositories of power. In the longer run, however, either Lippo’s strategy will change and 
adapt to the new openness, or the latter will give in to the interests of the former. 
 
What is so wonderful about market forces, they can be 
black, they can be white tomorrow, […] but the main 
thing is that during black and white you have to survive. 
(Anthony Salim)41 
The Salim Group 
Southeast Asia’s former largest conglomerate, the Salim Group, used to be in a different 
league altogether compared to the other Indonesian business groups. With 600 companies in 
1996, its annual sales of US$22.3 billion were almost three times the amount of the next larg-
est one, Astra, more than 12 times greater than the sixth largest group, Bimantara, and 33 
times greater than the Gemala Group, which was ranked at number 30 (see Appendices, Table 
1). In some years, Salim’s sales constituted 5 per cent of Indonesia’s GDP. After the crisis, 
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 James Riady disinvited me from an already confirmed interview appointment. Instead, I first had to 
talk to his friend, advisor, and Lippo Commissioner Farid Haryanto who – so it seemed – was supposed 
to find out if the questions I wanted to ask were too critical. Obviously I failed this fit-and-proper test, 
as Riady henceforth refused to meet me. This might be coincidental or due to other reasons, but it is not 
unlikely that this signified Lippo’s stance on how to deal with the public. 
41
 Interview 13 April 2005. 
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the enormous gap with competitors became smaller and Salim lost its extraordinary size and 
status, although it is still ‘one of the largest’ (Gunadi Sindhuwinata, President Director Indo-
mobil, interview 22 September 2004), if not ‘the biggest group in terms of assets’ (Angky 
Camaro, former Salim manager, interview 17 September 2004). The Salim boss Anthony 
Salim himself (interview 13 April 2005) claimed: ‘I don’t know if we are still the biggest, but 
at least we’re still there’, thus referring to the remarkable fact that the group survived the cri-
sis at all. In the following, I will point out how the conglomerate expanded, almost vanished, 
and re-emerged again. I suggest that the Salim Group was sufficiently developed to carry on 
in the post-authoritarian environment by adopting new strategies of survival. Salim thus 
represents the type of business group that was able to sustain without political protection. In-
deed, it required the new, post-authoritarian regime to grow further.  
The incredible success story of Salim started with the migration of the then 21 year old 
Liem Sioe Liong (also known – since the 1960s – as Soedono Salim, his Indonesian name) 
from Fujian in China to Kudus in Central Java in 1937 (see Schwarz 1994: 109-15). The 
problems he had to face as an indigent immigrant gave him, according to his son Anthony 
Salim (interview 13 April 2005), the necessary drive and urgent need to succeed in an alien 
environment. He thereafter established himself as a trader and expanded into the lucrative 
clove business. While he undoubtedly possessed high self-motivation and good business 
skills, his links with the republican army, which he supplied with goods, were clearly impor-
tant to his initial success. In the 1950s, he became a major business partner of the Diponegoro 
Division in Semarang that was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Soeharto. From 1966 on-
wards, as the latter took over political power in Indonesia, these connections paid off and 
Liem emerged as the president’s main crony. Through exclusive access to state credits and all 
kinds of business fields where ‘everything you touch at that time was basically a very big op-
portunity’ (ibid.), the Salim Group rapidly became Indonesia’s largest business group. Most 
instrumental were the trade and flour milling monopolies that served as the major money-
making machines of the group, facilitating capital accumulation on an immense scale.  
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Basking in windfall oil revenues from the mid-1970s to 1980, the focus of the New Or-
der’s economic policies changed from light to heavy upstream industry. The Salim Group 
correspondingly shifted its activities to cement, steel, and automobiles. In the mid-1980s, In-
donesia slowly undertook deregulation policies under pressure from falling international oil 
prices, which provided new opportunities for the conglomerate outside the immediate protec-
tion of state powerholders. The decisive factor, however, that triggered a cautious orientation 
of the Salim Group towards the market in general, was the deregulation of the capital markets 
at the end of the 1980s (ibid.). Consequently, the group established its dominance in the bank-
ing and financial service sector that, together with construction, food/consumer products, and 
automotives, constituted one of Salim’s four most important divisions (out of 11). The Salim 
group’s flagship companies were thus Indocement, Indofood, Indomobil, and Bank Central 
Asia (BCA) (Sato 2004: 41). 
With the help of the latter, Indonesia’s largest private bank, the conglomerate was suffi-
ciently liquid to expand more extensively beyond Indonesia, a process that had already begun 
in the late 1970s. Particularly in the 1990s, Salim branched out and established its headquar-
ters in Hong Kong and Singapore. According to Anthony Salim (interview 13 August 2005), 
35 per cent of Salim’s operations were overseas before the economic crisis of 1997. He de-
scribed the rationale behind overseas diversification:  
Between the mid-1980s to the 1990s, we already geared up in order to balance our portfolio, not 
only for Indonesia, but also multi-dimensionally, regional as well as international. So we had a 
diversification not only of markets, but also a diversification of activities, and more importantly 
a diversification of the portfolio. That enabled us to have a better balance during crisis. 
(Anthony Salim, interview 13 August 2005) 
Significantly, he assessed Indonesia in the 1990s as ‘a political risk’, which he tried to com-
pensate through international expansion in order to ‘have a diversification of our difficulties’ 
(ibid.). This reveals that the Salim group’s main motivation for overseas investment was to 
minimise the problems that they expected to experience should regime change occur in Indo-
  
147
nesia. Indeed, in the third decade of Soeharto’s rule, the group had begun to gradually dis-
tance itself from the president and his family, albeit not to the extent that was claimed by An-
thony Salim (ibid.). He suggested that Salim companies ‘were not taking government con-
tracts’ anymore by the 1990s, and even ‘during the mid-1970s to the 1980s, we were hardly 
having government contracts at all’. The truth is that the Salims always kept their proximity 
to Soeharto, whose family held 30 per cent of BCA shares, while Bambang Trihadmodjo’s 
Bimantara Group was a favourite partner for joint ventures. Only two years before the end of 
the New Order, the Salim Group was involved in the takeover of Astra International, com-
monly regarded as a Cendana deal. Even after the crisis, Soeharto’s half brother, Sudwikat-
mono, remained a major shareholder of the conglomerate (Laksamana.net 7 December 2002).  
However, the increased market focus as well as the strategy of regional expansion was 
seen as complimentary to the political patronage Salim enjoyed and, moreover, provided the 
group with the option of reducing its dependence on political connections in the long run. 
This was made possible because the Liem family had gained enough economic clout that ‘it 
could no longer be regarded as client or comprador hanging onto the coat-tails of Indonesian 
generals and foreign banks’ (Robison 1986: 297). The group was thus relatively well 
equipped for a time when the old dictator, Soeharto, would no longer be around.  
Liem Sioe Liong’s success before the crisis was based on three elements. First, undoubt-
edly, he was a good entrepreneur with enormous adaptability to changing political environ-
ments. He thus managed to select the right projects and partners at the appropriate time and 
seized every kind of opportunity that arose, often before others realised the potential of cer-
tain markets. Second, he had immense capital resources which made him economically indis-
pensable and structurally powerful to the extent that he – as it was widely believed or ru-
moured – became the only person who did not have to make an appointment before meeting 
the president. Third and most decisively, he had the right political connections. They were the 
necessary condition for his success without which the other factors would not have been as 
important. Anthony Salim emphasised this himself:  
  
148
Soeharto is a friend of my father for a long time. So being friends, of course, you have advan-
tages, at least an information advantage. And number two, you can see different things on dif-
ferent levels, if you are high, you can see more things. But whether we capitalised, as in utilised, 
the position of Pak Harto, has yet to be defined by other people. 
(Anthony Salim, interview 13 April 2005) 
‘Connections’, he added (ibid.), ‘are very important, because connections mean you can see 
opportunities, you are able to identify opportunities faster’. Without them the Salim Group 
would not have been able to become a big business group, let alone Indonesia’s leading con-
glomerate. If the patronage was taken away from the group, what was left? Was Salim mature 
enough to sustain itself in a less protectionist and more market based economy? 
As the crisis began and the New Order ended, not many would have given a positive an-
swer to this question. Liem Sioe Liong, as Soeharto’s main cukong, was a major symbol of 
KKN and Chinese economic dominance. Therefore, during the riots preceding Soeharto’s 
demission, he had to take most of the blame and anger of the people who ransacked and 
scorched his house in Jakarta, demonstrated against him by shouting and displaying anti-
Salim slogans, and burnt his portraits. After the family fled and sought shelter in Singapore, 
these sentiments were taken up by politicians who envisioned an economic future without 
cronies in general and the Salim Group in particular. The end of the New Order was seen by 
detractors as a perfect opportunity to dismantle the conglomerate that was now regarded as 
one of the ‘most dangerous threats to the Indonesian economy’ due to its closeness to Soe-
harto (Laksamansa.net 7 December 2002). Burdened by debts and without political protec-
tion, economists and politicians demanded a redistribution of Salim’s assets through fire sales 
(Solomon 2000), obviously supported by the new president Habibie who was eager to take the 
lead of the rising populist wave. His government’s target, according to Swa (17 September 
1998), was to dissolve Salim. For Anthony Salim, who took sole control of the group from his 
father in 1998, nothing was left to do than to pay the debts or to cease operations. Many ex-
pected the latter: ‘The Salim Group is finished’, as the The Wall Street Journal (Solomon 
2000) proclaimed, quoting another Indonesian tycoon after Soeharto’s resignation. Data Con-
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sult’s (1998: 166) assessment in October 1998 was a little bit less devastating but still ex-
plicit: ‘With the vulnerability of the conglomerate to corruption and collusion charges be-
cause of its long connection with the Soeharto family, the Salim Group is predicted to shrink 
badly in performance and its position as the largest conglomerate may become a legend.’  
Indeed, the enormous obligations of Salim’s flagship BCA alone made the survival of the 
group seem rather unlikely. The demise of BCA started with a run on the bank as the crisis 
reached its climax in May 1998. Ironically, the company had earlier been praised by the ‘Re-
view 200’-ranking of the Far Eastern Economic Review as an ‘example of financial sound-
ness’ (McBeth 1995). But, following the anti-Chinese riots from 14/15 May 1998 and Soe-
harto’s resignation on 21 May, depositors withdrew about Rp4 billion in only 10 days, fearing 
a collapse of the bank because of its closeness to the president’s family (Mahmud 1998). 
Eventually the government had to take over the bank, thereby discovering that almost 70 per 
cent of BCA’s loans went to other companies inside the Salim Group. This constituted a 
breach of the 20 per cent legal lending limit. Anthony Salim thus not only owed Rp52.7 tril-
lion in debts to the new government – about the amount of the whole conglomerate’s annual 
sales in 1996 – but also faced imprisonment. To prevent this, he started to negotiate and co-
operate with the new government, which itself was pressured by the IMF’s US$43 billion res-
cue package that was conditional on the termination of cronyism and the settlement of pay-
back agreements by November 1998.  
However, the Salim boss still had sufficient leverage to prevent the worst. Indonesia in cri-
sis could not afford to forgo the Salim Group’s economic role. In 1996, 210,000 people 
worked for the business group’s companies, as many as for the next 20 largest conglomerates 
put together. Therefore, Salim’s threat that ‘if you want to kill us off, fine, but you’ll lose 
100,000 jobs’ (cited in Solomon 2000) had its impact, as the conglomerate was too important 
to be dismembered. Further, he was needed by the government to convince Chinese capital to 
return to Indonesia; a fine line balance between reform and pragmatism, as Dasa Sutantio, 
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IBRA Vice President, characterised the government’s treatment of Indonesia’s main private 
employer (ibid.).  
Salim could thus take issue with the Habibie government. In order to repay the Rp52.7 tril-
lion worth of debt, he agreed to transfer shares in 78 companies to a holding company, PT 
Holdiko Perkasa, that belonged to the government but left the respective managements to the 
Salim Group. As soon as the debts were repaid, he was to be exempted from all criminal 
charges (Tempo 6 October 1998). Habibie, who did not like this deal as he doubted the verac-
ity of the value and wanted Salim to use his offshore capital to fully repay the loans in cash, 
initially refused to sign the agreement and demanded that ‘if the companies are worth that 
much money, then they should just give us cash’ (cited in Solomon 2000). He gave Salim two 
years to settle his debts. However, as an ‘unexpected ally’ the IMF came to the rescue, asking 
for ‘some flexibility’ in the repayment schedule to prevent ‘serious disruptions’ to the econ-
omy (Solomon 2000). Habibie thus had to accept the unclear, manipulable complexity of the 
collateral and was forced to grant a four years repayment period and Salim’s immunity from 
criminal prosecution. 
Habibie’s hesitation was not unjustified. After a re-assessment of the group’s assets under 
IBRA’s control, it turned out that the value was much lower than stated. Therefore, Salim had 
to add 30 more companies to Holdiko (Sato 2004: 33). Furthermore, in 2000, Anthony Salim, 
through foreign funds manager Citicorp, tried to buy back his assets from IBRA in bulk for 
only Rp20 trillion (Kontan 31 July 2000), thus openly admitting the actual market value far 
below the obliged amount. President Wahid and then-IBRA Head Cacuk agreed, thereby ac-
knowledging the fraudulence of the asset sales by accepting a loss for the state of more than 
Rp33 trillion and allowing the former owner to buy back his companies at a discounted price. 
Eventually, Salim failed to proceed with this plan because Coordinating Minister of Economy 
Kwik Kian Gie – backed by public outrage – objected (Kompas 13 November 2000). 
However, the group was – under the prevailing circumstances – in a good position to re-
coup its losses. Even though former shareholders were banned from repurchasing their old as-
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sets, there were manifold ways to bypass this Financial Sector Policy Committee (KKSK) 
declaration that failed to specify sanctions (Tempo 18 December 2001). The main method was 
to use proxies in pyramidal structures through which the real buyer remained unknown, as 
Djisman Simandjuntak (Director Prasetiya Mulya, interview 27 February 2004) revealed. The 
sale of TV station Indosiar and car producer Indomobil illustrated this clearly. The former 
was officially bought by TDM Asset Management, while the other by Trigemah Securities. 
However, there were five reasons to suspect that Salim was behind this ‘questionable transac-
tion’, as Tempo (18 December 2001) called this deal. First, the tender period was much too 
short. A divestment in only two weeks did not leave any time for due diligence. The buyers 
thus had to buy ‘a pig in a poke’ without knowing the real value and contents of the deal. 
Second, the successful bidders had no relevant experience in the respective business fields. 
Third, the assets were actually way too expensive for investors such as Trigemah and espe-
cially TDM, which was only set up a few months before. Fourth, the management of Indosiar 
and Indomobil remained completely unchanged, which is very unusual after a takeover. 
Lastly, in relation to the supposed value of the companies, the price at which the assets were 
sold off was significantly below expectations because the 25 per cent recovery rate for the 
sale of Indomobil would mean a 75 per cent loss for the government (ibid.). Faisal Basri 
(Commissioner KPPU, interview 11 September 2004) maintained that the anti-monopoly 
commission KPPU could prove price-rigging in the bidding for Indomobil as well as the in-
volvement of Salim in the process. However, these two transactions were relatively easy to 
see through, and Anthony Salim himself was not too cagey about it.42 
More difficult to disclose were purchases through nominees that were well established 
businesses. Here, the Djarum Group played an important role. According to Faisal Basri 
(ibid.), Djarum’s Hartono family owed the Salims a personal favour. Thus, Djarum took over 
                                                     
 
42
 For the first interview that was scheduled with him, he sent Indomobil President Director Gundadi 
Sindhuwinata as his representative, whom I met in Salim’s own office in Wisma Indocement, Jakarta. 
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the role as buyer of Salim’s stakes, as it was the case with Salim Oleochemicals, which again 
did not result in a single replacement of top management (Tempo 18 December 2001). In a 
consortium with the American based investment company Farallon Capital Management, Dja-
rum was involved in another spectacular purchase, that of BCA. Indonesia’s most important 
private bank was thus sold to companies without any experience in the banking sector at all 
(Sato 2004: 35). Even though BCA’s actual President Commissioner Eugene Galbraith (inter-
view 8 September 2004) claimed that Salim had nothing to do with the new owners (and of-
fered to resign should I prove him wrong), the press suspected that the whole deal was mas-
terminded by the Salim boss himself (Laksamana.net 30 January 2002). Another indication 
was that the Salim family never wanted to give up its 7.19 per cent stake in the bank, although 
this was explicitly demanded by Bank Indonesia, as the Salims were included in the DOT 
black list (Kontan 16 July 2001). This minority stake was obviously the foothold to get back 
this ‘jewel of Salim’s business empire’ (ibid.), while the Djarum/Farallon deal served as ‘first 
masterstroke’ for a comeback in all his old business areas (Laksamana.net 7 December 2002). 
‘We lost our bank, but one day we’ll be back, when, I am not sure, but not in a far distant fu-
ture. We’ll be there!’, Anthony Salim (interview 13 April 2005) revealed the next possible 
steps of the plan. As soon as there exists a legal and moral chance to claim back his bank offi-
cially, he would not hesitate to replace his proxies and again operate as the rightful owner of 
BCA. 
For Indofood, another of Salim’s cash cows, the conglomerate applied yet another strat-
egy. Its Hong Kong based investment arm, First Pacific, acquired 40 per cent of Indofood, 
thus bringing the company back under Salim’s control, and at the same time out of Indonesia, 
thereby safeguarding it against confiscation. This move was justified by Salim as a rational 
step of consolidation (Aji & Suprapto 2000). Indeed, while the group still had to repay its 
enormous debts in Indonesia, it was busily expanding overseas. First Pacific bought Philip-
pine Long Distance Telephone (Tempo 1 December 1998), while Salim’s Singapore proxies 
acquired his former shares in the bread producing company QAF from IBRA. Economists 
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such as Didik J. Rachbini demanded that Salim should be sued for not paying his debts to the 
state, despite buying back his companies. Emil Salim, the chairman of the National Economic 
Council, asked why he did not pay his debt first, if he had the money (both cited in Kompas 8 
November 2000). Then-Economic Minister Rizal Ramli labelled Salim as untrustworthy and 
threatened him with imprisonment for such practices, but as he turned to Attorney General 
Marzuki Darusman to take the accused to court, he was given the answer by the Attorney 
General that Anthony Salim in fact was the most cooperative debtor (Kontan 20 November 
2000). On 26 November 2002, finally, IBRA announced that the Salim Group settled its debt 
completely and was thus free of any barriers (Laksamana.net 7 December 2002).  
Since then, the conglomerate has been on its way back to the top, although the formerly 
diversified business group henceforth had to face competition and the loss of privileges. It 
also had to adjust to a transformed political economy and concentrate on certain business 
fields. However, Anthony Salim was very content with the situation of his group in the post-
Soeharto economy (interview 13 April 2005; see also Chapter 6.1). Many new characteristics 
of the regime that initially seemed hazardous for the Salim Group turned out to be the oppo-
site. They enabled the conglomerate to streamline its activities. The forced reconstruction 
came during an appropriate period, in which Soeharto’s former client was already sufficiently 
strong and independent to endure the financial crisis. In the long run, the restructuring even 
was the necessary step Salim needed to survive in further globalised markets. Thus, Anthony 
Salim successfully regrouped and realigned his conglomerate. From Holdiko, he only bought 
back the most lucrative companies, thereby trussing his interests. In Indonesia, these were the 
automotive and food industries. The latter was controlled by its Hong Kong First Pacific 
Group, which also owned several telecommunications and real estate ventures in the Philip-
pines. Salim’s Singaporean KMP Group focussed on food related industries and on property 
mainly in Singapore and China. Sato (2004: 41) interpreted this as a ‘shift from one extreme 
of a high degree of diversification to the other extreme of concentration on a core business’ 
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and ‘the most radical case’ of a ‘transformation from conglomeration to concentration’. The 
Salim Group was thus losing some typical traits of a conglomerate. 
The group adjusted to the changing environment not just structurally, but also in its strate-
gic methods. The crisis triggered the long needed shift from cronyism towards professional-
ism, as Gunadi Sindhuwinata (interview 23 September 2004) claimed. According to Anthony 
Salim (interview 13 April 2005), his group was already geared up for this during the New Or-
der, but the political environment did not allow for this. Therefore, the collapse of the regime 
together with old style-KKN caused, in a sense, a ‘normalisation’ of the Salim Group that 
continued to receive protection, but could not count on it anymore. On the contrary, serious 
opponents, who were longing to see the end of the Salim Group, arose after Soeharto’s per-
sonal patronage ceased. Thus, the group had to be able to survive on its own. The fact that 
Anthony Salim (interview 13 April 2005) had no problems in stating that nowadays, after the 
crisis, only 50 per cent of his business activities were domestic, clearly proved that Salim has 
emerged as an established, highly developed business group that considerably decreased its 
dependency on Indonesia and was no longer cautious about admitting this openly. Indeed, it 
adjusted very well to the grey areas of the post-authoritarian but not yet fully democratic In-
donesia, grasping all kinds of opportunities that were offered. The ways Anthony Salim man-
aged to recoup his losses illustrated his finesse in handling the endless possibilities the new 
regime provided for him to fight against great odds.  
To conclude, the Salim Group boss succeeded in five ways. First, by decreasing the degree 
of diversification of his conglomerate, he concentrated on certain, profitable business sectors. 
Second, Salim gradually converged with international corporate governance practices. Third, 
he increased the group’s global expansion and thus became independent from Indonesia. 
Fourth, Salim turned to the market and was mature enough to remain in existence without po-
litical help. Last, he still operated with tricks on the fringes of legality, where usually, besides 
rumours and insinuations, there was nothing to prove. However, despite all irregularities in 
the debt settlement process, the group had indeed succeeded in cultivating a reputation for 
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professionalism, purgation, and presentability in order to continue operating in post-Soeharto 
Indonesia. In fact, Salim could claim to be one of the first big debtors who had settled his debt 
completely and in a relatively short period. This will help the group to re-emerge as Indone-
sia’s largest conglomerate and its boss to become the most powerful tycoon in the footsteps of 
his father, with the difference that – in the long run – politicians will be going to him to tender 
themselves as patrons who, however, will increasingly lose their usefulness for the Salim 
Group. While Liem Sioe Liong was dependent on ‘business as privilege’ (Anthony Salim, in-
terview 13 April 2005), his son was about to free himself from such constraints, making his 
group sustainedly stronger than it had ever been before.  
 
5.4 Capitalist consolidation, consolidated capital 
As the case studies demonstrated, there were several ways for the conglomerates to survive in 
post-authoritarian Indonesia. Lippo, on the one hand, applied a more defensive strategy that 
resembled the corrupt methods the conglomerates used before in the New Order. It was still 
very dependent on patronage and connections with the political decision makers, which even-
tually brought them through the crisis. In comparison to the Soeharto regime, democracy was 
considered to be a more difficult environment that immensely restricted the range of Lippo’s 
activities. The Salim Group, on the other hand, embarked on different tactics. It progressively 
adjusted to the changes. While the group still reverted to KKN whenever it was deemed pos-
sible and profitable, it realised that there were indeed a lot of benefits to gain from democ-
racy, decentralism, and deregulation. Salim was mature enough to survive without President 
Soeharto as major protector. 
The resilience of these two groups – and the many more that are still alive and kicking – 
revealed the nature of the new regime. Even though many new conditions emerged through 
reformasi, which at first sight seemed to inhibit the continuation of the old elites, a fundamen-
tal break with the past failed to take place. Democratisation merely modified the workings of 
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the predatory arrangements without fundamentally transforming them. The basic structures of 
power were not altered significantly because post-reformasi powerholders have merely tried 
to capture rather than overcome the old system. The changes that have occurred, however, 
were adequate to please and appease international observers and creditors, as well as the few 
credible internal voices of reformasi. Still, the restructuring of the new regime was by far too 
inconclusive to overturn the position of those that had been incubated within the New Order 
oligarchy. 
In this chapter, I identified capital’s indispensability as the basic cause for structural con-
tinuance. As demonstrated, the crisis resulted in a mechanism that turned out to be very ad-
vantageous for the conglomerates: The more money they pulled out of Indonesia, the more 
the economy needed them. As long as the old system was in the process of revitalisation, the 
capitalists knew that they were the oxygen any post-Soeharto regime required to stay alive. 
This gave them the opportunity to recover and recoup many losses – as the case studies 
showed – and further increased their importance. Moreover, they managed through these 
processes to resist unpleasant reforms.  
Here, I analysed the reactions of the capitalists to reformasi. They were substantially re-
sponsible for many of the continuities between the New Order and the post-Soeharto regime. 
Beyond this, they could soften the consequences of the changes. Their capital was the basic 
condition for this, without which politicians could not run for elections in the new parliamen-
tary democracy. It also gave them the opportunity to make use of the many avenues of civil 
society. The end of the centralised state offered grey areas, provided new possibilites, and 
simplified the access to regional decision makers, who were easier to bribe than the former 
powerful gatekeepers in Jakarta. Through corruption, co-optation, or infiltration, the decen-
tralisation of power as well as the emergence of new watchdogs posed few serious difficulties 
for big business to pursue their strategies of survival in more deregulated markets. However, 
we cannot evaluate the conglomerates’ response to the demise of the New Order as strictly re-
actionary. The cases of Lippo and Salim elucidated that the new regime allowed the simulta-
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neity of reactionism and professionalism in corporate behaviour. Moreover, they also indi-
cated the potential future course of big business in Indonesia, making clear that the political 
system was no longer the main variable that determined the options of the conglomerates. On 
the contrary, the capitalists were ready to determine politics. They realised that they indeed 
could influence the outcome of democratisation, decentralisation, and deregulation and what 
was left of reformasi in accordance to their requirements. The post-Soeharto environment 
provided conditions particularly beneficial for the Chinese conglomerates that did not only let 
them survive, but substantially decreased the authority of the state over business. The follow-
ing chapter will explore actual and possible scenarios of Chinese capital’s accommodation in 
an initially unfamiliar, post-authoritarian environment that they moulded in such a manner to 





TOWARDS A NEW ACCOMMODATION 
The economic and political crisis in Indonesia ended the New Order regime, leaving one of its 
main pillars, the Chinese conglomerates, damaged but not destroyed. I have demonstrated 
how and why Chinese business groups emerged and flourished (Chapter 3) and how the end 
of the New Order disrupted the predatory arrangements and endangered the continuing exis-
tence of big business (Chapter 4). However, I have also shown how the new regime turned 
out to be less inhibiting for the tycoons than widely expected (Chapter 5). Indeed, they man-
aged to survive the crisis. But where did they go from there? In what ways did they cope with 
the dismantling of the old patronage networks? How did they attempt to thrive in a democra-
tised, decentralised, and deregulated post-1998 Indonesia? 
Most big businessmen were initially afraid of Indonesia’s democratisation, because, as 
Pharos boss and chairman of the Indonesian Chinese Association INTI, Eddie Lembong (in-
terview 21 October 2004), remarked, ‘democracy is unfortunately related to numbers, and the 
Chinese are very small in numbers’. Ufen (2002: 187) pointed out that the capitalists – as eth-
nic Chinese – had to fear a loss of their good relations with state officials which would leave 
them unprotected against anti-Chinese groups and sentiments. Amy Chua expected a similar 
outcome: 
In the numerous countries around the world that have pervasive poverty and a market-dominant 
minority, democracy and markets […] can proceed only in deep tension with each other. In such 
conditions, the combined pursuit of free markets and democratization has repeatedly catalyzed 
ethnic conflict in highly predictable ways, with catastrophic consequences, including genocidal 
violence and the subversion of markets and democracy themselves. 
(A. Chua 2003a: 16) 
She concluded that ‘market-dominant minorities do not really want democracy’ due to its po-
tential to be inimical to their interests and to cause ethnic hatred (A. Chua 2003a: 259), an 
  
159
analysis and prediction shared by many Indonesian experts. Almost all my interviewees knew 
and mentioned her book in which she explicitly discussed the case of the Chinese in Indone-
sia, showing that the question of economically powerful minorities and democratisation is a 
very relevant and timely one in the post-Soeharto era.43  
However, I offer a different interpretation of reformasi. Here I suggest that the capitalists 
were well represented by the new regime. Indeed, the democratic transition strengthened their 
stance in Indonesian society and resulted in a more beneficial political economy for the cor-
porate world that would eventually lead to the emergence of a relatively autonomous capital-
ist class. I argue that the regime change removed the social limitations of the Chinese tycoons, 
empowered them politically in relation to the politico-bureaucrats, and secured their eco-
nomic revival. This set the stage for an increasingly plutocratic Indonesia, in which these 
capitalists dominate the state unambiguously and assume the characteristics of a ‘ruling class’ 
(see Chapter 2.2). 
Therborn (1978: 203) proposed that ‘how far it [the bourgeoisie] is prepared to accept lib-
eralization will depend on the availability of modes of transition to other, equally good or bet-
ter, formats of representation’. The aim of this chapter is thus to observe the ‘modes of transi-
tion’ through a micro-level analysis of old, revised, and new patterns of political business 
prevalent in contemporary Indonesia and disclose capital’s corresponding ‘formats of repre-
sentation’, thereby providing empirical evidence that the tycoons – while still in hibernation – 
were quietly forging a new form of state–business accommodation, in which their dominance 
would be firmly established.  
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 Financial analyst Lin (2004), for instance, based a Tempo article on the ‘Chinese role in Indonesia’ 
on A. Chua’s propositions. In the interviews I conducted, he as well as other respondents (such as 
Sjahrir, Faisal Basri, Anton Supit, Alvin Lie) repeatedly referred to A. Chua’s hypothesis to substanti-
ate their arguments.  
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6.1 Capital in post-Soeharto Indonesia:  
Un-limiting Chinese big business 
With the end of the Soeharto era, the New Order form of accommodation between the ruling 
politico-bureaucrats and the Chinese capitalists was terminated as well. Capital, however, was 
needed for a reconstruction of the Indonesian economy and could thus prevent significant 
changes to the system that were detrimental to its interests. The modifications related to the 
sudden impracticability of authoritarianism, centralism, and KKN badly impaired the politico-
bureaucrats, but failed to neutralise the capitalists. On the contrary, as shown before, the 
structural continuities as well as the modest moves towards the objectives of reformasi were 
helpful to let Chinese big business survive and hibernate until a more stable form of accom-
modation emerged.  
This new arrangement between the state and capital is well on its way. Its point of depar-
ture was the democratised, decentralised, and deregulated regime without the limitations set 
by the authoritarian New Order state. It provided a basically amicable environment in which 
the conglomerates were socially, politically, and economically better positioned than before. I 
will focus on the most significant consequences of reformasi for Chinese capital. Through 
them, Chinese big business was elevated to a new social status, which constituted the precon-
dition for the overall political emancipation of capital.  
 
Democracy: Social de-marginalisation 
The capitalists in Indonesia have always been in an ambivalent position due to their precari-
ous societal status, which prevented a fusion of their high economic capacities with direct po-
litical power. As explicated previously (see Chapter 3), this particular position secured them a 
co-optation in the politico–business oligarchy. With the fall of Soeharto in May 1998, anti-
Chinese discrimination abated through the abrupt disruption of authoritarian rule and the ad-
vent of democratic reforms. The concerted state-led instrumentalisation of Chinese ethnicity, 
through which the New Order marginalised, discriminated, and stigmatised the Chinese mi-
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nority (Chua 2002), was currently not viable and enforceable anymore. On the contrary, the 
shock of the anti-Chinese riots and the encouragement of the liberal Abdurrahman Wahid 
presidency (1999–2001) saw the Chinese revive their cultural traditions on the basis of new 
anti-discrimination and human rights regulations. Celebrations of Chinese New Year, Chinese 
characters, and political and social groups of ethnic Chinese became legal, while most of the 
racist laws were abrogated (Lindsey 2005). 
Besides President Wahid’s genuine respect for minority rights (interview 17 September 
2004), the indispensability of Chinese capital also led to a shift in government policies. The 
World Bank Vice President for the Asia Pacific, Jean-Michael Severino, warned the new gov-
ernment that ‘the Chinese are the issue in Indonesia […]. How they fix [the Chinese problem] 
is up to the Indonesians, but the economic impact if they do not fix it will be huge’ (cited in 
Purdey 2005: 20). As a symbolic measure to reverse the capital flight, Habibie eliminated the 
legal distinction between pribumi and non-pribumi per decree in September 1998 (Cohen 
1998b: 15). Wahid, as one of the most eminent Muslim leaders, even proclaimed that he was 
of Chinese ancestry, went to China on his first official state visit, and appointed Kwik Kian 
Gie to his cabinet (Indonesian Observer 1 December 1999). He emphasised that ‘the Chinese 
act in tandem with the interests of the nation, not in their own interest. […] Yes, there has 
been a purposeful construction of ordinary Chinese [under Soeharto]. But now, there is no site 
anymore to do that’ (interview 17 September 2004). This signified the considerable shift in 
official government policies towards the Chinese minority. In post-Soeharto Indonesia ethnic 
Chinese were seen, for the first time in Indonesian history, as legislatively equal members of 
the nation and were finally regarded as a suku, a domestic ethnic group. 
Elsewhere, I pointed out how the Chinese capitalists were used by the government to stig-
matise all Indonesians of Chinese origin as rich (Chua 2004b). The marginalised social status 
of orang Tionghoa, in turn, diminished the power of the capitalists. Therefore, even though 
‘Chinese’ capitalists had nothing in common with small ‘Chinese’ shop-owners except the 
ethnic label, the change in minority policies had tremendous effects on all people categorised 
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as ‘Chinese’. Thus the big tycoons also benefited from the opening of societal spaces for 
Sino-Indonesians, who could now become regular participants in politics and civil society. 
These developments finally liberated the capitalists from being categorised as aliens and re-
moved the basic foundation of the New Order patronage networks: the pariah status of the 
limited Chinese capitalists that used to be incapable to challenge the absolutist rule of the 
politico-bureaucrats.  
The formerly much needed political protection henceforth became unnecessary, offering 
the tycoons a new, independent sense of security that boosted their self-confidence and let 
them proclaim that the Chinese ‘are in a very good shape, contrary to what people say’ (An-
thony Salim, interview 13 April 2005). However, businessman and INTI Chair Eddie Lem-
bong was still very cautious, believing that the ethnic label of capital will not vanish: ‘It won’t 
be like in Thailand; people won’t forget that you are Chinese’, he said (interview 21 October 
2004). Gemala Group boss Sofjan Wanandi (interview 8 June 2004), in contrast, predicted 
optimistically that ‘there will be no more tension in the future. […] Chinese big business will 
be national business, not Chinese anymore.’ The President Director of Indomobil, Gunadi 
Sindhuwinata (interview 22 September 2004), made a similar claim, suggesting that ‘the iden-
tity of a company, what belongs to whom, won’t be important in the future. Salim, for in-
stance, will become a real Indonesian company, although it is run by an ethnic Chinese.’ The 
threat of confiscation of ethnic Chinese property, demanded by some demagogues and feared 
by many capitalists in the beginning of the post-Soeharto regime, therefore paled into insig-
nificance. 
Certainly, the sudden diminution of Chineseness as an important, demarcating boundary 
was not uncontested. On the one hand, the Chinese tycoons themselves selectively made use 
of their Chinese ethnicity whenever they deemed it beneficial. The Chinese Indonesian asso-
ciation INTI with its successful lobbying efforts is one such example (see Jakarta Post 14 
August 2002), demonstrating the new political weight the Chinese as a group have achieved. 
INTI Chairman Eddie Lembong (interview 21 October 2004) – as most other entrepreneurs – 
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was still thinking in Chinese/non-Chinese terms: ‘Business requires attitudes that pribumi 
don’t have. It’s still the Chinese that will dominate the economy even in the distant future’. 
Anthony Salim (interview 13 April 2005), who identified ‘the upcoming of the Chinese and 
mainland China’s strength and […] a lot of interaction inside ASEAN between [ethnic] Chi-
nese people’ as the major economic trends for Indonesia, had a more instrumental view on 
ethnicity: While maintaining that he is an ‘Indonesian businessman’, he also stressed how im-
portant it is to be identified as Chinese – the reason why all his business cards had to be bilin-
gual (ibid.). The increasing economic importance of China will thus reconfigure local ethnici-
ties and foster the tycoons’ Chinese identity.  
On the other hand, some prominent pribumi competitors used populism to raise their eco-
nomic and political profiles. The new system based on elections and popular vote, through 
which pribumi capitalists such as Jusuf Kalla and Aburizal Bakrie emerged as Vice President 
and Coordinating Economy Minister respectively, was a latent danger for Chinese tycoons. 
The disquiet amongst Chinese Indonesians was immense when vice presidential candidate 
Kalla suggested affirmative action for pribumi (see Wibowo 2004). However, it was obvi-
ously their knowledge of history in which pribumisasi affected only small Chinese businesses 
that kept most tycoons calm over this issue. With their capital, connections, and friendships, 
they were not afraid of the Kallas or Bakries, as Artha Graha Group boss Tomy Winata (in-
terview 27 September 2004) proclaimed: ‘There is no worry of protectionism for native Indo-
nesians since Indonesian economy is still dependent on Chinese businesspeople.’  
However, it cannot be ruled out that, in the future, further attempts will be made to rede-
fine ‘indigenous’ in order to justify pribumi protectionism. If populist nationalist policies gain 
importance, they will be most probably based on anti-Chinese sentiments, as they used to be 
before. As long as the Chinese in general are seen as rich, big businessmen, this perception 
will remain useful as a tool to mobilise the masses and other interests. No indigenous power 
bloc would voluntarily relinquish this instrument of authority. Thus, the ‘Chinese problem’ is 
likely to reappear. That the conglomerates still feel vulnerable towards such threats can be 
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seen by the actual eagerness to reconcile their ethnic identity and stress their solidarity with 
the people and the country: ‘I love Indonesia. It was where I was born, where I grew up. I 
have my family here. I have a lot of friends, and I believe in the future prospects of Indonesia. 
And I do believe the Indonesian people are among the nicest people in the world, genuinely 
so’, James Riady (cited in Business Week 7 June 1999) rhapsodised. Similarly, Gunadi Sind-
huwinata (interview 22 September 2004) emphasised: ‘As entrepreneur it is important to in-
vest in Indonesia – as long as you do this for the people, you do this for the country’, under-
lining that his boss, Anthony Salim, ‘is staying in Indonesia because he loves this country, 
because he is committed to the development of this country. […] He will stay here although 
he is facing all these difficulties, all these problems, but he is trying to solve and overcome 
them.’ Tomy Winata (interview 17 September 2004) declared that his Artha Graha Group 
‘grew in Indonesia, stayed in Indonesia during the crisis and is investing in Indonesia now af-
ter the crisis. Artha Graha is a truly patriotic enterprise.’ He added that he is ‘purely Indone-
sian, loyal to this country and socially responsible’ (ibid.). However, it will still take some 
time until his self-ascription corresponds with the way others see him, for, as Budiman (2005: 
95-6) reported, ‘people felt that Winata’s actions were “typical Chinese” behaviour, espe-
cially for Chinese businessmen. They felt that the Chinese “always” bribed state officials, par-
ticularly the police and the military.’ As long as these traditional anti-Chinese sentiments re-
main prevalent in Indonesian society, pribumi capitalists would exploit them in their fight for 
market shares, thus preserving the century old demarcation between Chinese and non-Chinese 
further.  
However, these instrumentally used ethnic boundaries will never be as strong as those 
constructed by the state. In fact, the strengthening of Chinese identity was, momentarily, more 
beneficial than detrimental, fitting the conglomerates into Indonesia’s more inclusive diver-
sity and – simultaneously – linking them up to the emerging markets in China. Democracy, 
eventually, largely de-marginalised the capitalists and liberated them from their social chains, 
thereby placing the Chinese tycoons irreversibly at the centre of the Indonesian nation. 
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Decentralism: Political strengthening 
It was not possible to uphold the large-scale patronage networks between the leading politico-
bureaucrats and the most eminent tycoons after the fall of Soeharto. The new decentralised 
regime was incompatible with the former system of KKN that required centralised decision-
making, exclusively allocatable businesses, and potent investors. The absence of all these fac-
tors required a reorganisation of the mutually beneficial politico–business relations. This was, 
at the beginning, a major set-back for both parties involved. 
First, the once powerful top officials in Jakarta either lost the command over the huge 
gatekeeping institutions that presided over business opportunities, or the institutions’ author-
ity was considerably reduced or even eliminated. The politico-bureaucrats had thus compara-
tively little to offer, which diminished their capacity of extracting rents and bribes from the 
capitalists as they used to do for decades. Second, the entrepreneurs were deprived of their in-
fluential partners and had to learn to get by without the reliability and the clarity of the tradi-
tional KKN process. The old oligarchy in the way it was constituted, obviously, was consid-
erably weakened.  
However, although the situation of both allies deteriorated, the politico-bureaucrats’ status 
was more irreparable. While, there was no way of doing big business during the New Order 
without the Jakarta gatekeepers, most of them were replaced by a new set of relatively small 
scale bureaucrats in regional bodies that did not possess the same kind of authority. These po-
litical actors, with whom the conglomerates henceforth had to deal with, were thus less pow-
erful than their former colleagues in Jakarta. With them, the tycoons replicated the networks 
far away from Jakarta in the provinces.  
Initially, this was merely an emergency solution, meant to quickly rehabilitate the forfeited 
connections with the abdicated authorities, as the conglomerates could not imagine surviving 
without political patronage at all. However, they quickly adjusted to the new situation, in 
which ‘you cannot do KKN anymore because everybody can’, as Angky Camaro (interview 
17 September 2004) remarked, referring to the elapsed exclusivity of KKN. Monopolies on 
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huge projects and the respective exorbitant profits were a thing of the past; but on the other 
hand, the end of the unconstrained power of the bureaucrats had significant positive effects 
for the conglomerates, enabling them to become relatively independent from the political 
elite. The projects in the aftermath of the tsunami in Aceh, where Artha Graha submitted a 
blue print for the reconstruction of Meulaboh before and without the endorsement of the cen-
tral government (Tempo 8 February 2005), disclosed the newly gained sovereignty of the 
business groups.  
Sofjan Wanandi (interview 8 June 2004) asked candidly, ‘why do you need to be close to 
the government if there are no facilities there?’ The tycoons could detach themselves from the 
politico-bureaucrats, who had no leverage anymore to coerce the businessmen to pay. Not 
even the president was considered to be crucial anymore. Gunadi Sindhuwinata (interview 22 
September 2004) stated: ‘If you stand beside Megawati or whomever, people will think that 
you are recognised also in that level. This is important. It is the emotional touch, but it does 
not necessarily mean that you are supporting her’. As the politicians could not deliver any-
more, they became rather irrelevant for the conglomerates, which were increasingly able to 
acquire their businesses themselves. They were given direct access to the markets, and, if still 
required, they could refer to the respective authorities at the regional level. The Chinese capi-
talists were thus positioned favourably vis-à-vis their former political patrons and would be 
the main beneficiaries of the centralised regime’s weakening. While the bureaucrats’ power 
faded, Chinese big business gained political strength that they henceforth applied in their 
daily interactions with the authorities. 
 
Free markets: Economic resurgence 
The overall effects of the new, more deregulated economy on big business continued to be 
disputed. Sato (2004: 42), who studied Indonesia’s business groups, especially the Salim 
Group, in detail, suggested that ‘the golden age of conglomerates in Indonesia has come to an 
end’. Sofjan Wanandi (interview 1 July 2003) shared this allegation: ‘Chinese big business? 
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Don’t waste your time. They are all bankrupt’, he told me after I mentioned my research pro-
ject to him. BCA President Commissioner Eugene Galbraith (interview 8 September 2004), 
however, suspected that Wanandi was ‘probably on drugs’ as he proclaimed the death of the 
business groups. In fact, Wanandi’s statement was in stark contrast to perceptions of other ty-
coons who considered the business climate in post-Soeharto Indonesia to be tremendously 
positive.  
Due to the ongoing restructuring process and a lack of relevant figures and rankings, it re-
mains – on the one hand – impossible to substantiate the economic resurgence of the con-
glomerates with sufficiently reliable data (see Chapter 1.3). The persons who ought to know 
the actual state of the business groups, the owners themselves, refused to reveal their knowl-
edge, as it would make them vulnerable to further demands and weaken their leverage in the 
ongoing debts negotiations. Indeed, there was a trend to understate the size of their own en-
terprise. For instance, Artha Graha, Salim, or Sampoerna were each mentioned by different 
respondents as one of the largest groups in post-crisis Indonesia. Nevertheless, Tomy Winata 
(interview 17 September 2004) averred that his Artha Graha Group might be solid, but not 
‘big’: ‘There are a few giant business groups in Indonesia such as Sampoerna, Djarum, Salim, 
and Lippo. We are not comparable since our size is much smaller’. Anthony Salim (interview 
13 April 2005), as well, asserted that he did not know whether the Salim group was still the 
biggest conglomerate in Indonesia, and Angky Camaro (interview 27 September 2004) of 
Sampoerna emphasised that ‘Sampoerna is only a company, not even a conglomerate’. 
On the other hand, however, it is not necessary to measure the degree of consolidation 
quantitatively. Instead, it is sufficient to analyse the tycoons’ subjective perception of the 
business climate after the New Order. Significantly, most businessmen were very content 
with the actual situation, declaring that ‘nobody wants to have the New Order back. Chinese 
big business is psychologically and technically prepared to deal with democratisation and 
democracy’ (Eddie Lembong, interview 21 October 2004). Others such as Sindhuwinata (in-
terview 22 September 2004) stated that ‘we cannot turn the wheel reverse and we have to 
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look forward’. Even the conglomerate of Soeharto’s major crony Liem Sioe Liong, the Salim 
Group, did not go bankrupt because of the regime change. On the contrary, its boss, Liem’s 
son Anthony, was enthusiastic about the post-New Order situation: ‘The total product […] 
now is more than before, […] in fact, it increased by many percent compared to pre-crisis’ 
(Anthony Salim, interview 13 April 2005). He further claimed that, generally, ‘most of the 
businesses that are basically market related or with market orientation, they are in fact not 
only not affected, but thriving because of the new conditions’ (ibid.).  
There was obviously no longer a need to fight the post-Soeharto regime. The current eco-
nomic conditions were indeed very favourable for the capitalists. Their well-being indicated 
that the conglomerates consolidated socially, politically, and economically, and made them-
selves comfortable in the new Indonesia, best prepared to defend and expand their empires in 
a democratised country. 
 
We are well positioned to take advantage  
of a more open Indonesia.44  
6.2 Modes of transition: Patterns of political business 
What did the conglomerates do politically? How have the Chinese capitalists modified their 
ways of doing business in post-Soeharto Indonesia? If we were to believe the assertions of 
leading tycoons, the corporate world simply adjusted to the new democratic order. ‘Busi-
nesses adapt to whatever political or social situation is prevailing. That’s what I call a healthy 
attitude. Businesses should adapt’, Anthony Salim (interview 13 April 2005) stated, while his 
friend and Indomobil executive Gunadi Sindhuwinata (interview 22 September 2004) con-
firmed that ‘Pak Anton, whatever politics or government […], must also comply with the 
situation every time. That’s why, after Soeharto, Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid, he is able to 
                                                     
 
44
 A high-ranking member of the Salim family, cited in Solomon (2000). 
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survive, he is able to master the situation as business enterprise and businessman regardless 
who is controlling the country.’ Tomy Winata (interview 17 September 2004) concurred: 
‘Whoever will be in power, I am loyal to the government.’  
Indeed, the conglomerates have proven their flexibility in times of fast changing govern-
ments; otherwise they would not have survived the transition from the New Order to the post-
Soeharto regime. However, the myth of apolitical business that the tycoons tried to foster with 
these statements did not correspond with practice, as the following observations of modified 
and new business patterns will reveal. They indicate a steady shift of power in favour of the 
capitalists that they translated into more efficient representations of their interests.  
 
The restoration of KKN 
According to Alatas (1999: 6-7), corruption, collusion, and nepotism denote ‘the subordina-
tion of public interests to private aims involving a violation of the norms of duty and welfare, 
accompanied by secrecy, betrayal, deception and a callous disregard for any consequences 
suffered by the public’. Its Indonesian version, KKN, expressed the New Order oligarchy’s 
predatory, instrumental, and unrestricted use of the state apparatus, based on mutually benefi-
cial arrangements in which the Chinese conglomerates channelled huge sums to the authori-
ties as bribes, as commissions for business opportunities, and as protection money for politi-
cal shelter. This accommodation collapsed in May 1998. After the fall of Soeharto, many of 
these old practices have thus become different, some of which were impractical due to the 
new openness and institutionalised checks and balances. However, a new regime does not 
mean the eradication of the predatory appropriation of the state and its apparatus by economic 
and political elites. Democracy provided no barriers against KKN. On the contrary, more op-
portunities emerged, revealing that the capitalist oligarchy survived and still held the state 
firmly under control. However, as I will point out, the patterns of political business in post-
Soeharto Indonesia were different from the ones before the crisis, demonstrating that the hier-




In the New Order, corruption involved a semi-formalised process of channelling back some 
gains from the conglomerates to the politicians as required rewards for shoving profitable 
business facilities off on to them. During, and immediately after the crisis, this not only be-
came more difficult because of the increased public awareness, but also lost its applicability, 
as new business opportunities and the possibility to share profits were rare. However, corrup-
tion had not at all ceased in Indonesia, which was still perceived to be one of the most corrupt 
countries in the world (Castle 2004: 76). The rationale behind corruption, though, had 
changed. In the immediate post-crisis period, it was for the pure survival of the business 
groups that were dependent on leniency and preferential treatment of the decision-makers, 
who resided over the assessment of their obligations, the allocation of financial injections, and 
the conditions of a continuing existence. The past theme of corruption was economic expan-
sion; in and after the crisis it was the settlement of debts.  
Due to the more decentralised structure of post-Soeharto Indonesia, the new political pow-
erholders were less influential, but because of this also less demanding and, in general, more 
receptive for money. Hence, it was much easier to reach and bribe the respective persons in 
charge than before. This was the breeding ground for money politics (i.e. politics determined 
by money) that spread out from the top – where ICW (2004) discovered more than Rp14.5 
billion of unreported and thus illegal funds for the presidential candidates – down to the bot-
tom of the parliamentary system with ‘systematic approaches to members of parliament’ to 
vote in favour of certain business groups, as MP Alvin Lie (interview 7 September 2004) re-
ported. He experienced the wily way in which tycoons were able to use the new institutions of 
Indonesia’s democracy. In one case, where the DPR had to decide about the sale of Indosat, 
‘material gains and favours’ were offered so abundantly and constantly that even some of the 
initiators of the parliamentary fraction against the sale finally supported the opposite position. 
Instead of separating money and politics, as most reforms explicitly intended, the two be-
came even more intertwined. The new Indonesian democratic system with its decentralised, 
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more diffuse power structure, capital intensive campaigns for votes, support, and posts, and 
power hungry politicians and bureaucrats desperately looking for financiers, offered manifold 
hunting grounds for capital to reach an even higher return on investment than was possible 
before. They could rely on a seamless transition in personnel and mentalities from the New 
Order to the post-Soeharto era in which many Indonesian institutions, such as the central 
bank, still resembled a ‘den of thieves’ or ‘nest of crooks’ – in the words of former Bank In-
donesia Senior Deputy Governor Anwar Nasution (Laksama.net 10 May 2003).  
After the consolidation of the conglomerates was achieved, the tycoons returned to the tra-
ditional objectives of corruption and again focussed on the facilitation of business opportuni-
ties, although the money was spent to expedite the process rather than to accrue certain con-
cessions (Faisal Basri, interview 11 September 2004). However, the application of the same 
pattern took place under opposite signs. The politico-bureaucrats were no longer decisive and 
could not count on a permanent flow of money. On the contrary, the conglomerates were free 
to decide whom to bribe and were aware that it was often not necessary at all to use money to 
reach the wanted goal. Hence, the former hierarchy was turned upside down with politics that 
was determined by capital. Money politics became the main characteristics of Indonesia’s po-
litical economy and would be increasingly omnipresent in the future as integral part of pa-
tronage and infiltration. 
Patronage 
The character of patronage underwent significant changes as well. Most traumatic for the 
capitalists were the experiences of the riots in May 1998, where the authorities exposed the 
Chinese tycoons ruthlessly to a hostile social environment. The businessmen drew two con-
clusions. First, they could not rely on the politico-bureaucrats anymore and had to take care of 
their safety themselves. Second, they were forced at the same time to seek new patrons to get 
by the turbulent times of transition and political instability.  
James Riady was the corporate mogul who was most active in establishing himself as the 
main partner of the new political leaders. As Soeharto’s authority faded and the military was 
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expected to intervene, Riady set up direct contact with General Wiranto. He never wanted to 
experience the same kind of insecurity again, as he told Far Eastern Economic Review corre-
spondent Jeremy Wagstaff (interview 11 June 2004). This also meant that he had to be flexi-
ble. In fact, as Wiranto did not turn out to be the new president, he shifted his allegiance to 
Habibie, joining his team as ‘business ambassador’ (Shari 1999). As major ‘Habibie crony’ 
(ibid.) he intended to be the new Liem Sioe Liong of post-Soeharto Indonesia. For this he 
could revert to his experiences in the United States, where he ‘wanted to be known as main 
importer of best American values to Indonesia, but became main exporter of corruption to 
America’, as Lippo critic Lin Che Wei (interview 22 September 2004) declared, referring to 
the funding scandal (see Solomon & Holloway 1996) in which Riady proved his strength to 
tie the right political relations.  
James Riady was the indisputable ‘czar of Indonesia’s new money politics’ (Shari 1999), 
but others tried to catch up. Habibie’s successor, Abdurrahman Wahid, claimed that no ty-
coon attempted to establish links with him while he was president, because they knew about 
his integrity and were afraid of him (interview 17 September 2004), although there were 
strong indications that he sought to have his own group of cronies. This would explain why 
he, without any substantiation, intervened in the judicial processes against Marimutu Siniva-
san of Texmaco, Prajogo Pangestu of Barito Pacific, and Syamsul Nursalim of Gadjah Tung-
gal, and demanded the delay of the three tycoons’ prosecution (Bisnis Indonesia 20 October 
2000). He himself only admitted that he was close to Putera Sampoerna, who used to take him 
on his private plane to Singapore and discuss economic issues with him (interview 17 Sep-
tember 2004). However, the former head of state observed that during the Megawati years, 
the ‘black conglomerates’ (as examples, he mentioned James Riady, who ‘likes to cater to the 
needs of high officials and throw money away’, Anthony Salim, ‘a bad guy who lives through 
cronyism’, and Tomy Winata, who owns a bank that is ‘controlled by the armed forces and by 
hooligans’) succeeded in finding their partners (interview 17 September 2004).  
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These ad-hoc partnerships, though, could not replace the patronage relationships of the 
New Order that grew over decades. Before the crisis, the combination of patrons and clients 
was inherently habitual. Every politico-bureaucrat matched up with a compatible business-
man, and it was clear that the most important decision-maker, i.e. Soeharto, could gather the 
most decisive tycoons, such as Bob Hasan and Liem Sioe Liong, around himself. In post-
crisis Indonesia, political positions were uncertain and transient, as were many of the tar-
nished businesses. The high complexity and unreliability of the new power constellation was 
not conducive to an arrangement that required consistency. Patronage, as the efforts of James 
Riady revealed, was, for the short term, still useful. Indeed, it helped the conglomerates to 
survive, as I showed in the case studies (see Chapter 5.3). Furthermore, it secured them pref-
erential treatment deemed impossible in a democratic country. One ‘open secret’ in Jakarta 
was that electronic goods in Electronic City or cigars and other luxury goods in a shop of the 
Borobudur hotel were substantially cheaper because Tomy Winata as the owner did not have 
to pay the respective taxes (Chatib Basri, interview 12 May 2004). Political connections were 
therefore still advantageous, and groups such as Lippo continued to rely on them, as the con-
stellation of its new board disclosed. This included influential persons and politicians such as 
former Minister of Domestic Affairs Suryadi Sudirja, former Minister of State-owned Enter-
prises Tanri Abeng, and former IBRA Deputy Farid Haryanto, who were co-opted as directors 
(Trust 24 May 2004). 
To balance the diminished effectiveness and reliability of patronage, the conglomerates 
started to spread their risks, knowing the price of every party. The politico-bureaucrats could 
henceforth not count anymore on exclusive patron–client relationships. On the contrary, the 
former dependents were able to choose among a number of power brokers. Hedging thus be-
came a common practice, making it difficult to identify a distinct affiliation of the financiers. 
The political environment of elections further complicated the patronage process, as it was 
too uncertain to put all the eggs in one basket. Angky Camaro (interview 17 September 2004) 
remarked: ‘If we choose one party then we limit our market’. Hence, almost no tycoon re-
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vealed his favourite candidate before the first round of the presidential elections in 2004, as 
well as in the second round, where only a few supported one of the two remaining candidates 
openly (see Tempo 30 August 2004). The sometimes contradictory assumptions of observers 
portrayed the same situation: If one claimed that, for example, Tomy Winata was close to 
Megawati through his business connection with her husband Taufik Kiemas (e.g. Kevin 
O’Rourke, political analyst, interview 6 September 2004), he was as correct as another person 
emphasising Winata’s link to the other candidate, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, through one 
of his closest associates and former President Commissioner of his Bank Artha Graha, T.B. 
Silalahi, who became the key advisor of the latter (e.g. Lin Che Wei, economist, interview 22 
September 2004). Winata was also suspected of financing Yudhoyono’s campaign, while oth-
ers believed he funded Megawati. All allegations were probably true, as Faisal Basri (inter-
view 14 September 2004) suspected, who asserted that Winata had his money in every party. 
Significantly, the Artha Graha boss himself admitted: 
Up to now businessmen don’t want to be seen as supporting just one party. […] It will be the 
end for many businessmen who supported the wrong person. You cannot put all money on one 
horse, because the uncertainty of winning is too high. Besides this the president now changes at 
least every 10 years. 
(Tomy Winata, interview 17 September 2004) 
Often, family members carefully split their political loyalties, such as the Wanandis, where 
Sofjan was favouring Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Sofjan Wanandi, interview 8 June 2004) 
while his brother Jusuf used the Jakarta Post to secure support for Megawati (J. Wanandi 
2004). For the Riady family, James sided with the actual powerholders, while his father, Mo-
chtar, was ‘hedging the family's bets by courting opposition leaders’ (Shari 1999). For busi-
nessmen, it was quite problematic not to be certain where to put their money. However, for 
politicians, it was devastating not to have a stable cash inflow. To stay politically alive, they 
permanently had to make sure that their fountains did not run dry. 
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What we observe in post-Soeharto Indonesia is thus a modified way of collusion, where 
the traditional patron–client relationship has been turned upside down. It became the job of 
the politicians to seek new partners, although they had nothing much to offer in return. In the 
immediate post-crisis years, they could still provide social protection and secure the economic 
survival of the conglomerates. In the medium term, however, the capitalists would be able to 
unhitch from their former patrons.  
Infiltration 
Nepotism in Indonesia used to refer to the appropriation of the state and economy of the ex-
tended Soeharto clan. Certainly, this lapsed as the patriarch stepped back. However, it was re-
placed by the informal links between certain persons inside the political or bureaucratic sys-
tem and Chinese big business that were stronger than normal patronage relationships. In order 
to reduce the risk of wasting money, tycoons started a long time ago to identify potential poli-
ticians and establish relationships that went beyond material interests. These included people 
like Laksamana Sukadi, former CEO of Lippo Bank and later Minister of State-owned Enter-
prises, and several young military staff – supported by Tomy Winata – who were groomed 
since their youth. When they became powerful, it was almost impossible to separate the ties 
with their sponsors, as Member of Parliament Alvin Lie (interview 7 September 2004) ob-
served. This replicated the virtual family bonds between Soeharto and Liem Sioe Liong, or 
General Gatot Subroto and Bob Hasan. The significant difference was that the generals no 
longer adopted a businessman, but – the other was round – the tycoons chose their personal 
politicians and bureaucrats, seeking to ‘find someone whom they can groom for the next 10 
years’ (Tomy Winata, interview 17 September 2004). 
To prevent uncontrollable interference from potentially hostile new regulators the moguls 
tried to bring in and further the careers of close, sympathetic people or those who could be 
easily bribed in order to influence the composition, orientation, and arbitration of many insti-
tutions. The secretive nature of this procedure meant that it was difficult, if not impossible, to 
produce evidence for it, unlike cases of corruption. However, the incidents that made it to the 
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press, recurring allegations in Jakarta’s rumour mills or among competitors, as well as suspi-
cious outcomes indicative of collusion provided sufficient proof for such endeavours of the 
business groups. There are numerous examples illustrating how capital market institutions 
were especially dominated by big business proxies. Bapepam was said to be in the hands of 
the Riadys’ conglomerate, Lippo, as were several IBRA chairs (Roland Haas, former Presi-
dent Director Lippo Investments, interview 31 August 2004). Previous IBRA Deputy Chair-
man Farid Haryanto, for instance, used to be Lippo advisor before he worked for the agency, 
and has resumed this post again after he left the office. Several Bank Indonesia officials were 
suspected by prominent observers of being on the payroll of the Riadys. These included Aulia 
Pohan, Deputy Governor, or Miranda Goeltom, Senior Deputy Governor, whose election was 
supposedly secured by bribes to members of parliament. Lippo and other conglomerates ex-
pected them to hinder unfavourable investigations and to help them retrieve their assets 
(Faisal Basri, interview 11 September 2004). Others assumed that Tomy Winata supported 
Goeltom so that she would assist him to get hold of Bank Permata, which she actually – but in 
the end unsuccessfully – did by lobbying for him at the state-owned asset management com-
pany PPA, IBRA’s successor and the overseeing agency for the sale of the bank, as its Vice 
President Director, Raden Pardede (interview 17 September 2004) confirmed.  
There were rumours that Salim was behind the ‘sudden and instantaneous selection of 
three BI Deputy governors’ that gave rise to ‘strong suspicion that the selection of the BI 
Deputy Governors was expedited to make it easier for the Salim Group to get back into BCA’ 
(Tempo 18 December 2001). One of the governors was Bun Bunan Hutapea, the husband of 
Eva Hutapea, then-President Director of Indofood, who was put in charge of the fit-and-
proper test for the BCA investors. According to Rizal Ramli (ibid.), this was an intentional 
positioning to ‘make it easier for Anthony Salim to buy back BCA’. 
This revealed that compliant, reliable people inside the institutions that presided over the 
future status of the conglomerates were still essential for the capitalists and their efforts for 
sustenance in the new regime. At the same time and increasingly so in the future, the moles 
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were and would be needed to open up new business opportunities. For this, as Faisal Basri 
(interview 11 September 2004) reported, some big tycoons tried to influence the outcome of 
elections by supporting certain candidates or installing their own men as district heads, in one 
case even a relative – nepotism in its literal sense. The latter attempt was unsuccessful, but 
this is likely to be different in the future or in other elections, thus showing that the political 
system became very manipulable and susceptible to interventions of the conglomerates. Poli-
tics and institutions, the former exclusive domains of the politico-bureaucrats, thus became a 
playground of the capitalists.  
 
The politicisation of business 
These rather indirect interferences of capital in the political system were only part of the 
whole equation. Through their new status in Indonesian society as well as the possibilities the 
post-Soeharto regime provided, the Chinese conglomerates were able to steer politics in a 
more direct way than ever before, making use of legal and extra-legal means.  
Political activism 
The new framework gave businessmen the opportunity to get actively involved in politics. 
During the Soeharto period it was expected that the Chinese restrict themselves to business 
and leave the state to the pribumi. Thus, no ethnic Chinese made it into higher military or po-
litical positions (Heryanto 1999: 327). With the exception of Soeharto’s favourite crony, Bob 
Hasan, in the former president’s last officiating cabinet (which lasted for only two months), 
there has never been a minister of Chinese descent. Only a few, selected Sino-Indonesians be-
came members of parliament after 1965, of which the Wanandi brothers and Harry Tjan Sila-
lahi – ‘conceivably be likened to the “court Jews” of an earlier era in Europe’ (Coppel 1983: 
168) – were the most eminent Chinese politicians, without ever reaching cabinet rank. With 
this effective, one-sided separation of politics and economics, the politico-bureaucrats suc-
ceeded in decreasing capital’s potential to interfere in political decision-making. 
  
178
Since 1998, things have changed. The new authorities could not uphold their arbitrary and 
instrumental use of the state apparatus and had no means to hinder the emergence of Chinese 
Indonesian politicians. Symptomatic for the changed environment was the foundation of the 
ethnic Chinese pressure group, INTI, led by businessman Eddie Lembong, that lobbied effec-
tively for the rights of the Chinese minority. It encouraged the orang Tionghoa to become po-
litically active. Human rights lawyer Frans Winarta proclaimed at one of INTI’s conferences 
that ‘Chinese Indonesians should not merely concentrate on business, but must also consider 
entering politics. By entering politics, they could gain significant bargaining power in the de-
cision making process in the country’ (Jakarta Post 29 April 2002). This was already pursued 
by some well-known Chinese with business backgrounds, who started to be involved in party 
politics, such as Alvin Lie in PAN or Murdaya Poo in PDI-P. According to James Riady 
(cited in Business Week 7 June 1999), there was ‘an increased level of awareness in the busi-
ness community of politics. We see a number of political parties that have as their official 
leaders people from the business community.’ In the provinces, as Hadiz (2004: 713-4) re-
ported, many entrepreneurs began to take advantage of the new avenues of power and ran for 
the posts of bupati.  
Property mogul Ciputra (cited in Straits Times 20 April 2000) emphasised that ‘it is a dras-
tic change from the past that we now have important figures in essential positions within the 
government’. Legally, all political posts were opened up for Indonesians of Chinese origin, 
including the presidency. While the highest office was confined to ‘asli’/original Indonesians 
(i.e. pribumi) before, the 2002 amendment of Article 6 of the 1945 Constitution stated that all 
citizens born in the country were eligible (Lindsey 2005: 58). Although this was merely a po-
litical symbol – albeit not an unimportant one – Anthony Salim, for instance, self-confidently 
proclaimed that an ethnic Chinese could indeed become president in today’s context: 
It is still some time to go [for a businessman of Chinese origin to become president], but we are 
closing the gap. We have a Chinese to sit [in government] as Coordinating Minister of Econ-
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omy. This is close to the Vice President already. Below the Vice President’s rank is the Coordi-
nating Minister. It’s one of the highest.  
(Anthony Salim, interview 13 April 2005) 
Sjahrir (interview 24 September 2004) contradicted him, maintaining that this is still not real-
istic in Indonesia: ‘Anthony Salim can become very strong, but he can never become presi-
dent.’ In fact, the label of Chinese would still be a barrier, but their material background as 
businessmen was not. 
On the contrary, among the post-Soeharto politicians to claim important offices were two 
of the most successful pribumi entrepreneurs: Jusuf Kalla, who became Vice President and 
Head of Golkar, and Aburizal Bakrie, Coordinating Minister for Economy under President 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. This revealed that an own capital base was indeed very condu-
cive to assuming decisive posts. Chinese businessmen, who do not yet have the same kind of 
political standing like Kalla and Bakrie and were thus still not very comfortable with being so 
open to the public eye, will follow this trend with a certain time lag. They are, essentially, 
only one step away from becoming politicians themselves. The case of Thailand, for instance, 
has shown how Chinese tycoons became actively involved in politics and assumed leading 
roles in parties and governments (Hewison 1989; Handley 1997). With the absence of official 
restrictions, the involvement in political affairs obviously turned out to be a possible and ef-
fective way to further business interests and underpin their claim to power. 
Premanism 
While political activism was within the legal limits and the reinvention of KKN at least inside 
the traditional, partly accepted boundaries, premanisme/gangsterism was definitely outside 
the given rules. Formerly, the government itself often made use of such extra-legal measures 
to intimidate its citizens. For example, in the beginning of the 1980s, petty criminals were 
executed or, in the last decade of Soeharto’s dictatorship, pro-democracy leaders were at-
tacked by thugs (Aditjondro 2002: 45-9). In post-Soeharto Indonesia, the weak state no longer 
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had such capabilities anymore and gave capital the opportunity to subdue and replace it where 
it could not exert its influence. 
One basic condition was the incapability, ignorance, or goodwill of state institutions. As 
shown before, through bribes, patronage, or infiltration, the conglomerates succeeded in in-
fluencing the judicative, legislative, and executive massively. Without the backing of an inde-
pendently functioning legal system, opponents of the capitalists had problems in bringing 
cases to the court, pushing through their views, or defending themselves. The conglomerates 
relied on corrupt judges (see Indonesia Corruption Watch 2004), as one example clearly illus-
trated: Through judgements that appeared to be bought, the courts turned the anti-monopoly 
commission KPPU into a paper tiger by regularly ruling in favour of business interests, as it 
happened in the case of Indomobil. Despite evidence that the process of bidding for Salim‘s 
former car manufacturer was massively manipulated by collusion between the bidders to keep 
the price low and enable Salim to recoup his company (Faisal Basri, Commissioner KPPU, 
interview 11 September 2004), the ruling of the anti-monopoly commission was rejected first 
by district courts and finally by the Supreme Court. The latter stated as justification for its de-
cision that the KPPU, not being a legal body, had presumptuously used the words ‘for the 
sake of justice, based on the belief in one Supreme God’ in its decree (Jakarta Post 17 Januar 
2003). Such miscarriage of the courts was due either to ‘gross incompetence or because of 
tremendous financial lobbying by the business parties’ as Jakarta Post (30 July 2002) sug-
gested. Both possibilities were not meant to inspire confidence in the legal system, which 
was, apparently, under the control of big business.  
The absence of rule of law has, in many cases, helped the conglomerates to flourish again. 
Most significant is the alleged success of Tomy Winata in the illegal sectors of prostitution, 
gambling, and drugs. According to his critics, he had dominated organised crime in such a 
way that it became the basis of his growth into one of Indonesia’s most eminent businessmen. 
He himself, of course, denied these allegations: ‘If I have a casino, you can take it for free. 
[…] Whatever we do, we follow legal procedures’ (cited in Borsuk 2003). However, the point 
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is that, with or against the law, capitalists were free to do whatever they wanted to do in post-
Soeharto Indonesia.  
Not surprisingly, Tomy Winata was purportedly closely linked to groups such as Pemuda 
Pancasila, ‘Indonesia’s largest organisation of political thugs’ (Aditjondro 2002: 37-8), and 
Pemuda Panca Marga. Through these connections, he had his own vigilante groups at his 
command. One interviewee told me that banks sold their open loans to Winata’s Bank Artha 
Graha, as only BAG had the means to make defaulting debtors pay. Mobs were also hired in 
the provinces to terrify the local politicians to subordinate them to private interests (Lindsey 
2001). Indeed, the influence of the tycoons was even greater far away from Jakarta. For in-
stance, Winata was given the relatively exclusive opportunity to do business in regions such 
as Aceh or West Papua, for which he was admired as a ‘real nationalist’ by the President 
Commissioner of BCA, Eugene Galbraith (interview 8 September 2004). The husband of 
former President Megawati, Taufik Kiemas, as well eulogised that ‘the country needs more 
“crazy men” like Winata willing to invest in Indonesia’s remote provinces’ (cited in Borsuk 
2003), concealing that only the latter could go into conflict areas because of his close ties with 
the military. Therefore, other observers disclosed a different motivation for these engage-
ments, reporting that Artha Graha, in tandem with the army, grabbed most of the funds meant 
to rebuild the regions destroyed by the tsunami, drafted blueprints for the development of 
Meulaboh/Aceh even before the government, and terrorised the local population to relocate 
(e.g. Tempo 8 February 2005; Kompas 28 January 2005; confidential interview with an Aceh 
volunteer, December 2005). The ‘prominence of money and intimidation in Indonesia’s more 
decentralized and democratic politics’ (Hadiz 2004: 714) was a major indication for the way 
some of the conglomerates wielded their power after the crisis. 
These new possibilities revealed that collusion with existing officeholders was probably 
only the second best option for the capitalists. A more ideal proposition was to fill the power 
vacuum themselves, including through premanism. Especially where an alternative hierarchy 
of authority was yet to be established, the conglomerates filled the gaps with extra-legal ac-
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tivities. On both fronts, from the inside and outside of the system, capital was actively claim-
ing its rightful place at the apex of power in a state whose personnel was partially paralysed. 
 
6.3 Formats of representation: 
The rise of an autonomous capitalist class 
With the end of the New Order the configuration of power was reorganised. This continues to 
be an ongoing process. Even one decade after the crisis, the post-Soeharto regime was still in 
the process of being re-moulded. James Riady (interview in Business Week 7 June 1999) 
commented: ‘The new political system and the new order of politics would start to be formed. 
The old political system is not completely gone, but the new system is not formed’. Tomy 
Winata similarly stressed that Indonesia’s democracy is still in its embryonic stage:  
Democracy in Indonesia has to be done step by step. At this time it has been progressing too 
fast, as the country itself is still underdeveloped. More than 50 per cent of the citizens are still 
underpaid, uneducated and unemployed. You can compare Indonesia only with Europe and the 
US 100 years ago. 
(Tomy Winata, interview 27 September 2004) 
The same controversial tycoon, who has yet to prove his democratic credentials, maintained 
that, ‘as an Indonesian, it is part of my responsibility to help the country to democratise. […] 
We [Bank Artha Graha] are built to become the main engine of democracy in Indonesia.’ 
(ibid.). Many observers, understandably, did not accept these statements at face value. How-
ever, I suggest that the capitalists’ stance on democracy should indeed be taken seriously. It 
indicates their confidence in being able to shape the new regime to align with their interests. 
I will demonstrate how they started to achieve dominance in some spheres. The corporate 
moguls were in the process of replacing the politico-bureaucratic elite as the dominant frac-
tion of the ‘ruling class’, as the observed political business patterns illustrated. They alluded 
to three major trends: A detachment from their former patrons, the reversal of dependencies, 
and a more direct access to power. While capital only wielded indirect authority during the 
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New Order, mediated and limited by the politico-bureaucrats (see Chapter 3), the new regime 
provided the tycoons with an autonomous, dominant, and immediate stance towards the state. 
I will show that we can observe a plutocracy in the making, in which Chinese big business 
has found a favourable context within which it ‘ensures, by numerous different means, that 
the reproduction of its positions is represented’ (Therborn 1978: 203).  
 
Autonomy 
During the Soeharto regime, the capitalists were effectively dominated by their senior part-
ners in the bureaucracy who held quasi absolutist power through the appropriation of the state 
apparatus. The socially marginalised tycoons were limited to an economic role. However, 
both parties involved fared very well with this type of accommodation, as I demonstrated in 
Chapter 3.  
Nevertheless, since the 1970s, businessmen have tried to make use of their economic liber-
ties, not only to maximise profits, but also to safeguard their precarious societal position. The 
politico-bureaucrats widely tolerated their endeavours as they themselves partook in the prof-
its, but they had the means to deterring excessive capital accumulation that would have de-
creased the tycoon’s dependency on them. Through the stigmatisation of the conglomerates as 
‘Chinese’ and thus non-Indonesian, Chinese big business’ economic success was defined as 
undeserving and unfair to the ‘indigenous’ population. With such discourse, the politico-
bureaucrats set the capitalists’ thumbscrews that they tightened at times to keep them at bay.  
The pursuit of anchoring Chinese capital globally – particularly in China – was an espe-
cially delicate undertaking that could be politicised and used against them. Hence, whenever 
the authorities deemed it necessary, they publicly questioned the loyalty of the entrepreneurs, 
as, in the case of Anthony Salim in 1994, when he stated that more than 30 per cent of his 
group’s operations were overseas. Politicians accused him of capital flight and regarded over-
seas activities as proof for his lack of patriotism. The tycoon tried to assure the public that 
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these were merely rational business decisions meant to enhance the Salim Group ‘while still 
keeping 70 per cent of its assets in Indonesia’ (cited in Solomon 2000), concealing the benefi-
cial side effect of securing the group’s existence in times of political turmoil or transition. In 
fact, the expansion beyond Indonesia was one of the factors that helped Salim to survive the 
economic and political collapse in 1998, although, during the crisis, it became even more in-
convenient for the capitalists to be questioned about their offshore assets, because they had to 
pay back their obligations to the state. After the debts were settled, however, it was very re-
vealing that, for instance, Anthony Salim (interview 13 April 2005) did not have any prob-
lems to admit that the ratio of his operations overseas has risen to 50 per cent, denying that 
this issue was still a sensitive one. He even proclaimed that the main reason to still invest do-
mestically was ‘not because our attention is fifty-fifty, but because Indonesia is cheaper. You 
buy with the same dollar, but we are able to get more things here’ (ibid.). The attitude that the 
Salim boss displayed in his comments symbolised the economic self-confidence the entrepre-
neurs gained and highlighted their new autonomy in relation to the politico-bureaucrats.  
This exuberance became possible through the new liberalised framework. Democratisa-
tion, decentralisation, and deregulation did not turn out to be detrimental for big business, but 
enabled the conglomerates to emancipate themselves from the authority of the state managers. 
Their social, political, and economic limits vanished, allowing them to seek their own, inde-
pendent bases of power in the domestic and international markets. On the one hand, this made 
them rather unassailable. While their global investments were generally out of reach for the 
Indonesian state and thus secure from confiscation, domestic capital was safeguarded against 
expropriation through the stock market. On the other hand, the unrestricted devotion to mar-
kets multiplied the prospects for huge returns and increased the tycoon’s capital even more. 
Therefore, these independent fields of capital accumulation were not just symptoms of the 
new environment but they were the very material basis of their increased economic auton-
omy. The times were over in which the Chinese tycoons could still be contained, as they be-
came ‘ordinary’ capitalists who generated power out of the neo-liberal markets and did not 
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have to rely on the politico-bureaucracy and a state-controlled economy. Thus, the most sig-




Through the reforms the politico-bureaucrats lost their firm hold on some of the levers of 
power. This enabled the Chinese conglomerates to liberate themselves from the Babylonian 
Captivity of the political powerholders. While politicians were previously the decisive force 
that treated Chinese business ‘like concubines – to be enjoyed but not recognized’ (J. Wan-
andi 1998), the capitalists in post-Soeharto Indonesia turned the tables. 
The authorities no longer had the means anymore to secure the proximity of their former 
protégés. According to one of my respondents (interview September 2005), Megawati’s hus-
band Taufik Kiemas, for instance, was upset that Tomy Winata did not contribute enough to 
his wife’s campaign. He thus ordered the police to attack some gambling dens of Winata. The 
Artha Graha boss, however, could easily ignore such idle threats. Megawati’s presidency 
came to an end shortly after this, while Tomy Winata’s power continued to grow.  
The changing role allocation inside the collusive relationships could best be illustrated by 
the modifications to the old networks of patronage. During the New Order period, Chinese 
big business could not exist without sufficient political protection. After the crisis, conversely, 
politicians were not able to survive without adequate funding. The shift of power was slowly 
taking place. As former Minister of Finance Bambang Subiyanto (interview 16 September 
2004) maintained, politicians were still the ones who forced the conglomerates to donate. 
Some tycoons whom he knew left Indonesia for a while before the presidential elections, es-
caping from the pressure to make campaign donations. James Riady rejected such claims:  
I get the sense that there has not been a lot of fund-raising targeted at the business community, 
for the simple reason that the economic crisis has paralyzed and crippled a lot of business 
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groups. And I think there is also a general reluctance by the business community to give when 
they can ill afford to, when they can just barely meet the daily need of payrolls and paying sup-
pliers.  
(James Riady, interview in Business Week 7 June 1999) 
Tomy Winata agreed with him, firmly contesting Subiyanto’s assertion. He stated that  
Politicians don’t go around, ask for money and use the businessmen. It is the politicians them-
selves who get misused, not the other way round. Business groups approach politicians and not 
vice versa. 
(Tomy Winata, interview 17 September 2004) 
While Riady’s statement in 1999 of businessmen’s ‘general reluctance’ to be the cash cows of 
the politicians was already remarkable – and unimaginable only two years before – Winata’s 
allegation demonstrated that the capitalists had already taken the initiative. Moreover, the lat-
ter emphasised his patronising role towards the political sphere, applying the same concept of 
organic statism that the New Order used to legitimise its own existence and authoritarianism 
(see Hadiz 2001b: 273), except that the former protégées now emerged as the new godfathers:  
The new democracy needs businessmen like me. I see the country as a big family. Politics in In-
donesia at the moment are out of control, as much as the politicians that went wild, comparable 
with children that suddenly reach puberty and just go wild. I look at them like kids with myself 
taking over the role as a father who has to take care that the children grow and things don’t get 
too wild.  
(Tomy Winata, interview 17 September 2004) 
The hierarchy of government–business relations was massively. In an economically sound 
and socially safe environment, the capitalists not only detached themselves politically from 
the bureaucrats and politicians, but also began to dominate them and turned them into their 
clients, thereby creating new dependencies that helped the tycoons to determine the outcomes 





During the New Order, the Chinese entrepreneurs undoubtedly exerted influence, but only via 
the politico-bureaucrats. As capitalists, they had structural power, but as members of a mar-
ginalised ethnic group, they were ultimately dependent on the state apparatus, which was 
completely appropriated by the political elite. The power that the corporate elite wielded dur-
ing that period was, at best, indirect. With the end of the old regime, the formerly crucial me-
diators and their gate-keeping institutions vanished or became less necessary for the tycoons, 
who, additionally, reconciled their social stigma, so that more immediate modes of represen-
tation became feasible. The patterns in Chapter 6.2 revealed this new situation of business, in 
which the corporate moguls could henceforth beget political power through the bureaucrats, 
inside the institutions, and instead of the state apparatus.  
The first means of securing capital’s positions was rather traditional through the given 
state apparatus and the politico-bureaucrats therein. The new institutions and selection proce-
dures for the state’s personnel were very money-intensive and enabled the capitalists to be-
come sponsors, thus being indispensable for the parties and politicians of parliamentarianism. 
However, it was not a mere continuation of the New Order coalitions between the political 
and economic elites. The hierarchy had been reversed, with the ability of capital to dominate 
the bureaucrats and take advantage of them as their proxies inside the institutions. Through 
money politics and the restoration of KKN, Chinese big business thus exercised effective con-
trol over the state.  
 Second, the social de-marginalisation of the capitalists gave capital the opportunity to re-
present itself inside the reformed political system. Ethnic Chinese as well as other business-
men were no longer rarities in the political landscape of post-Soeharto Indonesia, in local in-
stitutions up to the national government. Indeed, recognised as an indigenous ethnic commu-
nity, the Sino-Indonesians, who were approximately 3 per cent of the whole population, con-
stituted an own pressure group and an important electorate that could no longer be easily 
overruled. In the near future, a bourgeois party that exclusively embodies capital’s interests 
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might as well be possible, replacing, supplementing, or taking over actual parties. With the 
existing groups’ clumsy efforts to be attractive to the broad masses, the distinctions in pro-
grammes and aims between the major political parties had evaporated, thus they became po-
tential vehicles for well-heeled business interests to hijack. Alternatively, entrepreneurs could 
opt to establish their own parties, as the Sino-Thai tycoon and former Prime Minister Thaksin 
did before in Thailand.  
The third way to exercise power became possible through the weak state that allowed capi-
tal to replace it. The Tempo case illustrated this very well. The mob that ransacked the maga-
zine’s headquarters, the police that interrogated the attacked instead of the attackers, as well 
as the courts that acted on behalf of Tomy Winata appeared to be on the payroll of this par-
ticular businessman. An analyst of the Washington Post (29 August 2004) said that ‘what sets 
Tempo’s case apart is that the state took up a criminal prosecution on behalf of a private citi-
zen’. It proved that capital had the potential to appropriate executive and legislative powers 
and could thus steer the state. Moreover, where the state apparatus was not yet entirely estab-
lished, the capitalists were able to fill those gaps of power. Premanism was the most spectacu-
lar option, where certain capitalists took the law in their own hands. With thugs, whom they 
employed as their private mercenaries, they infringed upon the state’s monopoly of coercive 
force.  
Capital in Indonesia, therefore, was given a more immediate access to state resources. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese capitalists were still far from being a ruling class in the traditional 
sense. However, considering their ostracised status until 1998 as well as their impending 
bankruptcies in and after the crisis, it was rather remarkable that they became widely autono-
mous and independent from the politico-bureaucrats in a matter of only a few years after the 
end of the New Order. Hence, it is merely a question of time for a more plutocratic regime to 




6.4 Plutocracy in the making 
The aim of this chapter was to disclose the characteristics of the new form of accommodation 
between the state and capital that had been on its way after the politico-bureaucrats as the 
predominant part of the New Order ruling class abdicated. The alterations in the power con-
figurations of post-Soeharto Indonesia were an immediate consequence of the regime change. 
For the conglomerates, democracy, decentralisation, and deregulation brought about social 
de-marginalisation, political appreciation, and economic recovery. These were the precondi-
tions for an overall emancipation of capital. 
The observed modes in the initial phases of transition provided empirical references for 
this claim. The patterns of political business, such as money politics, patronage, and infiltra-
tion, signified a different application of these practices, with a role-reversal between business 
and politico-bureaucracy. Moreover, the politicisation of business enabled the capitalists to be 
politically active – inside and outside the given laws. These new arrangements that were 
hardly feasible before disclosed an extension of capital’s possibilities to exercise power. 
The events and processes reported here elucidate an advantageous modification to state–
business relations in favour of the capitalists. They ceased being pariah entrepreneurs with, at 
most, only indirect ways to determine the outcome of politics. The new foundations of capi-
talist rule were autonomous and even dominant positions of business vis-à-vis the state man-
agers. They were adequately and immediately represented in the new regime. Therefore, there 
was no longer a need for the capitalists to fear democracy, because it facilitated their emer-
gence, ensured their influence, and secured the legitimisation of their rule. The post-Soeharto 
regime thus provided an ideal shell for capital to work slowly but steadily on a plutocratic or-




Any particular organization of capitalist wealth 
[…] can be challenged, even wrecked, but the capi-
talists involved can simply restructure their wealth, 
restore their profits in another form, and resume 
their destructive activities.  
(Wood 2003: 13) 
7 
CONCLUSION: 
THE STATE OF CAPITAL 
Democracy, literally, means the rule of the people. In theory, it connotes a system of govern-
ance in which ‘the lawful rule of the many in the true interests of the whole community’ is 
most efficiently realised (Corcoran 1983: 13), therefore constituting the antonym of oligarchy, 
the rule of a few. It is an idea that often inspires optimistic expectations about the conse-
quences of regime change once authoritarianism meets its demise.45 In Indonesia, the advent 
of the new reformasi regime raised hopes about the termination of the oligarchic power struc-
tures that had underpinned the authoritarian New Order. There were anticipations that free 
markets would reinforce democracy and vice versa.  
However, democracy can be manifested in many forms. The case of Indonesia illustrates 
that there is no predestined correlation between liberal markets and liberal societies as envi-
sioned by many neo-liberal theorists of social change (e.g. Sen 1999). It also challenges the 
contrasting hypothesis that democracy and free markets in combination fundamentally endan-
ger the Chinese capitalists (A. Chua 2003b). On the contrary, I demonstrated that, even 
though reformasi in Indonesia entailed a regime that formally adhered to the principles of 
democratisation, decentralisation, and deregulation, important elements of the old oligarchy 
have prevailed and took part in the constitution of an institutional framework that would safe-
guard their interests quite well. This has important consequences for understandings of possi-
ble changes in state–business relationships in post-authoritarian situations. 
                                                     
 
45
 For instance, Magnis-Suseno (1999: 228) enthusiastically proclaimed right after the crisis: ‘There is 
now a real chance, our real chance, to realise the central ideal of our founding fathers: to realise the 
sovereignty of the people!’ 
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The main objective of this research was to assess the current situation of Chinese capital in 
post-Soeharto Indonesia and explore how the regime change in 1998 affected the conglomer-
ates as one of the main pillars of the New Order oligarchy. The financial crisis in 1997 termi-
nated the Soeharto regime, and with it the features considered to be essential for the success 
of Chinese capital. Therefore, reforms were advanced that were thought to be prohibitive of 
the re-emergence of the old big business groups. Actual developments, however, have been 
rather different. The unravelling of the New Order did not entail the collapse of the oligarchy, 
but it did facilitate a change that saw a rearrangement of the respective positions of state man-
agers and capitalists. As I pointed out, democracy provided even better conditions for capital 
in Indonesia than the former authoritarianism. Reformasi thus endowed the Chinese tycoons 
with a very conducive political shell that first resulted in their liberation from some of the 
limitations imposed by politico-bureaucrats and, in the long run, is likely to lead to a more 
plutocratic form of capitalism with a relatively autonomous Chinese business class that is able 
to increasingly exert direct power on the state and its officials. By pointing out the emergence 
and growth of Chinese capitalists, their survival and successful reorganisation despite the 
breakdown of the political regime, and the advantageous reconfiguration of power relations, 
this study has highlighted the major indicators of this trend. 
To understand these developments, it was necessary to first focus on the ethnicity of the 
capitalists. Private capital in Indonesia is largely Chinese. Indeed, 26 of the top 30 groups be-
fore the 1997/1998 crisis were owned by Sino-Indonesians. This was no coincidence, but to 
look solely at cultural explanations to account for the economic predominance of Chinese 
capitalists is hardly helpful. However, we still have to take the constructed and instrumental-
ised – albeit not primordial – character of ethnicity into consideration, which was for the most 
part determined by state policies. In New Order Indonesia, the capitalists were restricted and 
did not comprise the dominant element of the ‘ruling class’. More central throughout the New 
Order have been the politico-bureaucrats – many of whom also transformed themselves into 
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capitalists – who held nearly absolute state power and were able to subordinate even the large 
Chinese corporations to their broader interests. 
Politico-bureaucratic elements, in other words, dominated the oligarchic capitalism that 
was predicated upon the specific role of Chinese businessmen, which had its antecedents in 
economic and social structures of colonialism. Their intermediate position between rulers and 
ruled already existed in pre-colonial times, but it was the Dutch that economically functional-
ised and ethnically segregated the Chinese minority as non-indigenous middlemen, more in-
tensively from 1800 onwards. This later led to their exclusion from the nation-building proc-
ess and the corroboration of their status as necessary, but disliked outsiders. Throughout In-
donesian history, the Chinese contributed significantly to the economy and even became an 
indispensable part of it, but their political weakness remained and was further aggravated. As 
economically strong but politically limited capitalists they could fulfil crucial functions that 
were useful for all regimes, enabling the state officials to prevent the emergence of a poten-
tially too powerful indigenous business class and effectively distance money from power, 
which is usually more closely interrelated.  
The New Order took over and even expanded these colonial policies, reinforcing the Chi-
nese status as pariahs through policies aimed at the marginalisation, discrimination, and stig-
matisation of the Chinese minority. Chinese capitalists – some of whom the new powerhold-
ers already had long lasting business contacts with – were subject to the same limitations. 
They were ultimately subordinate to and dependent on the political elite, regularly harassed 
by populist rhetoric and measures, and subject to extortion. In this way they constituted per-
fect clients for bureaucratic patrons. Of course, they as well benefited tremendously from 
these arrangements, which provided them with endless opportunities to economically exploit. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the previously loose alliance was consolidated in the form of an oli-
garchy underpinned by politico-bureaucratic authority. Among the main beneficiaries of these 
arrangements were also the state elites themselves, who succeeded in filling the vacant posi-
tion of indigenous capitalists. Besides the facilities and opportunities provided by the state – 
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which they completely controlled – they relied on the money and business knowledge of their 
Chinese partners. The two decades from 1980 onwards witnessed a further expansion of a 
capitalism that was still dominated by the bureaucrats, but in which the business element be-
came more prominent, as expansion took place in domestic as well as regional markets. Se-
lective deregulation policies enabled predatory raids on the economy – especially the opening 
of the financial sector – thus equipping the conglomerates with a massive capital base through 
which they could develop a stronger bargaining position in relation to the politico-
bureaucrats. However, until the financial crisis in 1997, the basic hierarchy of governing state 
bureaucratic and business relations was still maintained, even as the conglomerates began to 
internationalise. 
The breakdown of the New Order regime in 1998, finally, provided a breakthrough for the 
emergence of a more plutocratic form of capitalism. In my study, I focussed on three consecu-
tive processes to illustrate the transformation of state–business relations: first, on the financial 
crisis at the end of the old regime; second, on the survival of the conglomerates in a new re-
gime, revealing the continuity of the structural underpinnings of the system; and third, on the 
vibrant development and reorganisation of big business groups in post-Soeharto Indonesia.  
The success story was at first situated in a most dire setting. Indonesia was devastated by 
the financial crisis. The conglomerates were hurt tremendously, especially Soeharto’s clan 
and major cronies. More pertinently, with the collapse of the New Order, the old accommoda-
tion between the capitalists and the political powerholders was not feasible in the fashion in 
which it had existed for decades. The Chinese conglomerates had to face the unknown terrain 
of reformasi that required endurance and new strategies in a hostile political setting. In par-
ticular, the end of authoritarianism dispersed power and obliterated the formerly state guaran-
teed protection the conglomerates had enjoyed. Anti-Chinese populism, mirrored by general 
resentments against big business, became a new threat. As this antipathy could be channelled 
through parliamentary democracy, the latter too was perceived as potentially dangerous by 
many businessmen. Civil society, including many NGOs and the free press with new facilities 
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to control and impede the conglomerates and their collusive activities, made it difficult for the 
capitalists to maintain their close links to government officials. The end of centralism further 
eradicated the easy, straightforward process of corruption and replaced it with more complex 
procedures of doing business. Economic reforms, geared to curb KKN and rid Indonesia of 
monopolies, threatened the conglomerates to the very core. The unravelling of the New Order 
thus marked a point of no return for Chinese capital insofar as the old practices were con-
cerned. Many business groups were indeed close to collapsing. The crisis was therefore a se-
rious test of their survival and adaptation abilities.  
Most conglomerates passed this test. In fact, their reactions to the crisis showed their ma-
turity as capitalists. Contrary to how the situation may have looked at first glance, a closer 
analysis of the immediate post-crisis period revealed that they were given the leeway to re-
constitute themselves from a rather advantageous position, being able to count on their eco-
nomic indispensability as well as on certain prevailing structural continuities. The focus of 
post-Soeharto governments and their international creditors was on a quick revival of the 
economy, not on a thorough restructuring. Therefore, due to a lack of alternatives, Chinese 
capital was needed to prop up the ailing economy. Most changes they had to bear were, as it 
turned out, not at all prohibitive for them, because the reforms only affected the legal and po-
litical superstructure of the system. These were problems they could deal with, allowing them 
to adapt and even influence the scope and outcomes of reformasi. In all three battlefields in 
which the struggle for the new regime was fought out, they proved to be enormously resilient: 
Democratisation, for instance, facilitated a relative de-marginalisation of Chineseness, which 
gradually removed the capitalists’ ethnic limitations. This observation alone is important in 
terms of understanding the possible changing social position of economically dominant ethnic 
minorities. A more open society, in the long run, provides more opportunities for Chinese 
businessmen to participate in politics or the civil sphere, as shown in the case of Alvin Lie, 
for example, but also a number of other Chinese politicians – albeit still quite limited. On the 
institutional side, the money politics dominated system of electoralism increased the impor-
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tance of wide-ranging alliances between business and capital, even at the local level. Decen-
tralisation may have cut off the links to the formerly important gate-keeping institutions in 
Jakarta, but liberated the capitalists from the major politico-bureaucrats that used to preside 
over them. Moreover, regional autonomy gave the conglomerates many new opportunities in 
the provinces and regions. Economic reforms induced freer markets that were – despite the 
loss of many privileges – particularly beneficial for already established capitalists, who man-
aged to quickly gain new market shares. As the two case studies of Lippo and Salim illus-
trated, there were many possibilities for the capitalists to carry on and reorganise. On the one 
hand, they could still count on the remnants of the former regime that continued to occupy 
important offices and oversaw the debt settlements and the restructuring of businesses. On the 
other hand, they had already internationalised their interests to a sufficient degree so that a na-
tional crisis would not result in their complete annihilation. On the contrary, the political and 
economic regimes forged after reformasi gave them the chance to rebound in conditions that 
were less antagonistic for them than initially feared. This environment allowed them to recon-
stitute as part of the overall process of resuscitating the Indonesian economy. 
Post-authoritarian Indonesia did not only guarantee the survival of the Chinese capitalists; 
it further allowed them to elevate their position vis-à-vis the politico-bureaucrats significantly. 
They established new modes of political business that tied in with traditional patterns, but in-
dicated a considerable difference from the New Order relations of power. First, there was the 
restoration of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. These practices reappeared but adhered to 
the modified hierarchy between business and government. The proliferation of money poli-
tics, new configurations of patronage, as well as an instrumental grip on institutions that were 
infiltrated with willing helpers and loyal representatives of big businesses signified a new de-
pendence of politicians on owners of capital. Further, some capitalists became politically ac-
tive themselves, either inside the formal political framework as politicians in parties or as 
leaders of pressure groups, or outside the law as preman (gangsters) or their initiators who 
were immune from prosecution, monopolising activities out of reach for the state. The cases 
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in which struggles between civil society and corporate interests were overtly carried out, 
demonstrated not only the weakness of the state, but also its crude appropriation on behalf of 
particular capitalist interests. 
Ultimately, there was no mere return to old modes of patronage politics. Instead, three ma-
jor modifications characterised the post-New Order political economy: (1) greater autonomy 
of the Chinese capitalists from the state apparatus, (2) their new-found dominance over old 
politico-bureaucratic partners, and (3) their more direct access to political power. The 
changed political environment thus strengthened capital enormously vis-à-vis the state. The 
corporate elites could still refer to old methods that they used successfully under the bureau-
cratic capitalism of the New Order, but they were more than ready to face free markets and 
democracy, as their rapid adjustment to conditions imposed by reformasi showed. Therefore, 
Indonesia can be seen as moving towards a plutocratic form of capitalism in which the Chi-
nese tycoons as capitalists-proper have gained leverage – other than their pribumi counter-
parts that had less to benefit from a weaker state. The new regime has thus turned out to be at 
least as favourable for Chinese big business as the protectionism of the New Order. 
By observing, interpreting, and presenting data on the development of capital in this cru-
cial historical intersection from boom to crisis to recovery, this study has demonstrated that 
there is not necessarily a conjuncture between regime changes and a disruption of the under-
lying structures that underpinned the preceding political system. Instead, I have shown that, 
particularly, the capitalists have remained resilient, making use of their economic power to re-
fashion state–business relations in ways that reflected their importance. Further studies on In-
donesia as well as on democratic transitions in general should take these significant modifica-
tions to the prevailing power relations into consideration.  
Will the capitalists be able to maintain the momentum towards their emancipation? The 
requirements of the Indonesian economy, and the way in which it is linked to the global capi-
talist economy, guarantee a conducive environment for big business. A backlash against capi-
tal is hardly possible due to structural constraints of the capitalist system and will not be tol-
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erated by the international community with its manifest interests in a stable business envi-
ronment in Indonesia. Thus, in spite of continuing pressures to regulate business activities 
based on predatory alliances with state officials, a return to the New Order regime will be ob-
viated. Even in the unlikely event of a re-establishment of military-dominated rule, it will not 
be possible to downgrade the position of the conglomerates significantly. However, the 
metamorphosis of capital, and its dominant Chinese element, into an assertive social force is 
not all that extraordinary in the context of broader global historical processes. Whatever the 
future brings, Chinese big business is currently in a quite comfortable position in the twilight 
zone between the dusk of the New Order and the dawn of more thorough reformasi. The state 
of capital in post-Soeharto Indonesia thus indicates that the Indonesian state will become, in-
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Table 1: The 30 largest conglomerates in Indonesia before the crisis (1996) 
Source: Warta Ekonomi 24 November 1997: 32; Data Consult 1998: 44-6; Sato 2004: 25. 
 Conglomerate Main owner Chinese name Estab-lished in 
Annual sales  
(tril. Rp / bil. US$) 
1 Salim Soedono Salim Liem Sioe Liong 1969 53.12 / 22.3 
2 Astra International P. Sampoerna/Prajogo Pangestu/Bob Hasan 
Liem T.P./Phang 
D.P./The K.S. 1969 20.20 / 8.5 
3 Sinar Mas Eka Tjipta Widjaja Oey Ek Tjhong 1970 20.19 / 8.5 
4 Gudang Garam Rachman Halim Tjoa To Hing 1958 9.44 / 3.9 
5 Lippo Mochtar Riady Lie Mo Tie 1976 9.03 / 3.8 
6 Bimantara Bambang Trihatmodjo — 1981 4.29 / 1.8 
7 Gajah Tunggal Sjamsul Nursalim Lim Tek Siong 1970 4.20 / 1.8 
8 Ongko Kaharuddin Ongko Ong Ka Hwa 1971 4.18 / 1.8 
9 Djarum Robert Budi Hartono Oei Hwie Tjhong 1951 4.03 / 1.7 
10 Rodamas Tan Siong Kie Tan Siong Kie 1967 3.97 / 1.7 
11 Nusamba Bob Hasan The Kian Seng 1981 3.89 / 1.6 
12 Kalbe Franciscus Bing Aryanto Khouw Lip Bing 1966 3.66 / 1.6 
13 Dharmala Soehargo Gondokusumo Go Ka Him 1970 3.43 / 1.4 
14 Argo Manunggal The Ning King The Nin King 1961 3.36 / 1.4 
15 Barito Pacific Prajogo Pangestu Phang Djoen Poen 1975 2.87 / 1.2 
16 Maspion Alim Husein Lim Wen Kwang 1971 2.46 / 1.0 
17 Bakrie Aburizal Bakrie — 1942 2.45 / 1.0 
18 Humpuss Hutomo Mandala Putra — 1984 2.32 / 1.0 
19 Danamon Usman Admadjaya Njauw Jauw Woe 1976 2.32 / 1.0 
20 Cipta Cakra Murdaya Murdaya Poo Poo Tjie Gwan 1970 2.25 / 1.0 
21 Panin Mu’min Ali Gunawan Lie Mo Ming 1968 2.24 / 0.9 
22 Jan Darmadi Jan Darmadi Fuk Jo Jan 1968 2.23 / 0.9 
23 Pembangunan Jaya Jakarta Govt,  Ciputra 
— 
Tjie Tjien Hoan 1961 2.12 / 0.9 
24 Sampoerna Putera Sampoerna Liem Tien Pao 1913 2.09 / 0.9 
25 Raja Garuda Mas Sukanto Tanoto Tan Kang Ho 1973 1.97 / 0.8 
26 Texmaco Marimutu Sinivasan — 1970 1.78 / 0.8 
27 Metropolitan Ciputra,  Budi Brasali 
Tjie Tjin Hoan,  
Lie Toan Hong 1962 1.71 / 0.7 
28 Matahari Mochtar Riady Lee Mo Tie 1972 1.69 / 0.7 
29 Ometraco Ferry Teguh Santosa Kang Som Tjhiang 1971 1.64 / 0.7 
30 Gemala Sofjan Wanandi Liem Bian Khoen 1973 1.63 / 0.7 
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ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY 
AJI: Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (Alliance of Independent Journalists) 
APINDO: Asosiasi Pengusaha Indonesia (Indonesian Employers Association) 
APP: Asia Pulp & Paper  
AYDA: Aset yang diambil ahli (foreclosed assets) 
BAG: Bank Artha Graha 
Bank Indonesia: The central bank of Indonesia 
Bapepam: Capital Market Supervisory Board 
Bappenas: National Development Planning Agency 
BCA: Bank Central Asia 
BDNI: Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia  
BEJ: Bursa Efek Jakarta (Jakarta Stock Exchange) 
BII: Bank Internasional Indonesia 
BKMC: Badan Koordinasi Masalah Cina (Coordinating Body for the Chinese Problem)  
BLBI: Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia (Bank Indonesia Liquidity Support) 
BPPN: Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional (see IBRA) 
Bulog: Badan Urusan Logistik Nasional (National Logistics Board) 
Bupati: District head 
CAR: Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Cendana: Soeharto family business groups 
CIDES: Centre for Information and Development Studies  
Cukong: Master, boss (Chinese business partners of political elite; hokkien) 
CSIS: Centre for Strategic and International Studies 
DOT: Daftar orang tercela (list of banned people) 
DPR: national parliament 
Golkar: Golongan Karya (functional groups); the state party under the New Order 
IBRA: The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency 
ICW: Indonesia Corruption Watch 
INDRA: Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency 
INTI: Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa (The Chinese Indonesian Association) 
Kabupaten: District parliament 
KADIN: Kamar Dagang dan Industri (Chamber of Commerce and Industry) 
KKN: Korrupsi, kolusi dan nepotisme (corruption, collusion, and nepotism) 
KKSK: Komite Kebijakan Sektor Keuangan (Financial Sector Policy Committee) 
KPPU: Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (Commission for the Supervision of Business 
Competition) 
LIPI: Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (The Indonesian Institute of Sciences) 
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LPEM-FEUI: Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat, Fakultas Ekonomi Univer-
sitas Indonesia (Institute for Economic and Social Research, Faculty of Economics Univer-
sity of Indonesia) 
LPKB: Lambaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa (Institute for the Promotion of National Unity) 
LSSI: Lembaga Studi Sejarah Indonesia 
Malari: Malapetaka 15 Januari; the anti-government and anti-Chinese riots in January 1974) 
Masyumi: Majehlis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Muslims in Indone-
sia) 
MPR: Majelis Permusyawaratan Pakyat; the convention which, until 2004, elected the presi-
dent 
NPL: Non-performing loans  
Orang Cina: Derogatory label for Chinese Indonesians 
Orang Tionghoa: Chinese Indonesians 
PAN: Partai Alamat Nasional (National Mandate Party)  
Pancasila: The state ideology 
Partai PIB: Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru (New Indonesia Alliance Party) 
PDI-P: Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (Indonesian Democratic Party) 
Pertamina: The national oil company 
PP10: Peraturan Presiden No. 10; presidential decree by Soekarno (1959) that forbade foreign 
businesses outside the cities  
PPA: Perusahaan Pengelola Aset (State-owned Asset Management Company) 
Preman: Gangster 
Pribumi: ‘Indigenous’ Indonesians 
Sekneg: State Secretariat 
UNSFIR: United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery 
Yayasan: Charitable foundations used for political funding and rent extraction 
 
